Procedure and House Affairs Committee on May 9th, 2023

[Cherie Wong]

Yes, I can also speak to some of the interviews I've undertaken with diaspora members here in Canada.

It's quite concerning when people begin to laugh off a dead rat on their front porch as, “Oh, they tried to intimidate me with a dead rat, as if that would do anything.” Their tires are slashed, and they just say, “Oh, now I have to buy new tires.” These types of incidents happen to diaspora and dissident communities so frequently that our community begins to see them as jokes, as just a part of our daily lives. That is incredibly unfair for all of our allies, because we should not be afraid to go outside. We should not be afraid that there's a dead rat sitting on our front porch or that our tires will be slashed because we intend to attend a protest today, yet that's the pattern of behaviour that many, many dissidents are experiencing and continue to survive.

[Ruby Sahota, Liberal, Brampton North, ON]

I have to admit that's incredibly worrisome. Of course it can cause paranoia, and rightfully so.

In order for the regime to intimidate or pressure people to not act contrary to their interests, they try to get to them so the person recognizes that something is happening that they can't quite explain or perhaps take to the police, although they are being intimidated in some way.

[Cherie Wong]

Again, I want to emphasize that there's already a culture of silence, because engaging in these types of activities is seen as dirty and as not something that someone who is in their right mind should be doing in politics. The idea is that you shouldn't touch that. For a lot of the community members, when they do see the very severe cases of intimidation and harassment, they look at themselves and say, “I'm not brave enough to undertake this. I'm not going to engage in it.” They practise self-censorship before they get to the point of becoming a dissident.

[Ai-Men Lau]

I also want to add quickly that a lot of our community members may not have the choice, because they might have to go back to the PRC or PRC-controlled territories such as Hong Kong. That puts them at an even bigger risk.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

Thank you.

Go ahead, Madame Normandin.

[Christine Normandin, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

Thank you very much.

I echo my colleagues' comments regarding your courage, ladies. Thank you for being with us today.

This has already been mentioned, but I would like you to elaborate on the importance of having a different cultural lens when analyzing attempts at interference and assessing threats to the community.

Should we be engaging community members more to better identify what they deem threats? Should we be keeping a record of those, even though they may not be considered threats if seen from the outside the community?

[Cherie Wong]

Absolutely the diaspora is the expert, and bringing us into rooms will only enrich the solutions that come through. We take a different perspective; we have different linguistic and cultural lenses that could come into the conversation, absolutely.

[Christine Normandin, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

More broadly, I'd like you to talk about the messages we are sending about the recent expulsion of a Chinese diplomat. Before the diplomat was expelled, we heard the government say that it needed to check whether there was a risk of economic or diplomatic retaliation by China.

On the one hand, does this send a message to China that threats and fear work, even in Canada? On the other hand, by holding this discourse, we are somewhat prioritizing maintaining our interests over protecting the diaspora. Was the message that was sent a bad one?

[Cherie Wong]

Beijing sees inaction as weakness. They respond only to strength, and sometimes that means we have to take extraordinary measures that may cost us in something—maybe trade, maybe getting our diplomat expelled from China. We have to show strength in our interactions with them, because they take our weakness for granted. They will continue to push.

This is what Beijing is doing on multilateral institutions. They push the rules until the rules don't apply anymore, until the rules twist and turn in favour of Beijing. This is happening in the World Health Organization, in the UN, in Hollywood and on Wall Street. I believe we need to draw a line somewhere in Canada to say, “This is where you must stop. We are taking a stand for ourselves.”

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

Thank you.

Ms. Blaney, go ahead.

[Rachel Blaney, NDP, North Island—Powell River, BC]

Thank you, Chair.

Through you, I'm going to come back to Ms. Wong first, and then, Ms. Lau, please add anything.

In your earlier presentation you talked about having sector-specific advice. When I listened to that, I was really thinking about how many conversations we've had at this table around action that we need to take not just during elections but also between elections. I heard you reference—and I can think of only three off the top of my head—different sectors like academia, media, business and so on. When you talk about that sector-specific advice, can you expand on what that advice would look like and how that would be provided?

