Procedure and House Affairs Committee on May 30th, 2023

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

Good morning, everyone. I call the meeting to order.

We have with us, on our panel, Mr. Dan Stanton, former executive manager, Canadian Security Intelligence Service, CSIS, and Mr. Artur Wilczynski, former assistant deputy minister and director general, intelligence operations, Communications Security Establishment, CSE.

You will each have up to five minutes for opening statements, after which we will proceed to questions from committee members.

To keep it nice and tight, we'll start with you, Mr. Stanton, and then you can pass the floor to Mr. Wilczynski. We'll continue with questions after that.

Welcome to the committee.

Mr. Stanton, the floor is yours.

[Dan Stanton, Former Executive Manager, Canadian Security Intelligence Service, As an Individual]

Thank you, Madam Chair.

Good morning, members of the committee.

My reason for speaking today, and the message I'd like to get across, is that I do not agree with the decision to not have a public inquiry on the foreign interference allegations. I will address the rationale used to support that decision.

Additionally, I do not want the onus falling to the opposition to push for a vote to have a public inquiry. Instead, I wish to see the government—more particularly and respectively the Prime Minister—reconsider the decision to not have a public inquiry.

The special rapporteur's review found “no examples...of Ministers, the Prime Minister or their offices knowingly or negligently failing to act on intelligence, advice or recommendations.” He focused on the machinery of government, the policy-makers, and he did acknowledge that he found significant and concerning gaps in the sharing of intelligence and sensitive intelligence.

He advised that the Minister of Public Safety does not have access to top secret emails that national security officials use to share intelligence, including potential threats to members of Parliament. This has led to “situations where information that should be brought” to the political level does not get there “because it can be lost in the sea of material that floats through the government.”

In the case of intelligence and the targeting of MP Michael Chong, we're told, from the review, that while it was sent to the public safety minister and his chief of staff, it was sent through a top secret email system for which they lacked log-in details.

I ask, respectfully, this: How can there not be indications of a failure to act on intelligence warnings when decision-makers at Public Safety and a number of national security intelligence advisers never saw, or were unable to access, the reports?

We are told that some of the allegations reported by The Globe and Mail and by Global News were proven to be without foundation and were taken out of context. Which allegations? I think it's important to know that.

Canada recently expelled a Chinese diplomat. Should we reconsider the PNG action?

Security experts have advised the rapporteur—and he reported this—that we cannot have a public inquiry as it might upset the Five Eyes. Having worked with nine of the 12 Five Eyes partners' HUMINT and SIGINT agencies for many years, I can say with confidence that they have the highest regard for Canada's intelligence agencies and national security infrastructure.

The Five Eyes have survived existential leaker damage from Kim Philby to Edward Snowden, and they have much bigger preoccupations with the China target than what could be considered our slightly more pedestrian, but certainly domestic, foreign interference investigation. Five Eyes reporting—and, yes, I have no doubt there probably is some—can be sanitized for disclosure. Additionally, it can be reviewed either through witness testimony or through reports in camera at a public inquiry. The Five Eyes are not a showstopper. The Five Eyes are not like the Eye of Sauron, looking down at our public inquiry with grave concerns.

We do have precedents for public inquiries on national security matters. We have Justice John Major's commission inquiry into the bombing of Air India flight 182—anniversary next month, by the way—where sensitive reporting and witness testimony were reviewed in camera. The same could be done with a public inquiry on foreign interference, where the Attorney General of Canada can request the commissioner to review sensitive information privately.

Finally, I wish to address the issue of the question of privilege related to an intimidation campaign against the member of Parliament for Wellington—Halton Hills. I am very proud of my 30 years of service in the Canadian Security Intelligence Service and of the work it does every day to keep Canadians safe.

That being said, I believe that, when it received credible information that a member of Parliament's family members were being targeted by the People's Republic of China, he should have been apprised of that information on a priority basis. CSIS should have told Mr. Chong directly, rather than waiting for the machinery of government to fix its email problems.

Thank you, Madam Chair.

[Artur Wilczynski, Former Assistant Deputy Minister and Director General, Intelligence Operations, Communications Security Establishment, As an Individual]

Thank you, Mr. Stanton. Thank you, Madam Chair.

I would like to begin by saying that the foreign interference experienced by Mr. Chong and other members is incompatible with democracy. Threats against members are inexcusable and threaten the integrity of our democratic institutions and their ability to represent Canadians.

In his testimony, Mr. Chong raised a series of key issues to address threats posed by hostile state actors such as China and Russia. In his report, the special rapporteur also highlighted elements that undermine Canada's ability to respond to foreign interference. Both of them have raised some key issues, and I'll try to address a few of them.

