Procedure and House Affairs Committee on May 30th, 2023

[Luc Berthold, Conservative, Mégantic—L'Érable, QC]

Time's running short. We'll come back to this and discuss specific measures that should be taken.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

That was a very specific answer. Thank you, Mr. Juneau.

Go ahead, Mr. Fergus.

[Greg Fergus, Liberal, Hull—Aylmer, QC]

Thanks very much, Madam Chair.

I'd also like to thank both witnesses.

I've had the pleasure of reading the work of both these witnesses and—

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

Just a minute.

We will suspend. I'm told the interpretation isn't working, so I'll keep speaking French.

[Ruby Sahota, Liberal, Brampton North, ON]

Now it is, Madam Chair.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

The interpretation is working now.

We will resume, Mr. Fergus. The floor is yours.

[Greg Fergus, Liberal, Hull—Aylmer, QC]

Thank you very much, Madam Chair.

I hope the interpretation is working smoothly.

Madam Chair, I was saying that I had read the work of Mr. Juneau and Mr. Wark, who are obviously experts.

Mr. Juneau, this past March, and once again this evening, you said that Canada had already taken a number of steps to counter foreign interference, but you think we could do more.

Would you please briefly tell us where we started, where we are now and what we need to do to address political interference in future?

[Dr. Thomas Juneau]

First of all, I believe that Canada is taking action against foreign interference. I hear public comments, including those from certain witnesses who have appeared before this committee in recent weeks, to the effect that Canada has done nothing. I don't think that's true of either the present or previous governments, although Canada should absolutely do much more.

What else should we do? First of all, there are all the recommendations that I made it my presentation, but there are others I could mention. First, there could be a foreign agent registry. We discussed this when I appeared before you the last time, and others have discussed this with you as well. That should've been done a long time ago. Considering where we are today, we should move forward on this, although cautiously so we don't go too quickly.

Lastly, I would add that we need to discuss this at greater length publicly, generally, whether in the context of this committee's proceedings, as we said earlier, or in other fora. That's not a particularly original idea, but I've seen, in various research projects over the years, that the Canadian government acts reactively in national security matters. It acts when it's under pressure, both public and political pressure, but not when it's under pressure from a national security threat. The political pressure is on right now, and we've seen it take tiny steps in such circumstances in the past. I think we'll see progress over the next year, but it will have to be evaluated.

[Greg Fergus, Liberal, Hull—Aylmer, QC]

Mr. Juneau, you've discussed political interference more broadly, and I very much appreciate that. Debate often focuses on the issue of China. If my understanding is correct, you're also an expert on Iran. Iran has often been cited as another major player in foreign interference.

Would you please say a few words on the role Iran plays or on Iran's modus operandi with respect to foreign interference? How is it different from China's?

[Dr. Thomas Juneau]

I'm glad you asked that question. Many experts have expressed fears in recent weeks—that's definitely true in my case—that the debate has focused too closely on China. China, of course, is the main source of foreign interference; it's the most significant threat, but it isn't the only one.

There are also Iran, Russia and countries we typically consider friends, such as Turkey, a NATO ally, which is engaged in large-scale foreign interference in Canada. Saudi Arabia, with which we reconciled last week, exerts pressure on Saudi dissidents in Canada, for example. It isn't just China, and the problem doesn't stem solely from our adversaries.

In the case of Iran, the main form of interference that concerns me—and it isn't the only one—is what I call “transnational repression”, by which I mean repression outside its borders. We see the Iranian regime exercising pressure through cyberspace, sometimes via loyal individuals on the ground in Canada, to intimidate, threaten and blackmail Iranian Canadian dissidents who advocate for human rights or democracy in Iran. They're subject to often serious threats. In some instances, their families in Iran are also threatened. These persons, many of whom I speak with regularly, say they feel neglected, forgotten and vulnerable, and that the government isn't doing enough for them.

[Greg Fergus, Liberal, Hull—Aylmer, QC]

I hope I'll have an opportunity to ask you some more questions, Mr. Juneau, but I also have some questions for Mr. Wark.

Professor Wark, you wrote in a recent Substack post that you recognized that you wouldn't have a lot of time to make a quick recommendation, but if there was one thing you wanted to leave with this committee, would you please get that on the record for us today?

[Dr. Wesley Wark]

Thank you, Mr. Fergus.

The one thing that I think is important above all, and a reason why I advocate for public hearings as opposed to a judicial inquiry, is that we face in Canada—and this echoes some of what my colleague and friend Thomas Juneau had to say—a significant issue of deficiency around what the CSIS director calls “national security literacy”. The public has a very important role to play in responding to and combatting foreign interference, perhaps the most important play of all the actors at work in this. It is vital that we try to raise that level of public understanding and education.

