Madam Chair, members of the committee and fellow commissioners, before I begin, I would like to thank the committee for its invitation to participate in this consultation. The exercise that you have recently embarked upon is of great importance for our democratic institutions if they are to be in tune with the reality in which they operate. As you have requested, I am here today to share my thoughts with you on the means by which parliamentarians' questions relating to their obligations under the code can be addressed in a non-partisan and independent manner. I will also speak on how parliamentarians can reconcile their private interests with their public duties and functions.
First of all, it seems obvious to me that the person responsible for applying the code of conduct for elected officials has a scope of independent action that is commensurate with the process of their appointment. In Quebec, the Ethics Commissioner is appointed by the national assembly, by two thirds of its members. This status allows the office holder to exercise public office in an independent and impartial manner. The appointment of the commissioner is different from that of other appointees, however, since it must be proposed jointly by the premier and the leader of the official opposition after consultation with the leaders of the other parties represented in the assembly. In making this choice, parliamentarians have demonstrated the exceptional and delicate nature of this unique position, and the importance of appointing a person in whom all members of the national assembly can have confidence.
The independence and impartiality of an institution such as the commissioner's position must also be embodied in the mechanisms to prevent conflicts of interest, real or apparent; they must deal with situations where the ethical obligations of elected representatives are not respected.
The Quebec code, by allowing the commissioner to give advice to MNAs, encourages MNAs to be proactive and transparent. In addition to being confidential, advice can only be requested by the member of the national assembly directly affected by a given situation. Moreover, the situation cannot be hypothetical; it must be based on concrete facts. These criteria undoubtedly contribute to preserving this tool from attempts at instrumentalization.
As for investigations, there are also mechanisms to ensure that the independence granted to the commissioner in the interpretation and application of the code's provisions is respected. For example, when a member of the national assembly requests an investigation, it must be focused and substantiated. The request must clearly set out the reasonable grounds for believing that another member of the national assembly has breached the code, including a statement of the facts and the evidence available, if any. A member cannot ask the commissioner to conduct blind audits to determine whether there is a basis for an investigation. In investigations undertaken at my initiative, I also adhere to this reasonable grounds standard.
In a parliamentary system now characterized by fixed-date elections, which suggests a sometimes more intense political dynamic at the end of the cycle, these criteria can act as safeguards. Moreover, the assembly, by virtue of the parliamentary privilege to discipline its members, reserves the right to adopt a sanction following a report finding a breach; however, the interpretation of the provisions of the Code of Ethics and Conduct of the Members of the National Assembly is the exclusive responsibility of the commissioner, who may also issue guidelines if they deem it appropriate.
As to how elected officials can reconcile their private interests with the exercise of their office, there is no easy answer. The difficulty lies in the fact that the rules must be applicable to all, while their interpretation must inevitably take into account the context and facts surrounding each situation. It is therefore necessary, in order to ensure a certain predictability of the rules, to find a balance in their assessment in light of particular circumstances, without proceeding only on a case-by-case basis. Moreover, the backgrounds from which elected representatives come are diverse, and the contexts in which their functions are exercised evolve rapidly. This notion of necessary applicability therefore makes review exercises like the one you are conducting extremely timely. In Quebec, the legislator also wanted such an exercise. The code in fact provides that the commissioner shall report every five years on its implementation and on the advisability of amending it.
But it is unrealistic to believe that these exercises can be held with such frequency that codes of ethics will succeed in providing an appropriate response to any situation every time, especially as they depend on a consensus between parliamentary groups. I am therefore of the opinion that office holders such as myself must be allowed a certain amount of leeway in the application of ethics rules, so that they reflect the values of society as much as they encourage compliance from the parliamentarians who must respect them.
Thank you.