For many years, I was a consumer of intelligence. At Public Safety Canada and at Global Affairs Canada, as director general, I consumed highly classified intelligence from across the Canadian intel community and from international partners. I engaged regularly with deputy ministers, ministers and their staff to discuss a wide range of issues.

After serving as an ambassador, I returned to work at the Communications Security Establishment as the director general of intelligence operations. I was asked to join CSE because of my years as a consumer of intelligence. Part of my mandate as DG of operations was to improve the experience of consumers of CSE's intelligence products. I was responsible for CSE's client relations officer or CRO program. I was also the chair of the board governance of Canada's top secret network, the platform that provides access to highly classified intelligence to clients across government.

My experience has given me a better understanding of the collection, analysis, dissemination and use of information. That's why I agree with many observers that the dissemination, consumption and use of information in Canada must be modernized. This issue isn't new. It was in part to address some of those challenges that I was appointed to the Communications Security Establishment. Unfortunately, this is still a work in progress.

While some intelligence consumers have effective partnerships with producers, particularly personnel in the Canadian Armed Forces and other security organizations, there remain significant gaps. This unfinished business of modernization is why I was not shocked by Mr. Chong's experience or the observations shared by Mr. Johnston. They are familiar complaints of consumers of intelligence and a require a systemic response.

My work was at CSE, Canada's foreign signals intelligence agency. Intelligence in Canada is produced by a wide range of actors including CSIS, the Canadian Forces Intelligence Command, FINTRAC, CBSA and the Privy Council Office. It is complemented by classified diplomatic reporting from Global Affairs. That's just material generated by Canada. We also access intelligence from the Five Eyes, NATO and other arrangements.

This is a vast information ecosystem. Ensuring that the right people see the right information at the right time to make decisions in Canada's national interest is the goal. There is still much work to do to effectively achieve that self-evident objective. We invest heavily in the collection of intelligence. We need to invest more in effective assessment and consumption. We need better coordination in the dissemination of intelligence.

As a consumer of intelligence, it is difficult to prioritize classified information coming from multiple sources and at a volume that is almost impossible to effectively manage. Consumers of intelligence, whether ministers, their staffs or deputies and other senior officials, need better training to understand what intelligence is and how to effectively use it in their decision-making process. We need a better intelligence culture in Canada.

That culture is comparatively robust in addressing security threats to Canada and Canadians. It is far more tenuous when it comes to new and emerging issues, where new consumers have less experience with intelligence and are deciding how to allocate scarce time to reading highly classified material.

We need greater transparency in intelligence, so Canadians better understand what it is and how it's used. We need greater coordination of dissemination processes. We need to value and empower the people that share that intelligence with clients and strengthen the systems used to do so. This should be the role of the office of the national security and intelligence adviser. The Office of the Director of National Intelligence in the United States is an excellent model. While much can be done through policy change, I believe codifying the NSIA's role in law would help.

Finally, I believe that deputy ministers should be more accountable for how their organizations use the intelligence they ask for. The accountability currently rests with collectors and assessors who respond to requirements set out by all of government. Consumers should be accountable for providing feedback and saying how the intelligence was used to achieve outcomes in the national interest.

Much of that information will need to be classified, but these are important strategic fixes that I think will address some of the challenges raised by Mr. Chong and the special rapporteur.

There are systemic challenges in our intelligence system. I hope we dedicate the time and resources to address them. I'm happy to share greater details on possible next steps with the committee.

Thank you very much, Madam Chair.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

Thank you very much for those opening comments. We appreciate your taking the time to be here with us today.

We will now enter into six-minute rounds, starting with Mr. Cooper, followed by Mr. Turnbull, Madam Gaudreau and then Madam Blaney.

Just a reminder, comments are through the chair. Also, we have two official languages in Canada, so a pause between comments and responses would be appreciated.

Mr. Cooper, the floor is yours.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

Thank you very much, Madam Chair.

I'm going to direct my questions to Mr. Stanton, through you, Madam Chair.

You spoke in relation to the issues concerning member of Parliament Michael Chong. The Minister of Public Safety and senior officials in his office were sent a sensitive email in May of 2021. They didn't have the log-in information and couldn't access the email.

Minister Blair was the minister for 18 months as of May of 2021. What does that say about the machinery of government that a minister who was in place for 18 months didn't have access to emails. Emails were being sent. CSIS was continuing to send those emails, and they were effectively going into a black hole. That doesn't seem to add up.

[Dan Stanton]

That's exactly.... I mean what inference we want to draw from that is that you have all this sensitive reporting going into the system, which—and I'm quoting from the rapporteur's findings—is basically bobbing on a digital sea of computers. Maybe I'm being a little harsh, but it seems that there is a dearth of briefing up going on that you would expect would be done with various departments.

It also sounds like a predilection for digital copies and that hard copy briefings are passé. I think there are advantages actually with hard copies.

