Procedure and House Affairs Committee on May 16th, 2023

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

Thank you, Mr. Chong.

Mr. Chong, just for my understanding, would you prefer having some time that is in camera and not in public?

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills, ON]

I prefer not to reveal the nature of those threats.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

Whether it is in camera or in public?

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills, ON]

That's right.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

Okay. I just wanted to ask.

Madame Gaudreau is next.

[Marie-Hélène Gaudreau, Bloc, Laurentides—Labelle, QC]

Thank you, Madam Chair.

The committee has been studying Chinese interference since November, Mr. Chong. A number of surveys show that one in five Canadians does not trust the results of elections in Canada. The House of Commons Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs had a lot of work to do.

Today, we find out that the public safety minister, Mr. Mendicino, issued a new directive to CSIS, instructing the intelligence service to inform him of any threats to elected officials or Parliament. CSIS is also going to have to inform parliamentarians of threats against them, whenever possible. Much of that information flows only one way.

Fifty times now, we have heard that something has to be done, that bold action is needed and so on. There have been baby steps.

Unfortunately, Mr. Chong, you're helping to change and preserve the integrity of our democracy.

I'd like to hear your thoughts on that.

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills, ON]

I think the minister's directive comes a bit too late. Clearly, foreign interference poses a major threat, and Canada isn't the only target. Other democracies are being targeted as well.

That's why I think the government needs to deploy a lot more tools to tackle foreign interference.

For that reason, I think the government needs to expeditiously introduce legislation for a foreign agents registry.

We need to reconcile the problematic definitions of foreign interference in the Security of Information Act and in the CSIS Act. They are different from each other. We need to reconcile the security community's definition of foreign interference with the RCMP's definition. We need to ensure that the RCMP has the resources it needs to prosecute not just foreign interference but espionage, as we've seen recently with the Hydro-Québec case and the recently botched case, I might add, of a former employee of Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada in the Prairies.

There are a whole range of things that need to have been done yesterday to protect us from foreign interference and espionage.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

Thank you.

Go ahead, Ms. Blaney.

[Rachel Blaney, NDP, North Island—Powell River, BC]

I need this clarified with just a yes or a no.

With regard to the meetings that were offered to you, you asked for those meetings.

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills, ON]

That is correct.

[Rachel Blaney, NDP, North Island—Powell River, BC]

Thank you. I wanted that clearly on the record.

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills, ON]

I did not ask for the meeting of June 24. This was part of CSIS's effort to reach out to the MPs to brief them on the general nature of foreign interference threat activities. I believe our colleague MP Jenny Kwan also received a briefing. I think dozens of MPs subsequently received a briefing on that.

The subsequent three meetings—I will double-check the dates—on August 5, 2021, February 5, 2022, and July 18, 2022, came from my reaching out to CSIS to convey information I had about threat activities for which I think I was the target.

[Rachel Blaney, NDP, North Island—Powell River, BC]

Thank you. That's very helpful.

We've heard testimony from other folks who have had challenges with authoritarian governments and states. They have talked about going to the local police or RCMP to try to say this was happening, and getting absolutely no response. There seems to be a lack of awareness or understanding at that level of how to address that issue, which I think all fits in, because you've talked about how you also shared what was happening with local RCMP.

What sort of protective measures need to be put in place? As MPs, we have this extra bit of privilege, so if something gets caught, it goes into the Globe and Mail, but for so many Canadians who are not in these roles, nobody is going to report on it.

What do you think we need to do around addressing this in a more meaningful way comprehensively across Canada, both on the political level and on the everyday level of people in Canada?

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills, ON]

First, as has long been called for by experts in the intelligence community, we need to reconcile the different definitions of foreign interference in the Security of Information Act and the CSIS Act.

I think the next thing that needs to happen is a clear understanding between our intelligence community that collects intelligence, which may be converted into evidence, and the RCMP about the definition of foreign interference so that investigations can begin and prosecutions can follow.

To my knowledge, in the last several years, despite the heightened foreign interference threat activities here in Canada, we've not had a single investigation that's led to the prosecution of any agent acting on behalf of an authoritarian state here in Canada. This is despite the fact that in our closest ally countries, individuals have been arrested for these activities.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

Thank you.

Mr. Chong, as you're not a stranger to these hallways and these meetings, we will be taking you slightly over the hour to finish this round, if that's okay.

Thank you for indulging us.

I have Mr. Calkins, followed by Mr. Turnbull.

[Blaine Calkins, Conservative, Red Deer—Lacombe, AB]

Thank you, Madam Chair. My questions for my colleague Mr. Chong will go through you, of course.

I'd like to start by thanking my colleague. He and I have been here a long time. If you add the years together, I think it works out to something like 36 years of service in this place. I have known him a long time. I want to commend him for the grace with which he has comported himself since finding out this information. I wish him and his family the best going forward, regardless of what comes out of these meetings.

Mr. Chong, you're no doubt aware that this committee has been seized with undertaking a study on foreign interference as it pertains to elections. In this case, we've seen numerous pieces of information put into the public realm through non-normal channels, information that we would normally expect to see through transparency and sunlight. I have my own thoughts about whether it's a breakdown in the machinery of government or whether it's a political vacuum in leadership. However, we've asked numerous times in this committee for the production of documents through various motions. Some of the motions have passed. Some of the motions were amended to remove the request for production of documents. There is a motion before this committee right now that will request documents.

