Procedure and House Affairs Committee on April 25th, 2023

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

Thank you.

Ms. Sahota.

[Ruby Sahota, Liberal, Brampton North, ON]

Thank you, Madam Chair.

Through you to the witnesses, thank you. I think that was a very valuable exchange that we just had. We're really trying to figure out where the gaps are and how we can improve them through legislation. That's what we've been hearing through several meetings.

However, there is some confusion as to how we even properly identify whether it is a foreign state actor or it's misinformation or disinformation coming from some unknown source. That was brought up in an earlier meeting today as well.

We had examples, let's say in the last election, of information shared on WeChat. It was stated that the Trudeau government would legalize all hard drugs and things like that, which was trying to sway Chinese Canadian voters away from voting for a Liberal government.

There's an exchange of all of this information going on at election time, which is not from verifiable journalistic sources but is being shared. We don't know where the sources of this information are coming from, and the environment is becoming more and more dangerous because we don't have a strong media ecosystem. We have a lot of media outlets that are shutting down in this country.

We also have what you mentioned, Ms. Robillard, about Twitter now. The users are no longer able to identify a source versus bots and other perhaps state actors that may be trying to influence our elections or the thought process of Canadians in general.

What should we do to improve our media ecosystem to make sure that there is reliable information? You touched a little bit on that just now, Mr. Bordeleau.

How do we improve our system of receiving information?

Go ahead, Ms. Robillard.

[Laurence Grondin-Robillard]

One thing that has been proved in recent weeks, and I am thinking of the new owner of Twitter, is that it is easy to stick labels on forms of content or accounts.

We could legislate or make rules concerning online content. For example, regarding sharing an article on Facebook, it would be possible to show that it comes from a verified or approved source. Artificial intelligence is capable of creating categories of content. That is something to develop with the owners of sociodigital media. It would be one of the solutions.

I'm going to yield the floor to my colleagues so they can make other suggestions.

[Steve Waterhouse]

In light of managing the information that goes to the public, yes, it's very hard to pinpoint the origin of the sources, as obfuscation is omnipresent whatever information is produced from anywhere in the world. It could be from here inside Canada, as well as from other countries across the planet.

I cannot agree with Laurence here on the fact that you can mark the data according to the source of information, as, again, false information can also be justified as being as valid as real information, so the bottom line remains the education and awareness made to the public by various means, just like the cybersecurity centre of Canada put on various programs to educate people, but that has to be put down to a level that is accessible to everyone. It cannot be a thesis of five pages with small characters that let people know what the threat is, how to address it and how to live with it.

It's also not necessarily during election time that the information has to be filtered, because, before an electoral process, people get influenced by all sorts of discussions and matters. Then, when it comes to the election period, they are already preprogrammed, if I can use that term, to cast their votes according to the influence they received throughout the two, three or four years before that election.

[Jean-Nicolas Bordeleau]

I want to highlight Mr. Waterhouse's point in saying that education is a key factor here. It's going to be extremely difficult to attack the attackers in this sense. Even if we do create policy, pass new bills or modernize the Elections Act in a way that prevents attackers from engaging in foreign interference, I think they're going to find other ways to do so. The best way we can counter foreign interference is through citizen preparedness and through educating Canadian citizens and showing them how to consume information appropriately.

As was said, I don't think this is going to be achievable by 21-page CSIS reports that probably only a handful of Canadian citizens have the time to read or the desire to read. I think there's a need to bring it to a level that is going to be of interest to Canadian citizens and that there is going to be a desire to learn about.

I'd also like to mention that we talk a lot about misinformation, but I think it can also come from factual information. It's pretty easy to twist facts and to frame information, even real information, in a way that is going to hinder trust and undermine trust in the Canadian democratic process.

A study I conducted recently uses the same sorts of information, which are basically factual news media reports and CSIS reports that have been published, but frames the information slightly differently, one in a more positive “we're combatting foreign interference” tone, and the other one in a more negative “foreign interference is happening” tone. We see drastically different levels of trust among citizens between the two treatments.

[Ruby Sahota, Liberal, Brampton North, ON]

I wish I had more time. There are so many follow-ups to that.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

We always wish for more time.

Madam Normandin, you have the floor.

