Thank you very much, Madam Chair. It's greatly appreciated, and I greatly appreciate hearing that I have five minutes. I thought I only had four. I have lots of time.
I served as national security and intelligence adviser from January 2020 to June 2021. This term came at the end of a 30-year career in which I held senior positions in a variety of security departments, including National Defence, the Privy Council Office, Global Affairs and Public Safety. In all these positions, I was either a producer or a consumer of intelligence. Security intelligence was at the heart of my public service career.
I am pleased that Canada is finally having a public debate about national security and intelligence. However, this is not the way to go about it.
I condemn the individual or individuals who have leaked highly classified intelligence. These leaks undermine our national security, and they potentially put lives at risk. They also present an incomplete and potentially misleading picture of national security concerns. Providing a few examples of isolated intelligence without any context does not make for informed discussions; it is akin to proudly displaying a complicated jigsaw puzzle with most of the pieces missing.
The men and women of our intelligence community are highly trained and dedicated professionals, but is that community without flaws? Unequivocally, no. Since I left government, I have spoken publicly about these flaws.
I co-authored a report last year with Thomas Juneau from the University of Ottawa, who I think was a witness before this committee last week. It was supported by retired senior security officials with close to 300 years of collective experience. It identified systemic weaknesses in our national security system, with everything from a lack of security culture and strategy to shortfalls in information sharing, governance and transparency. All of these played out, not only during the foreign interference controversy, but during the “freedom convoy” as well. I have commented publicly about that.
I was once part of that system, and I accept my share of responsibility for those failings, but my point is that even before the current storm over foreign interference, informed commentators were stating that our national security system was in peril and called for a review of related policies, governance and tools to help confront the very dangerous world in which we live. We have had no such review in nearly 20 years.
A highly politicized debate over one specific area of intelligence, however important, seemingly aimed at assigning individual blame is not the solution.
While I was national intelligence and security adviser, the pandemic and other issues consumed much of my time. I discussed foreign interference with the Prime Minister on at least one occasion formally, and I read intelligence reports on the topic and discussed them with colleagues. I fully understood that it was a serious long-standing and growing problem in Canada.
The July 2021 report on the targeting of Mr. Chong and other individual MPs was produced and distributed after my departure, but I am not surprised that this intelligence was not raised to the political level. This is where the system is particularly weak. The intelligence community produces thousands of reports a month, many of which I read over the course of my term. I would estimate that I read probably between 5,000 and 7,000 intelligence reports in my 18-month stint, but we did not have a formal system to flag important pieces of intelligence. What we had was ad hoc, and it was inconsistent.
I knew there was a problem. In response, I created a new DM intelligence committee, the DMIC, which put a greater premium on operational-level intelligence. I was concerned that important and actionable intelligence was not being appropriately flagged or followed up on. This committee was a step in the right direction, but it was still a work in progress when I departed in the summer of 2021.
Finally, I am aware that more steps are being taken to strengthen information sharing, but it should not be just for foreign interference. It should be for all intelligence. Reforms should include, first, a stronger intelligence capability at the centre to flag and fuse important intelligence to the Prime Minister and to other ministers. The government, in my view, should explore creating a position within PCO similar to the director of national intelligence, or the DNI, in the United States and separate from the NSIA.
Second, create a cabinet committee on national security, chaired by the PM, that meets regularly to receive intelligence briefings and discuss appropriate responses.
Last, promote greater transparency. Government should, among other things, produce annual public threat assessments, respond to NSICOP reports, publish intelligence priorities and share more intelligence outside the executive, including with members of Parliament. These are issues that have been discussed in government but have still not been implemented.
I'd be happy to discuss any of these issues in greater detail, especially those moving forward. I am here today as a witness because I care about this issue and I would like to see our national security be improved.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
