Let me address that, because I've had that experience, and I've spoken in the past to members of Parliament on this type of issue. When the service does these interviews, there's a certain amount they can disclose, like talking to you. I'm going to have to tell you who I am and then you're going to tell me things, so it's a bit of a back-and-forth of information getting.
Then, when there's information that comes in.... Perhaps some of the information that came in on Mr. Chong was not really necessarily assessed as credible. It could have come from a source of unknown reliability. It could have come from some other party or something. It's not like the moment the service gets that information, they're going to go to that member of Parliament and say, “Look, we understand you're...”. They have to assess that. The process of assessing could be a number of interviews with that subject.
I did, in my final words, say that, when the service obviously understood that this was accurate, that some entity in the PRC was targeting him, they should have told him, but they don't always have the luxury of that accurate, full picture as the threat is unfolding.
I don't know what the mechanism is other than to have trust in the intelligence service that they will know when it's reaching a point where they should act or turn it over to policy-makers.