Procedure and House Affairs Committee on May 9th, 2023

[Cherie Wong]

I think that's precisely why we are the experts and we have the knowledge. Thank you for having us here again.

I believe that strengthening the diaspora and dissident communities so that we are more free to participate in civil society and in civic activities is a proactive counter to foreign interference. If we're more included in decision-making rooms, we can notice things that are going wrong or things that are happening.

I believe there is a need for a long-term solution, but also that we need to make concrete efforts to put diasporas in the room when we're making decisions, particularly when it comes to foreign interference, where we are the experts. We see it happening all the time in our daily lives. Bring us into the rooms. We'll inform you. We'll tell you how to best move ahead.

First of all, again I will say that we have to rebuild trust with the communities. There is an ongoing negligence that's been happening, and we need to first build a bridge to the diasporas and say, “We are listening and we are willing to change some of our ways so that we could incorporate you in our work.”

[Marie-Hélène Gaudreau, Bloc, Laurentides—Labelle, QC]

On a scale of 1 to 10, how would you rate the diaspora's trust in the means currently available to us to help you counter interference?

[Cherie Wong]

I think it's very difficult to say. Many of my colleagues and my volunteers, I think, are seeing these types of consultations, these meetings, as a step forward, but these are just consultations. We need actions. Actions lead to change.

I don't want to speak on behalf of the diaspora to say that this is how much we trust you, because there is a very wide political ideology behind the diaspora, but I do think that we are coming slowly to the beginning of regaining trust.

[Marie-Hélène Gaudreau, Bloc, Laurentides—Labelle, QC]

I invite you to send us any additional information on the demonstration, on educating people and on ways to improve the means we have.

For example, what would be the new thresholds that would allow us to intervene upstream?

It would be very important for us to get those pieces of information here at the Committee so that we can help you.

[Cherie Wong]

We have made a written submission. We'd be happy to make any supplementary submission as needed.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

Thank you.

In fact, this morning, we received a document of several pages that we have sent to the interpreters of both official languages and that we will send to everyone afterwards.

Ms. Blaney, you have the floor.

[Rachel Blaney, NDP, North Island—Powell River, BC]

Thank you, Chair.

As always, all things through the chair, and I first want to start by thanking our witnesses for being here. I deeply appreciate you doing this, especially in the context in which you're doing it. I appreciate that.

For my first question, I'm going to start with Ms. Wong. If Ms. Lau has anything to add, I welcome it.

I really think—and I've heard this in other testimony—that one of the challenges is that it feels like the police and the RCMP are not prepared, that they don't understand how to react around this particular issue. We know that the diaspora does not always feel connected to those groups, so I'm wondering about two things: One, do you have any recommendations or thoughts about what these groups need in order to be more extensively trained and to understand these complaints as they come forward? Two, how do we build trust between those communities so that they can have faith that if they move forward...? You told your story and you disclosed something, and then you heard nothing, so the trust was be broken.

I'm wondering about your thoughts on that.

[Cherie Wong]

There are multiple layers to this.

One is that the police officers and enforcement agencies need to enforce laws when there is very clear criminal activity, such as harassment, assault and destruction of property. These activities already occur, and they need to be treated seriously.

The second layer is having a foreign interference lens. Enforcement agencies need to be trained to notice the patterns and the signs of foreign interference at play. Without adequate training of our enforcement agencies, they won't be equipped to make an informed call on whether or not to flag this issue.

Another layer of this is.... Not to shy away from it, there is institutionalized and systemic violence towards racialized people by policing agencies. That is a fact. When we want to engage with enforcement agencies, we have to understand that some members of the racialized and diaspora communities do not feel safe in doing so. We therefore need alternatives to make sure every member in the community has a safe way to reach out and seek help. That doesn't necessarily mean they should go to people they don't trust, but rather to those with whom they have had good interactions in the past.

[Rachel Blaney, NDP, North Island—Powell River, BC]

Thank you.