[Cherie Wong]

On one, ethnic media, Beijing actually actively sends ethnic media journalists from Canada to train in Beijing to tell a “good China” story, a narrative favourable to Beijing. While that is a perfectly fine exchange, Canadians should be informed that these actors are being trained in Beijing by state actors. Therefore, we would need to develop a plan or a strategy to inform Canadians that when they're consuming this ethnic media organization's news, they should know that this organization is endorsed by the CCP and PRC and know that they are trained and funded through whatever means.

That's a very specific type of approach to media: understanding the funding and understanding the training they're undertaking.

With respect to academia, we already see some initiatives happening, but we should also be reaching out beyond academic institutions. We should be reaching out to researchers and to students to help them understand their collaborations with foreign principals and their proxies and how their research may be used for dual-use technology later, where it's applied to civil or military use.

We need to basically consult with experts from each sector and understand how each sector is facing foreign influence activities and create solutions for that specific sector in that time and space with respect to exactly the challenges they're encountering.

[Rachel Blaney, NDP, North Island—Powell River, BC]

My last question is around having a registry.

I've heard from a lot of communities that they're concerned about who could be put on that registry. I know there was talk about a strong appeals process.

I'm wondering whether you could explain how to balance the need for accountability and the need for human rights.

[Ai-Men Lau]

I also think it's very important to understand the messaging around the foreign agent registry. A lot of the messaging around it may have gotten lost. Certainly people were starting to take on their own narratives of it. Again, I'm stressing that this registry is country-agnostic and meant to deter.

Additionally, I think consultation undertaken with the diaspora communities is a good first step. Again, have further consultations with more groups. Understand not just one side of the concerns but also other concerns. You have to understand, especially for the Canadian Chinese community, that we have faced multi-faceted challenges that don't just relate to the PRC. Certainly, during COVID, we saw the rise of anti-Asian sentiment. That is a fact. That clumsy rhetoric has led to discrimination and increased violence against Canadian Chinese communities and the Canadian-Asian diaspora as a whole.

I think, as well, that we need to be understanding. We need to build out this registry act as a long-term solution rather than a short-term solution and look at the ways other countries may be engaging in foreign interference as well.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

Thank you.

With that, I would like to thank you both for joining us today, Ms. Lau and Ms. Wong, and for the information you've shared.

I acknowledge once again that you provided us with a submission this morning. Once it is translated, we will share it with committee members. As always, if you have more information to share with us, please do not hesitate to share it with the clerk. We will have it circulated around.

With that, we will suspend quickly, do the sound check and have the next panel start.

We'll be back in a couple of minutes. Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

I call the meeting back to order.

Joining us for our next panel are Mr. Duff Conacher, coordinator of Democracy Watch, and Mr. Andrew Mitrovica, writer, who is appearing as an individual.

We will have both of you do your opening comments. Then we will have Ms. Wong stay for the question-and-answer session with members.

With that, I will turn the screen over to you, Mr. Conacher. Welcome to PROC.

[Duff Conacher, Coordinator, Democracy Watch]

Thank you very much, Chair.

Thank you to the committee for the opportunity to testify on this important topic today.

I am, as mentioned, representing Democracy Watch. However, in several cases, in terms of the changes that I will be proposing that the committee recommend on any reported issues, I will also be representing Democracy Watch's coalitions of citizen groups. They have a total membership of about 1.5 million Canadians, and they are collectively calling for these various changes.

The main overall point I'm making is that simply putting in place a foreign agent registry, especially if it's loophole-filled, will not do much to stop foreign interference. Loopholes in election donations and spending and in lobbying and ethics rules currently make secret foreign interference relatively easy, as do the very weak and cabinet-appointed watchdogs, who have very weak enforcement powers. They generally also have very weak attitudes and practices in terms of enforcement.