There are all kinds of instruments through which that can be done, including a national security strategy, which, as Professor Juneau has indicated, was last produced in 2004. I think public hearings, with the kind of flexibility they have and given that they are very different from a judicial inquiry, could really advance that conversation.

That would be my one key hope that I would promote.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

That's excellent. Thank you.

Madame Normandin, go ahead.

[Christine Normandin, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

Thank you very much.

I want to thank both of our witnesses for being here. I have some open questions, and I invite them to jump right in if they'd like to answer them.

The issue of intelligence culture was raised in the testimony you both gave. I'd like you to discuss it at greater length further to the discussion that took place this morning. You said we were working in a compartmented manner. The intelligence people have the expertise, but they don't really know what's happening on the policy side. Conversely, the policy people don't really know what's going on in intelligence.

Should we provide more guidance for the people we appoint to policy decision-making positions and as advisers to the Prime Minister, for example? Should we require those persons to have specific qualifications?

[Dr. Thomas Juneau]

The issue regarding poor knowledge of policy issues in the intelligence sector is a major problem, although I believe the situation has somewhat improved. I've seen an improving trend in the research I've conducted, but we aren't at all at the point where we should be. I discussed better training in my presentation because training is a major weak point. I mentioned staff exchanges and secondments because that's also a major weak point.

You mentioned promotion. I didn't bring it up, but it's an area I'm very much interested in. There's a limit to requiring overly specific competencies. If we're too rigid, the system may become too cumbersome.

I made a recommendation in other circumstances that I think might help you, and that was to include more ambitious diversity of experience criteria for lower-level promotions. Many intelligence agencies, such as CSIS, the RCMP and CBSA, have people who rise to the director general, or EX‑03, level and even to assistant deputy minister levels, so EX‑04 or EX‑05, who have never worked elsewhere than in those agencies.

I think that's an enormous problem. These people may have highly advanced technical expertise but no understanding of Ottawa in general.

[Christine Normandin, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

My question was more about the reverse situation. Should people who are responsible for policy or who advise members of the government, for example, have a clearer understanding of what goes on in the intelligence sector, subject to certain guardrails?

[Dr. Thomas Juneau]

Absolutely. My argument also applies the other way around.

There are ways to modify criteria for promotions to EX‑01 or EX‑03 levels in a central agency or a policy-based department, such as Public Safety Canada or Global Affairs Canada, so that the requirement is for three years of experience in intelligence, for example.

[Christine Normandin, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

Would you like to jump in, Mr. Wark?

[Dr. Wesley Wark]

I'm delighted with the question.

First of all, to understand the problem of intelligence culture, I think we can put this plainly and simply: A country only has an intelligence culture when its government, those who serve it and the public at large understand that good intelligence is vital for decision-making, and they take it seriously.

As Professor Juneau indicated, that is not the case in Canada. We take it seriously only episodically, and Canada is frankly offside with all our Five Eyes partners. I'd even include New Zealand in that basket, which is not a country we want to necessarily compare ourselves with in terms of national security capabilities and not taking intelligence seriously, not assuming that intelligence has to be part of any policy-making process.

There are many ways, again, that the question of seriousness can be addressed, and some of them have to do with the machinery of government. I think certainly a national security committee of cabinet chaired by the Prime Minister would be one way to get there.

On the national security adviser, just briefly, the national security adviser exercises his or her power through what is often called the power of persuasion. There have been suggestions in the past that this should have some statutory power behind it. I think that's open to argument, but the national security and intelligence adviser office absolutely needs someone with great seniority and great respect across the Government of Canada, and with great knowledge of intelligence and national security. Unfortunately, in Canada, that position has been a bit of a revolving door over the last several years. Some very good people have occupied the position for not nearly long enough.

In the U.K. model, a similar model in terms of an adviser to cabinet, it's understood that this is the last post that a senior civil servant will occupy. They're beyond influence. They're beyond concern about career progression. They are concerned with the national interest. I think we have to frame the NSIA job in that context.

Certainly I think both Professor Juneau and I agree that the national security and intelligence adviser has to have resources, has to have a staff. It's a skeleton staff in the PCO who assist the national security and intelligence adviser, and it's not surprising in that context that pieces of intelligence can get missed.

There is a broader problem there, because there is a vast flow of intelligence. Let's recognize that. The challenge is making sure that that intelligence is really good and that people understand that it has to be read. I think there's a lot of work that Canada needs to do in that regard.

Thank you.

[Christine Normandin, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

Thank you very much.

Regarding intelligence culture, Mr. Juneau mentioned that the situation had slightly improved in recent years. However, Mr. Wark, you held positions under prime ministers Martin and Harper. Did we have the same problems then? Was the culture different? Has progress been made over time?