[Christine Normandin, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

Thank you, Madam Chair.

The witnesses' remarks are fascinating.

Ms. Grondin-Robillard, to echo what Mr. Waterhouse said, can someone be a foreign state actor and generate interference out of whole cloth, or do people really have to be a bit more vulnerable because of echo chambers?

Is it possible to stage an operation without the public already being receptive?

I would like to have your comments on that.

[Laurence Grondin-Robillard]

It really does involve connecting. There may be an interference operation that relies on creating content out of whole cloth, but if the content doesn't circulate, there will be no effect. People, the public, really have to be reached, whether by polarizing content or, on the other hand, by content that will confirm their opinion and incentivize them to share the content.

It can also be misleading content, whether using clickbait or by decontextualizing a situation in a way that does not correspond to the publication as such.

So there are several strategies for getting content to circulate. The people engaging in foreign interference still have to have a better understanding than we do of how the sociodigital media they are going to use, and those media's codes, work.

[Christine Normandin, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

Mr. Waterhouse, you talked about digital hygiene and the fact that human beings are, in a way, the weak link in cyber security. Can people be categorized by age group or education level, when it comes to their vulnerability, or is this relatively homogeneous? If people can be categorized, could a foreign actor exploit that weakness by targeting a particular segment of the population?

[Steve Waterhouse]

In the population in general, I would say that people tend to use technology intuitively. There is no formal teaching about how the new model of iPod or Android phone works, for example. People learn by using them intuitively, or by osmosis, with contacts.

We might think that new young voters are more susceptible to disinformation because they may be more exposed and consume information from social media rather than the traditional media, which they very rarely look at. However, if we consider the oldest segment of the population, our seniors, they are more likely to look at the traditional media. In the intermediate age groups, it is less divided. Some people will choose one type of media over another, based on their beliefs. As a result, I consider them to be just as vulnerable.

We have to practise cyber hygiene: keeping our devices up to date and protecting access to our social media. Otherwise, if threat actors, whether in Canada or outside, are able to make off with the social media contacts list of a person who has a lot of them and take control of the person's account, they can then influence the people in the person's circle, because the information will seem credible since it is coming from a known person: a family member, a friend, or someone else. That is why I say that everyone, without exception, needs to review their security practices and apply them diligently, to deal with it.

[Christine Normandin, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

Thank you.

Mr. Bordeleau, we have addressed the question of the threshold beyond which information about attempted interference must be made public. What we are hearing about this gives us the impression that it is a binary thing: either the threshold has been crossed or it hasn't.

Could there not instead be a kind of gradation, or different levels? For example, for a more limited attack or interference, we would give the public somewhat more generic information. However, if something very concrete happened and involved a very high risk, we would give the public much more specific information about the type of interference in issue. Should this threshold have different levels?

[Jean-Nicolas Bordeleau]

That is certainly an idea. I think there are some restrictions that come with a gradation process. According to the study I mentioned earlier, if we give out information that is not verifiable or clear, it is easy to misrepresent the spirit of it, to use it negatively or wield it as a weapon against the public and to undermine their confidence in the democratic system. So we have to be careful how a gradation system is used. Using a binary system certainly has its disadvantages, in that it can be difficult to set a threshold that is clear and precise. However, I believe that gradation is possible, and that it is a direction that should be considered.

[Christine Normandin, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Bordeleau. I don't have a lot of time. If I can continue this discussion in the next round, remember this question.

My next question is for all of the witnesses. If we reach this threshold, what is the risk that the public will dig their heels in if we tell people they are being duped? Could that exacerbate the polarization? What can we do to mitigate that risk?

[Jean-Nicolas Bordeleau]

As I said, the best way to eliminate that risk is to provide clear information. It is always preferable that information about foreign interference be conveyed to the public by the authorities responsible for security rather than via TikTok or by Mr. Musk, on Twitter. When there is verifiable, usable information and it is the authorities responsible for security that control it and communicate it, I think the risk is reduced.

[Christine Normandin, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

Next is Ms. Blaney.

[Rachel Blaney, NDP, North Island—Powell River, BC]

Thank you, Chair.

Thank you to the witnesses who are here with us today to talk about this issue, which is incredibly challenging. What we've heard again and again in testimony is how rapidly this changes. It's like we're trying to find ways to block misinformation, to prevent any interference, but the target is moving all the time.