First, turning to the foreign agent registry, it must require anyone or any entity to register if they are paid or compensated in any way, directly or indirectly, by a foreign government, a foreign entity or a foreigner. It must also require them to register if they have some arrangement with them for any activities that involve public relations, communications or any political activities aimed at influencing politicians, parties or governments. If the registry only requires registration of people or entities paid to directly influence Canadian politics, they will easily be able to avoid being required to register by arranging to be compensated for other services, or in some other way, while doing the influence activities for free.

Second, more than 40 lawyers and professors, 26 citizen groups and The Globe and Mail, in two editorials, have called for your colleagues on the House ethics committee—and I hope you will call on them—to reverse their position and to reject federal Commissioner of Lobbying Nancy Bélanger's proposal to gut key ethical lobbying rules in the Lobbyists' Code of Conduct in ways that will make secret interference in elections and secret activities to influence federal MPs and party leaders easier for foreign governments. Essentially, Commissioner Bélanger and the committee are proposing to gut key ethical lobbying rules in ways that would allow lobbyists to bribe MPs.

Third, loopholes in the lobbying law allow for secret lobbying. If you are allowed to lobby without registering under the lobbying law, then you can lobby unethically, because the lobbyists' code doesn't even apply to you. It doesn't even matter if it's gutted, because it doesn't even apply to lobbyists who are not required to register. That also facilitates secret lobbying by foreign interests and agents.

Fourth, loopholes and too-high limits on donations and spending allow wealthy interests, including foreign-sponsored lobby groups, to have undue influence over elections and policy-making processes.

Fifth, lobbyists and lobby groups, including foreign-sponsored lobbyists and lobby groups, are allowed to collude with contestants for nominations and party leadership in secret, and non-citizens are allowed to vote in both nomination contests and party leadership contests. Those are all loopholes that facilitate foreign interference.

Sixth, federal ethics rules have huge loopholes that allow MPs to act unethically and allow ministers and top government officials to have secret investments and to participate in decisions that they profit from. These allow for unethical arrangements, including with foreign lobby groups and foreign-sponsored groups. This committee failed to address any of these loopholes when it reviewed the MPs' ethics code last year, in secret mostly, and issued an initial report last June.

In fact, this committee—and you say you're concerned about foreign interference—proposed, and the House approved on March 30, a new loophole in the MPs ethics code that now allows lobby groups, including foreign-sponsored lobby groups, to pay secretly for interns in your offices. Essentially, you have made it legal now for foreign-sponsored groups to plant spies in MPs' offices and to pay for them in secret, with no disclosure.

Seventh, many types of false claims are allowed about election candidates, party leaders and MPs. No enforcement agency has the power to order social media companies to remove false online posts or ads.

Finally, eighth, as I mentioned at the top, enforcement of election, political donation and spending, and lobbying and ethics laws is very weak. All the watchdogs are hand-picked by the ruling party cabinet through secretive partisan political appointment processes. They all lack key powers and do not even have to report on complaints or situations they review and investigate. They can fail to do their jobs completely.

That includes the so-called independent critical election incident public protocol panel, which is not independent at all, because it's made up of public servants who were chosen by, and serve at the pleasure of, the Prime Minister. The cabinet directive for the protocol has several flaws that allow essentially for cover-ups of foreign interference—

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

Mr. Conacher—

[Duff Conacher]

I will end there. I welcome your questions.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

We appreciate that. I can tell that your opening comments were not completed, so please share the remainder of the comments that you didn't get through during questions and answers with the committee, because it's important that we hear them.

[Duff Conacher]

I was actually finished. I have a written submission I will be filing with the committee, though, with more details.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

We appreciate that. Thank you.

Mr. Mitrovica, welcome.

[Andrew Mitrovica, Writer, As an Individual]

Thank you, Madam Chair. Good afternoon.

I have been a reporter and writer for almost 40 years. For much of that time, I was an investigative reporter at CTV, CBC, The Globe and Mail and The Walrus magazine.