[Dr. Wesley Wark]

Madam Chair, again, it's a very interesting question.

I would just reflect on my own experiences in the crafting of the national security strategy in 2004, providing advice as that strategy was being finalized, and also serving for two terms on what was then created as the Prime Minister's advisory council on national security.

My experience with the national security strategy convinced me that this is an important instrument that government needs to have as a road map for itself, and it is a vital piece of public education, both for the Canadian public and also for our allies, to signal how Canada intends to deal with a range of identifiable national security threats.

I will be brief, Madam Chair. I always thought the idea of a Prime Minister's advisory council on national security was a very interesting experiment that didn't perhaps run as long and as far as it needed to go.

I'll end on those two points.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

Thank you, Professor Wark.

Ms. Blaney, go ahead.

[Rachel Blaney, NDP, North Island—Powell River, BC]

Thank you, Chair.

Thank you very much to the witnesses here today. It's already been really interesting.

I'm going to ask an open question of both of you. I think it's interesting that I heard in both of your interventions discussions about literacy, both on the public side and I would dare say on the intelligence side, but also maybe on the MP side. You talked about a national security strategy and a whole-of-society effort.

Those things all correlate to me. I think the discussions have become far too partisan and are not really focusing on the core issue, which is how we are going to deal with this and how Canadians can have trust in the systems that we have in place.

I guess I'm curious. How could a national security strategy help with engaging the public in a meaningful way around encouraging public literacy? Do MPs have to be part of that as well? You talked about having a cabinet committee on security, but does it make sense to have a broader component? I know that we have NSICOP, but we also heard testimony today saying that more MPs should actually be educated in this so that we can move towards a less partisan realm and address this key issue.

If you could answer that big and fun question, I would really appreciate it.

[Dr. Wesley Wark]

Thank you for the question, Madam Chair. I would say it's an excellent one.

I think we need to pay more attention to that, particularly on the side of trying to provide opportunities for MPs, especially newly elected MPs coming into the strange world, perhaps, of the House of Commons or even the Senate with some degree of formal education, where they were perhaps unlikely to have ever come across the nature of national security threats and intelligence responses to them. I would extend that beyond MPs and senators to include their staff, who, as you know better than I do, play an important role in providing advice to MPs. I think there is a lot of educational work that can be done there.

I also think it's the case that MPs, senators and their staff need access to more readable and publicly available information relevant to Canada on national security and intelligence. That is one huge argument for a national security strategy. National security strategies exist among many of our Five Eyes partners, and they do a number of things. Principally, they spell out the understood range of national security threats a country faces. Second, they talk about responses to those threats, in terms of both the response capability of government and how those responses fit into a democratic framework for a society engaging with these threats. It can be a very vital public education tool, including for MPs and staff, but it also serves as a road map for the government itself, which is, in the national security intelligence realm, decentralized and siloed. It could use, frankly, some marching orders.

I would remind members of this committee about some of the testimony the national security and intelligence adviser, Jody Thomas, gave to the Public Order Emergency Commission, where she referenced the fact that she found it difficult to pull together a government response from her level because of the absence of a framework or national security strategy. If we're looking for an example to make this something more than just a nice ask, I think it was demonstrated, frankly, during the government's efforts to respond to the “freedom convoy”.

Thank you.

[Dr. Thomas Juneau]

I fully agree.

The last point in my presentation today was to suggest that one of the benefits of a national security strategy review would be raising awareness with the public writ large. There are many ways to do that—in addition to just releasing documents called “strategy speeches”—throughout and after the process on the strategy and review, by politicians but also by senior public servants, the director of CSIS and others. Engagement and consultation with civil society are not things we do nearly as much as we should.

When I say “engagement”, I mean real engagement. There is a tendency in the intelligence community, when it engages with the media, civil society and academics, to view engagement as a bit of an opportunity to “tick a box”, in bureaucratic terms. However, there is a need for serious engagement as a two-way conversation with civil society groups—Chinese Canadians when we're talking about foreign interference, or Iranian Canadians, as we discussed before, and so on.

Engagement with the media is something the national security community does not do well or enough of—the national media, but also local and ethnic media. That's a very important way to get the message out to raise awareness in specific communities. There is a need to ramp up efforts at that level.

The last point, and I really want to emphasize this point, is that the national security community does better today. There is a bit of a theme in what I am saying, but there is an improvement over the last 10 years. I think that's absolutely true, but they still struggle to engage in a meaningful way. Too much engagement is viewed as the offloading of speaking points, which is, at best, not very useful. In some cases, it's actually counterproductive, because it can be offensive. It can convince people that the engagement is not meaningful. Therefore, it reinforces suspicion, mistrust and so on.

It's about engagement throughout a national security review, accompanied by a serious effort to think about how to do meaningful engagement.