It's not inspiring. The thing to appreciate is.... We talk about threat-related, and in this context, of course, it's a member of Parliament. With a lot of threat-related intelligence, whether it's dealing with terrorism or espionage, or things like that, there already is a drill. There already is a performance. They don't wait for CSIS to send assessments into that email system. This would go in as an assessment piece on the foreign intelligence threat with all sorts of other information that probably goes in on a routine basis.
I've heard it said by the public, “Why doesn't CSIS call, or why doesn't CSIS hint there's something in there?” What we don't want to have, with security intelligence, is the agencies shaping the narrative or saying to the policy-makers, “Here, you must read that.”
What I'm saying is that I don't think that report went into the system and that the producer, CSIS, thought, okay, this needs immediate attention. It just goes in as a routine process on that. I do find it disheartening, because I spent 32 years in the business where you collect information. There's considerable risk and expense in producing intelligence reports, so you like to think that somebody read them or found them interesting.
Perhaps what this initial review is revealing is that those gaps are more significant than maybe we appreciated, if reports are just floating around the system.