It does sound to me like CSIS is putting in these very sensitive reports, and there are these glitches and gaps—and they probably didn't start last year—that need to be rectified so that the critical information would go at least to the cabinet minister level to make his decision.

I have no idea why. It just strikes me as dysfunctional.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

Madam Chair, through you, ultimately, what does that say about ministerial responsibility? Ultimately, who bears responsibility? A minister is in place for 18 months—the Minister of Public Safety. We have an email on a matter as critical as an accredited diplomat threatening and targeting a sitting member of Parliament, and the minister doesn't know about it because he doesn't have access.

[Dan Stanton]

I'll touch on a point that Mr. Wilczynski mentioned when he talked about the rigorous review on the collection side. CSIS, CSE, CAF and others are subject to it on an annual basis in terms of their performance and compliance with policy.

I am suggesting that, on the policy-maker side, the machinery of government, we don't have the same type of review or accountability.

It should be ministerial accountability. I think that's part of the bedrock of our parliamentary system. It's where every department is responsible. You would think there are mechanisms for briefing up, particularly in security and intelligence, such that you don't have to have a particular passcode to read a particular message to factor that into your decision-making on something as critical as a threat to the members of Parliament.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

Madam Chair, through you to Mr. Stanton, after CSIS sent that email in May, it went into a black hole. The minister didn't know even though he had been minister for 18 months. CSIS then tried to again alert the minister and other departments, the PCO, when they prepared the July 2021 memo. That went to the PCO. It went to the Prime Minister's national security adviser, yet apparently the Prime Minister didn't learn about that.

Does that sound believable to you? If the Prime Minister is in fact saying that he had no idea, what does that say about the information flows and structures that he has in place to be briefed and be alerted to critical national security information?

[Dan Stanton]

It's not inspiring. The thing to appreciate is.... We talk about threat-related, and in this context, of course, it's a member of Parliament. With a lot of threat-related intelligence, whether it's dealing with terrorism or espionage, or things like that, there already is a drill. There already is a performance. They don't wait for CSIS to send assessments into that email system. This would go in as an assessment piece on the foreign intelligence threat with all sorts of other information that probably goes in on a routine basis.

I've heard it said by the public, “Why doesn't CSIS call, or why doesn't CSIS hint there's something in there?” What we don't want to have, with security intelligence, is the agencies shaping the narrative or saying to the policy-makers, “Here, you must read that.”

What I'm saying is that I don't think that report went into the system and that the producer, CSIS, thought, okay, this needs immediate attention. It just goes in as a routine process on that. I do find it disheartening, because I spent 32 years in the business where you collect information. There's considerable risk and expense in producing intelligence reports, so you like to think that somebody read them or found them interesting.

Perhaps what this initial review is revealing is that those gaps are more significant than maybe we appreciated, if reports are just floating around the system.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

Yes, I'll give you....

[Artur Wilczynski]

Thanks very much.

Just to add, I think it's really important to understand that within the Department of Public Safety, where Minister Blair was the accountable minister—again I also agree with the concept of ministerial accountability—there are structures. There is a branch responsible for national security that does receive regular information and intelligence from CSIS and other agencies. It's the deputy minister of public safety who determines how much and what goes to ministers.

As I mentioned in my opening statement, there's a massive volume that comes out every single day of intelligence products and assessments. Having a more robust engagement with clients like ministers, like deputies, so that the producers of intelligence better understand their needs and what needs to be brought to them urgently is something that is still weak, I think, in the government system. It needs to be addressed.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

Thank you.

I know you're new to our committee, but we still use the old-school mechanism of the beep, beep, beep. That means time is up. However, I think it's always suitable to have a response.

I thank you, Mr. Cooper, for wanting Mr. Wilczynski to be able to also contribute.

Mr. Turnbull, the floor is yours.

[Ryan Turnbull, Liberal, Whitby, ON]

Thanks, Madam Chair.

Thanks to both the witnesses for being here today. I really appreciate your expertise and lending your perspective to this important conversation. I think you bring a lot to it.

Mr. Stanton, maybe I'll start just with a question for you in a follow-up to Mr. Cooper's line of questioning.

In this particular case that Mr. Cooper was speaking about, we're sort of inferring things from what the Right Honourable David Johnston has reported on in his report. What he's able to say and what he's able to report are based on obviously lots of classified intelligence that he's able to review. I just wanted to know if you are intimately aware and knowledgeable about those specific allegations.

You bring a lot of expertise to the conversation. but there's a part of me that's assuming that you don't exactly have the detailed information that David Johnston has been able to review. Am I right on that?

[Dan Stanton]

Absolutely, yes.

[Ryan Turnbull, Liberal, Whitby, ON]

That's helpful, because I wouldn't put you in a position to confirm or deny certain things that you don't have knowledge of. I think that's putting you in an unfair, compromising position.