I thought I would ask all of you a question.

I'll start with you, Ms. Grondin-Robillard, and then we'll go from there.

All of you talked in some capacity about education and how to inform and keep Canadians aware of what's happening. We know that's challenging, because how people take information in is different. I represent a more rural and remote riding, so there are parts of my riding where there is no accessibility to the Internet. There are also parts of my riding where there is no media that is local that can inform you and that is a trusted source. It's an interesting dynamic.

When we look at how to educate Canadians, what would be the best advice you could provide in terms of this constantly moving threat in a huge country in which we have different ways of communicating with one another and with Canadians?

It's a small question.

[Laurence Grondin-Robillard]

Thank you for that excellent question.

Where my opinion differs from my colleagues' who are here this evening is that I don't believe the responsibility for being better educated falls solely on the individual. That is important, but I think everyone has to get involved.

Since the interference in the 2016 American presidential election, Facebook has compiled a library of advertising so people can consult the archives, particularly in relation to political issues. For example, you can go there and see political parties' advertising that is currently circulating, along with the pages of elected representatives on Facebook and Instagram, two networks owned by Meta. So it is Meta's library.

When you go and see the advertising, you realize that there are politicians and parties that use codes that may resemble disinformation and misinformation. They put paid content on line that will circulate and will confirm people's opinions or further polarize them. So there is housecleaning and education to be done, but also on the part of the government. That is where the strategy has to start, to reach the public, who would better understand how social media work, in general, and how disinformation and misinformation can circulate.

[Steve Waterhouse]

It's a great question the member put.

I have to put in, as Ms. Grondin-Robillard said, that, yes, it is a team effort. The message has to be formatted at the top and then pushed down through the educational system. I'm one who believes firmly—education is a provincial responsibility, and we all know that—in a program that will then be prepared at the federal level for the citizenship of everyone. It could then be driven to all these provinces at a very low cost of integration and put into the school systems.

You said it well: In rural areas—I'm from one of them—the preoccupation is not to be spending 24-7 in front of a TV set or other technological device. Sometimes in very remote areas of the country it takes so many minutes—and I'm saying minutes—from the satellite downlink to the consumer getting that information. I relate to that. Then again, if it is embedded into the communities maybe not by religious leaders but through the school system, the educational system, it will be much more worthwhile to push it down and make everybody aware of it and make it especially known. In the same way economics is taught, the political system also has to be taught to everyone.

[Jean-Nicolas Bordeleau]

I think this is a great question. I agree with the other witnesses here that this needs to be not just a citizen-level effort but also a government-level effort. One of the ways that can be achieved is through having greater co-operation between security agencies, the SITE task force, political parties and members of the House, as well as understanding the threat landscape and understanding how information you are consuming and you are sharing will be used and will be consumed by citizens. I think there are certainly briefings that can be done and educational material that can be put together to provide political parties and political campaigns and members of Parliament with better tools and an overall better tool box to understand the effect of the information they will be sharing with the citizens in their ridings.

[Rachel Blaney, NDP, North Island—Powell River, BC]

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

We will now go with our second round of questions.

Mr. Berthold, the floor is now yours for five minutes.

[Luc Berthold, Conservative, Mégantic—L'Érable, QC]

Thank you, Madam Chair.

Thanks to the witnesses for being here.

Mr. Waterhouse, my questions are primarily for you, but if someone else wants to say something, give me a signal.

You testified before the Special Committee on the Canada–People's Republic of China Relationship in 2021, where you talked about the threat from the Beijing regime. Can you confirm that the present-day threat is completely different from the one we were looking at eight or 12 years ago?

[Steve Waterhouse]

Thank you for the question, and I would say that the threat has been amplified.

I refer to the strategies taken from a book published in China in 1999 whose English title is Unrestricted Warfare. That book emphasized how China should position itself, given that it was less well equipped, technologically and militarily, than the Americans or the influential western countries. It also suggested mounting an all-out attack, regardless of any regulations there might be, to get information and lay the groundwork everywhere in the world.

From 1999 to today, we can see the influence that China has had in Africa and South America. We necessarily see the ramifications here in Canada.