Go ahead, Ms. Lau.

[Ai-Men Lau]

Putting on my research hat, I would ask the committee how often you think foreign intimidation, influence, surveillance or interference happens in Canada. Can you point to how many cases there are?

We had a report, “In Plain Sight”, that we submitted previously to the CACN committee with recommendations. One of them was a public commission on foreign influence. We wanted to collect data on foreign influence and allow for a public reporting mechanism. This is a way we can allow for diaspora communities, who have been facing the brunt of foreign influence and intimidation, to have a reporting mechanism. We can collect that data and see not just how severe the problem may be within Canada but also identify patterns, establish patterns of operations, and see how they work in order to better inform our authorities on how this works.

Additionally, I would like to stress that foreign intimidation and surveillance is not a strategy used solely by the PRC. We have seen other countries use these same tactics. The Citizen Lab has a fantastic report called “Digital Transnational Repression in Canada”. They carried out interviews with Canadian dissidents experiencing foreign harassment. That aspect needs to have a country-agnostic approach. We need to be looking at how this repression affects other communities as well.

Those would be my recommendations for the committee.

[Rachel Blaney, NDP, North Island—Powell River, BC]

Thank you for that.

Another thing that I saw, Ms. Wong, in some of the information I read about the work you've been doing, is with regard to specific targets around rural and remote communities. Could you talk about that?

I represent a more rural and remote region. It concerns me that sometimes information is not as accessible and sometimes doesn't come from trusted sources, especially as we see a lot of local papers and things like that closing down in communities. Could you talk a bit about that?

[Cherie Wong]

Rural, remote and northern communities are at a higher risk. Foreign interference is more effective because the fewer resources have a disproportionately larger impact on the community. We need to look at northern and rural communities with a specialized lens when we talk about civic engagement and how we can get accurate information to these communities while at the same time making sure we're not allowing foreign influence activities to take place without calling attention to them.

[Rachel Blaney, NDP, North Island—Powell River, BC]

Thank you.

My next question is around Canadian elections. I read your information as well. Right now, of course, a lot of information is given out in French and English, but that's it. How would having an expanded number of languages to reflect the diverse communities within Canada help with foreign interference and Canadian election strength?

[Cherie Wong]

For one, we need to actually stop translating materials, because when you translate materials, they get taken out of the linguistic and cultural contexts. We need to actually generate materials with a cultural and sensitive lens that reach the communities you're talking to and that talk about things they care about.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

Thank you.

We'll now go to the next speakers. I'll give five minutes to Mr. Gourde, five minutes to Ms. Sahota, and two and a half minutes to Ms. Normandin.

Ms. Blaney, you have two and a half minutes. Then we will bring in the next panel.

Mr. Gourde, the floor is yours.

[Jacques Gourde, Conservative, Lévis—Lotbinière, QC]

Thank you, Madam Chair.

My first question will be for Ms. Wong.

Ms. Wong, any form of intimidation, whether it is mild, aggressive or severe, constitutes interference, whether it is to restrict an individual's actions or the information they wish to disclose.

Can you give an example of the intimidation? Earlier, you mentioned that your computers seemed to be under surveillance. There are urban legends about that. For example, people say they feel like their house or apartment is being photographed and they are being followed on the street.

Is this the kind of thing you have experienced? Do you know people who have had this happen to them and who wanted to restrict their freedom of expression because of it?

[Cherie Wong]

Intimidation and harassment are the extreme ends of how the diaspora could be controlled in their behaviours in Canada, but there are more subtle and more seemingly innocuous ways to influence and govern the diaspora.

First off, many in the diaspora already know that there are certain topics and issues that you can't cross, because it will be be seen as angering Beijing or getting on the PRC's radar, and that's not even talking about dissenting behaviour. You're not talking about challenging the state. These are simply activities and social issues that are seen as sensitive by the state that you learn to steer clear of.

