Thank you, Madam Chair.
Good morning, members of the committee.
My reason for speaking today, and the message I'd like to get across, is that I do not agree with the decision to not have a public inquiry on the foreign interference allegations. I will address the rationale used to support that decision.
Additionally, I do not want the onus falling to the opposition to push for a vote to have a public inquiry. Instead, I wish to see the government—more particularly and respectively the Prime Minister—reconsider the decision to not have a public inquiry.
The special rapporteur's review found “no examples...of Ministers, the Prime Minister or their offices knowingly or negligently failing to act on intelligence, advice or recommendations.” He focused on the machinery of government, the policy-makers, and he did acknowledge that he found significant and concerning gaps in the sharing of intelligence and sensitive intelligence.
He advised that the Minister of Public Safety does not have access to top secret emails that national security officials use to share intelligence, including potential threats to members of Parliament. This has led to “situations where information that should be brought” to the political level does not get there “because it can be lost in the sea of material that floats through the government.”
In the case of intelligence and the targeting of MP Michael Chong, we're told, from the review, that while it was sent to the public safety minister and his chief of staff, it was sent through a top secret email system for which they lacked log-in details.
I ask, respectfully, this: How can there not be indications of a failure to act on intelligence warnings when decision-makers at Public Safety and a number of national security intelligence advisers never saw, or were unable to access, the reports?
We are told that some of the allegations reported by The Globe and Mail and by Global News were proven to be without foundation and were taken out of context. Which allegations? I think it's important to know that.
Canada recently expelled a Chinese diplomat. Should we reconsider the PNG action?
Security experts have advised the rapporteur—and he reported this—that we cannot have a public inquiry as it might upset the Five Eyes. Having worked with nine of the 12 Five Eyes partners' HUMINT and SIGINT agencies for many years, I can say with confidence that they have the highest regard for Canada's intelligence agencies and national security infrastructure.
The Five Eyes have survived existential leaker damage from Kim Philby to Edward Snowden, and they have much bigger preoccupations with the China target than what could be considered our slightly more pedestrian, but certainly domestic, foreign interference investigation. Five Eyes reporting—and, yes, I have no doubt there probably is some—can be sanitized for disclosure. Additionally, it can be reviewed either through witness testimony or through reports in camera at a public inquiry. The Five Eyes are not a showstopper. The Five Eyes are not like the Eye of Sauron, looking down at our public inquiry with grave concerns.
We do have precedents for public inquiries on national security matters. We have Justice John Major's commission inquiry into the bombing of Air India flight 182—anniversary next month, by the way—where sensitive reporting and witness testimony were reviewed in camera. The same could be done with a public inquiry on foreign interference, where the Attorney General of Canada can request the commissioner to review sensitive information privately.
Finally, I wish to address the issue of the question of privilege related to an intimidation campaign against the member of Parliament for Wellington—Halton Hills. I am very proud of my 30 years of service in the Canadian Security Intelligence Service and of the work it does every day to keep Canadians safe.
That being said, I believe that, when it received credible information that a member of Parliament's family members were being targeted by the People's Republic of China, he should have been apprised of that information on a priority basis. CSIS should have told Mr. Chong directly, rather than waiting for the machinery of government to fix its email problems.
Thank you, Madam Chair.