My question for you, given the fact that the information will be largely about you, for an example, is this: Do you think it's completely reasonable, in a request for production of documents, that this committee should adopt that production of documents? Is it also reasonable that both unredacted and redacted copies be sent to the parliamentary law clerk so that the law clerk can then discern, and compare and contrast, between the redacted documents—which we have seen some of, and which aren't particularly helpful—and the unredacted documents? It would be at the discretion of the law clerk to make that information available to this committee so that in looking at this question of privilege on your behalf, we may come up with the proper findings and the best recommendations.

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills, ON]

Thank you. I think that's exactly the procedure that should be undertaken.

Parliament has the unfettered right to call for the production of documents and for witnesses. I remember when a witness—one Karlheinz Schreiber—had to be released from the custody of Her Majesty in right of the Province of Ontario from, I believe, the Mimico correctional facility because the Speaker had issued a warrant, I believe, for this individual to appear in front of a committee.

Parliament has always had the unfettered right to call for the production of documents and for individuals. In this case, I think the government should provide documents, under lock and key, to the parliamentary law clerk, who would then, in consultation with government officials, make the decision about redactions of anything that would be injurious to national security in order to protect national security. I think that's an appropriate process to follow.

If NSICOP were ever to be brought into Parliament, it would be a good procedure for Parliament to follow. It's one that was recommended by former law clerk Dufresne, and I think it's a good process to follow.

[Blaine Calkins, Conservative, Red Deer—Lacombe, AB]

Thank you, Mr. Chong.

My next question is more about your opinion and your feelings about the matter at hand.

As members of Parliament, we hear from our constituents all the time. Sometimes we hear things that appear to be horror stories. I've had people come to me saying that they've been under threat. I do not have a large Chinese-Canadian diaspora in my constituency, but I have some. Some of them are very reluctant to talk to me over the phone. They're very reluctant to send me an email. They're trying to find ways to talk to me without anybody knowing we're talking. I found that odd when it was first happening.

The brazenness of trying to intimidate a sitting elected MP in the House of Commons of Canada tells me there is no fear by the PRC. If they're willing to do this to you, what are they willing to do to intimidate a Chinese-Canadian citizen?

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills, ON]

Thank you.

Look, I think that's the real thing we need to be focused on. It's not just my case; it's the fact that, behind my case, there are many Canadians—it's hard to quantify—who have suffered in silence for years.

We've heard stories about people in tears who've been targeted by authoritarian states. For too long, the government hasn't taken action to defend them here on Canadian soil. We don't have any jurisdiction outside Canada to enforce Canadian law, but surely we can do a good job of defending Canadians here on Canadian soil who are being targeted at home by agents acting on behalf of authoritarian states.

Madam Chair, if I could indulge you, in addition to the June 24, 2021, meeting, which CSIS reached out to me to have—that was the meeting on the general nature of foreign interference threat activities—I can confirm that I reached out to CSIS three other times to convey to them information about threat activities that I believed were being targeted at me by the PRC. The meetings were on August 5, 2021, February 25, 2022, and July 18, 2022.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

Thank you, Mr. Chong, for providing that insight.

I will note that oftentimes I give Mr. Calkins four minutes instead of five. Today he had six minutes and 39 seconds. He's way ahead of the game. That's a minute and 39 seconds extra.

I'll work on that. Better is always possible.

Mr. Turnbull, I give five minutes to you.

[Ryan Turnbull, Liberal, Whitby, ON]

Madam Chair, I hope I'm afforded the same generosity with regard to time.

Mr. Chong, I want to say thanks for being here tonight. I appreciate your testimony. I note that you've been around Parliament Hill and serving for quite some time—I think about 19 years, if I'm not mistaken. Thank you for your service.

As this session tonight will form part of our study on foreign interference, which we've been studying for some time, I want to take the opportunity to ask you a bit more about foreign interference in the Harper government, which you obviously served in.

We haven't had a lot of opportunity to hear from officials or representatives from that period, with the exception of Ms. Byrne, whom we were happy to hear from recently. Last week, she said she was never briefed on the potential of foreign interference. She also said she never received any reports and there were no briefings by CSIS. She went on to say that foreign interference never came to mind. Essentially, it wasn't a major concern at the time.

Would you agree with that?

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills, ON]

I recall that former CSIS director Dick Fadden publicly raised concerns about certain elected officials in Canada at the provincial and municipal levels being targeted by the PRC in Canada. I recall that The Globe and Mail, at the time—some 10 years ago—reported that CSIS had advised the government of the day that a certain Liberal MPP in Ontario was involved.

[Ryan Turnbull, Liberal, Whitby, ON]

I don't mean to cut you off, but I think what I'm hearing from you is that you acknowledge that it was a concern—that there was foreign interference during the Harper era.

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills, ON]

That's correct.

[Ryan Turnbull, Liberal, Whitby, ON]

I would agree with you on that. From my perspective, going through public reports, I can count no less than eight CSIS annual reports provided to the government and Parliament that outlined foreign interference as a major concern for the agency.

In fact, the 2009-10 annual report states:

Canada has also traditionally been vulnerable to foreign interference activities. Foreign powers have engaged in covertly monitoring and intimidating various communities. In many cases, these activities are designed to support the political agendas of foreign governments, a cause linked to a “homeland conflict” or to unduly influence Government of Canada policies.

Could you perhaps point to one or two examples from the Harper era that responded to the concerns brought forward by CSIS?