Another aspect is that the diaspora is encouraged to surveil each other and report on each other. There is guilt by association to begin with, so if you are associated with someone who has been seen as a troublemaker, you're less likely to get a job promotion. You're likely to be denied services. You, your work and your friends and family could be in trouble, and under that lens is where lateral surveillance comes in, in that your friends and your family could be telling on you in exchange for being able to be seen as soldiers loyal to the regime.

Some of these are self-initiated initiatives, but some of them are out of self-censorship and self-protection in the sense that if I report on someone, I would be able to steer clear of the PRC's radar.

I do want to emphasize time and time again that the diaspora is surviving the PRC's violence here in Canada in whatever ways they can. We do not assign blame onto the diaspora, but we need to address this type of behaviour, whether it is lateral surveillance or this type of social pressure and exclusion. At its core, it is the foreign principal who is pressuring the community to engage in these types of violent and ugly behaviours.

[Jacques Gourde, Conservative, Lévis—Lotbinière, QC]

Is it common for people to pressure the children, parents, spouse or other family members of someone who has, by virtue of their position or what they do for a living, some influence in our society to limit their freedom of expression?

[Cherie Wong]

Yes, and that type of activity is also extended to individuals who are here in Canada.

For example, I have spoken with a Chinese mainland international student who attended a protest and was later called to the embassy to talk about her visa status. Those are the types of activities that are used to suppress and govern not just our Canadian relatives overseas but also those who are here to make sure that control over the diaspora is maintained.

[Jacques Gourde, Conservative, Lévis—Lotbinière, QC]

Do you feel that there is foreign interference and infiltration in all spheres of society in Canada, whether it be the political sphere or the economic sphere, for example? It seems systemic.

I think there are many more people watching us than there are people we take the time to watch.

Is this a widespread phenomenon in Canadian society?

[Cherie Wong]

In our previous report, “In Plain Sight”, which was published two years ago, we did talk a lot about political influence, aspects of building relationships with people of influence and making sure that political decisions are favourable to Beijing.

There are also other aspects of infiltration and interference in basically any sector you could name in Canada, like technology, research, academia, civil society and the media narrative. It's happening in a whole-of-society manner. We have to address this as a whole-of-society issue.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

Thank you.

Ms. Sahota is next.

[Ruby Sahota, Liberal, Brampton North, ON]

Thank you.

I want to start off by thanking both the witnesses. Ms. Wong and Ms. Lau, your courage is really amazing. Thank you for coming forward.

You mentioned the overt but sometimes subtle tactics that are used, even just now with an international student being called into the consulate.

In your experience, the tactics were quite overt. You felt the intimidation by Beijing. Has it been your experience that others who speak out contrary to the regime's interest would also face these types of overt tactics by the regime? Are there other examples you could give the committee today?

[Ai-Men Lau]

Sure.

I have interviewed a number of members of the Hong Kong diaspora globally, not just within Canada. We have found a pattern of behaviour in which many of these Hong Kong dissidents who left Hong Kong after the 2019 protests and the 2020 crackdown experienced doxing. They also felt that they were being physically followed or had seen incidents of being physically followed.

Many of the interviewees I talked to also noted that at public-facing sites, like sites of protest, they were often getting their photos taken. They were getting threats of their photos being sent to embassies so that the embassies would have their information. Additionally, they would receive a lot of threats via texts and emails and online. There is definitely this pattern of behaviour that happens.

Many of the interviewees pointed to the fact that there is a seeping paranoia that they have to live with. This in turn seeps into the community itself. There's a lot of vetting. There are a lot of community security protocols that we take in order to safeguard ourselves, because we have felt like there is nowhere to turn. There has not been adequate support in that sense.

Additionally, a lot of advocates have taken other proactive measures, such as cutting off ties with families, loved ones or friends who continue to live in the PRC or in PRC-controlled territories.

[Ruby Sahota, Liberal, Brampton North, ON]

Ms. Wong, do you have anything to add?