[Dan Stanton]

Yes.

[Ryan Turnbull, Liberal, Whitby, ON]

I do think this conversation has become overly partisan in lots of our dealings on the Hill with foreign interference. It's such an important conversation to be had. I think the report from David Johnston, which I reviewed thoroughly multiple times now, really points to areas where we need to see improvements. At least from this side, the government side, we sit around the table hoping that we're going to get to the detailed, good-faith suggestions that can improve our system of intelligence.

I think the big thing that comes up in the report for me is the way in which information is dealt with, coordinated, how it's fed up and how it's used to make decision-making.

Mr. Stanton, maybe I'll start with you. Maybe you could give us some of your sentiments on that. Then I'll go to Mr. Wilczynski.

[Dan Stanton]

Thanks for asking that, Mr. Turnbull, because I wouldn't want anyone to interpret my comments in any way in a partisan way, because I am the antithesis of that. That's why I don't want a vote in the House. I'm trying to avoid what would be a divisive vote.

I raised the issue of these gaps, the email system and such in the context that we're hearing from the reviewer, Mr. Johnston, that there was no sign of interference, negligence or anything like that in reaction to the reporting. I am simply asking how you can make those conclusions when the policy-makers who are making these decisions didn't see, hear, read or find a report.

With these gaps in the system of being briefed, how do we reach the conclusion that the decision-makers carried out their decisions in a way that was either competent or devoid of that?

I didn't mean it in a partisan way, but in the initial question you asked me, no, I have no insight on that side of the House. I spent my whole life in what was called “collection” in field and headquarters, collecting reporting and sending it over to the consumers of reporting, so I have no insight into the system and whether it.... I am simply going by what Mr. Johnston publicly disclosed he found and acknowledged were serious and significant gaps in sharing intelligence.

[Ryan Turnbull, Liberal, Whitby, ON]

Thank you.

Mr. Wilczynski, you made some pretty important comments in your opening remarks on how we can better deal with the flow and modernize the flow of information and how it's coordinated through the intelligence agencies to the appropriate ministries and ministers, who are ultimately accountable.

Can you speak to how we can improve that?

[Artur Wilczynski]

Sure. There are a number of ways we can improve that.

First, we need to make sure that all government departments have access to that top secret network, so that they can receive that information. The way that access is managed in those departments needs to be from a policy perspective and a response perspective, as opposed to a technical, departmental security point of view, which is how it's managed right now.

I also think we need to modernize and improve the coordination of the client relations officers. Those are the human beings who meet with clients around government to make sure that they get the information at the right time. At the moment, there are too few of them. At the moment, they are employed by the Communications Security Establishment. They are my former colleagues and, again they reported to me, even though they were providing a whole-of-government service in many cases. There needs to be more of them. They need to be better trained. In my opinion, they need to be at a more senior level when they are meeting with deputies and other senior officials, in order to make sure that they have the ability to engage.

Another important element is ensuring feedback. When consumers read the intelligence, they tell the collectors whether or not it is, in fact, the information that they are seeking. This is because part of the challenge is making sure that people spend time on the intelligence, and too often, when it isn't what consumers want, there is no feedback provided. That affects the volume of information that goes to key clients, which I think is part of the problem with the system as it exists.

[Ryan Turnbull, Liberal, Whitby, ON]

We've heard about some people going into a room with a very large binder of intelligence that they're supposed to review and being given no direction as to what is relevant in that binder. I could just imagine if I were in that person's shoes. You aren't given adequate time to actually review the material, first of all, and you don't necessarily know how to.... There are a number of skills, I imagine, that you need to have.

How long, Mr. Wilczynski, would it have taken you to be able to interpret intelligence in a way so that you'd feel confident about what actions you would take as a result?

[Artur Wilczynski]

As a consumer, it takes years to get an understanding of the information in front of you, and you need regular engagement with a range of actors to be effective in turning the information that you see into actual, effective decision-making. This is why I say we need to change the intelligence culture in this country.

We need to speak more frankly with Parliament and with parliamentarians. We need to speak more often with Canadians about what intelligence is, so that when they are elected to represent us here in the House of Commons, they have a basic understanding of how intelligence works.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

Thank you.

Go ahead, Ms. Gaudreau.

[Marie-Hélène Gaudreau, Bloc, Laurentides—Labelle, QC]

Thank you, Madam Chair.

I'd also like to thank you, witnesses, because you're reassuring me in a way. You're reassuring me because, since November 7, we've been worried and have been doing everything we can to get to the bottom of this.

When I hear you say that there's no reason not to hold an independent public inquiry, that the list of measures taken has already been prepared, and that you've been working in the field for over 30 years, I ask myself the following question: Since we can go back on our decision, as you said, why do you think an independent public inquiry isn't being held, in your opinion?