I have written a lot about intelligence services. That work led to a book called Covert Entry: Spies, Lies and Crimes Inside Canada’s Secret Service. It is one of only two books of any consequence written about CSIS. That fact speaks to how few journalists in Canada know anything about how this nation’s domestic spy service truly operates.

Despite having turned down many requests to appear as an expert witness in court, why have I agreed to appear here? I have been troubled by much of the recent reporting about alleged Chinese interference in Canada’s elections. I have been disturbed in particular by the reliance on anonymous sources to tar Canadians of Chinese descent as being disloyal to the maple leaf. This egregious, life-altering allegation should require much more than some spook hiding comfortably in the shadows to accuse other Canadians of being a tool of a foreign power.

I know about China’s interference in Canada. I wrote a series of front-page stories about Chinese interference throughout Canadian society while I was at the Globe in the late 1990s and early 2000s. That reporting culminated in a story about a joint RCMP-CSIS probe called Project Sidewinder.

Sidewinder was intriguing for several reasons. Its central finding—that the PRC was working with triads to infiltrate almost every aspect of Canadian life—was so controversial that the then CSIS director, Ward Elcock, did something that no director has done, to my knowledge, before or since: He publicly dismissed his intelligence officers’ work as, in effect, crap. Of course, he used much more diplomatic language. He called it an interesting theory.

The curious story of Sidewinder doesn’t end there. A senior CSIS officer ordered all copies of the report to be destroyed. This was also, I believe, unprecedented. Anyway, a surviving copy of the report made its way to me and subsequently onto the Globe’s front page.

Here is where my reporting and much of the recent reporting about Chinese interference differ. Sidewinder included names of a slew of well-known companies, organizations and high-profile individuals that the RCMP and CSIS believed had been compromised by the PRC. At the time, my editors and I agreed that it would be irresponsible to publish their identities when relying solely on a 23-page report, even if it was marked “top secret”.

Here’s the other main reason I have agreed to appear. A kind of hysteria is being ginned up by scoop-thirsty journalists and what is likely a handful of members of Canada’s vast and largely unaccountable security intelligence infrastructure. It’s dangerous, and people’s reputations and livelihoods are being damaged. My warning to you is to be cautious and skeptical about so-called intelligence, even if it is trumpeted as top secret—which, by the way, is a standard security classification.

The fact is that CSIS gets it wrong often. In the current somewhat hysterical climate, it’s worth remembering the following, which Eva Plunkett, a former inspector general for CSIS, wrote in 2010:

The reviews...have identified again what I consider to be a large number of...errors identified in CSIS information holdings. While my office only reviews a sample of CSIS operations, these...errors are not isolated to one program or one set of processes. They appear in the range of core activities of the Service and across regions.

Those errors have had profound and lasting human consequences. Just ask Maher Arar.

Finally, I am working on a story involving two dedicated police officers who have had their loyalty to Canada questioned by, frankly, incompetent conspiracy-consumed CSIS officers. Their lives and livelihoods have been damaged too. It’s a cautionary story, and after publication, I urge you to invite them to this committee to tell you directly the horror of what can happen when CSIS gets it so wrong.

Thank you for your time.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

Thank you for those comments.

We will now enter into six-minute rounds, starting with Mr. Calkins. He will be followed by Mr. Turnbull,

then Ms. Normandin and Ms. Blaney.

Go ahead, Mr. Calkins.

[Blaine Calkins, Conservative, Red Deer—Lacombe, AB]

Thank you, Madam Chair.

I will get to our new witnesses who have just joined us, but I first want to ask Ms. Wong a question, and I believe my colleague from the Bloc was getting to this as well.

You've testified, Ms. Wong, not only at this committee but at other committees, that you believe your laptop and your Internet were disrupted or hacked and that it wasn't a coincidence. Can you speak to any times, other than that particular incident, when you believe you or somebody from your organization was interfered with as a result of being invited to Parliament or any committee of Parliament?