Procedure and House Affairs Committee on June 8th, 2023

[Marie-Hélène Gaudreau, Bloc, Laurentides—Labelle, QC]

Madam Chair, when the mic is always on, it's harder to hear the interpretation. I'm often having fun, but I don't want to lose this time. The witness's answer is nearly inaudible when my mic is on.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

I asked for only one mic to be on at a time. The time it takes to turn off one mic and turn on another is time that will be granted to you. If we let the technicians do their work, we will hear everything.

[Marie-Hélène Gaudreau, Bloc, Laurentides—Labelle, QC]

Very well.

I would like to know why for 10 years, even 20 years, interference issues have been worsening, so much so we find ourselves here today.

Given your broad national security experience and your role as Associate Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, why wait until the media sounded the alarm? Is there something else we need to understand? Then, we'll talk about the future.

What must we understand?

[Vincent Rigby]

Thank you, Madam Chair, for the question. I think it's a very important question.

There were two reports that came out a year ago, 18 months ago. The first report was done by CIGI. It was co-authored by Wesley Wark, who I think you know well, and Aaron Shull. That came out in December 2021. Then the Ottawa U report, co-chaired by Thomas Juneau and me, came out in May 2022, if I am not mistaken.

I remember talking to CIGI and talking to my colleagues at the time and thinking, boy, what a one-two punch this is going to be for these two reports to come out, because they came to almost identical conclusions and almost identical recommendations: that (a) the national security structure in Canada was in peril, and (b) massive, massive changes needed to take place. We thought, “Boy, this is going to get some headlines, and this is going to get some action.”

I'll be perfectly honest: I was disappointed in the response.

There was some media that did pick it up—a lot of interviews. The media was actually quite good, but I don't believe there has been a lot of pickup at the political level. But I could be wrong. I don't know what goes on behind closed doors right now, and maybe some of those recommendations I'm talking about, like a cabinet committee, are now being explored.

I do find it interesting that almost all of the recommendations with respect to foreign interference and information sharing and governance played out during whatever you want to call it—the storm right now over foreign interference—and a lot of the recommendations and material that we had in there about information sharing played out also during the convoy. We talked a lot about sharing information better with the provinces, with the territories, with the municipalities, and it all played out.

I take no credit for having a crystal ball or being a clairvoyant, but I just found it very interesting that this stuff has been out there. Everybody is now walking around going, “Oh, my God, I'm so surprised. I can't believe this is happening. I can't believe we have these kinds of issues in our national security system.” They were actually laid out in two major, major reports in the space of six months.

[Marie-Hélène Gaudreau, Bloc, Laurentides—Labelle, QC]

Thank you, Madam Chair. I will stop my timer as well.

It worried me when Ms. Jody Thomas told us there's 3,000 to 4,000 reports to read almost every month. You've just said you might have read between 700 and 5,000 reports. There comes a time when we just can't do it anymore and need help. We're hearing that the culture of intelligence is lacking. I dare to hope it will improve, since the situation has been a concern since last November.

I would like you to tell us about the 180‑degree shift… You already talked about some public measures intended to reassure people. I just want to take a moment so you can tell us what we need to do to recalibrate after all these years. All is not lost, but these are grave times.

[Vincent Rigby]

I suggested three or four recommendations at the end of my opening statement. I honestly believe we do need to fuse the intelligence better and flag it better. I think that my successor has taken some steps in that direction.

As I've said, I made some early attempts with the creation of this DM intelligence committee, which had always focused on strategic level foreign intelligence assessments. I wanted to focus a little bit more on domestic stuff that was happening inside Canada, intelligence that was actually actionable. When you do a very strategic foreign intelligence assessment that say is looking at what is country X doing in region Y, it's not necessarily immediately actionable. But I and a number of colleagues, including David Vigneault, the director of CSIS, said there's stuff coming out that we're not necessarily looking at and thinking about what we need to do in terms of follow-up. So I created that committee.

I think it's a legacy issue. I think it had been there for a long time. I created the deputy minister intelligence assessment committee when I was the head of the international assessment secretariat from 2008 to 2010. I think it was a gap and that's why I created a different committee with a focus both on the strategic assessments and the operational level intelligence.

Does that answer the question that's probably coming as to did anything with respect to Mr. Chong or other targeted MPs come before that committee? No, it didn't. That committee was having teething problems as well.

I'd love to come back and talk about some other ideas. Maybe I'll get another chance.

[Marie-Hélène Gaudreau, Bloc, Laurentides—Labelle, QC]

With these recommendations…

Madam Chair, I admit that I blanked on my question, but I know it would've been too long. Let me take my remaining 30 seconds and add it to my next turn. I will ask it then.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

Ms. Blaney.

[Rachel Blaney, NDP, North Island—Powell River, BC]

Thank you so much, Chair.

Thank you to the witness for being here today. I appreciate your testimony.

I'm just trying to clarify a few things. We had Ms. Thomas in the committee very recently. She said that she was not provided with the Michael Chong CSIS memo, but that her predecessor had seen it. I'm hearing from you that you haven't seen it.

I'm trying to figure this out, because it feels like there's some sort of process that's missing. I'm trying to understand that. I'm wondering if you could speak to that.

[Vincent Rigby]

I did not see it because I retired on June 30, 2021. The memo came out in July. It was prepared and distributed after I left. I did not see drafts of it or anything along those lines or any other intelligence that I can recall referring to this. That's why I personally didn't see it.

As to what happened after that, there was a long lag between myself and Jody being named as the NSIA. It took six months to name a new NSIA. There were interim or acting NSIAs in the meantime. I think you're having one or two of them appear before the committee.

[Rachel Blaney, NDP, North Island—Powell River, BC]

Thank you for that. I appreciate that clarity.

It's interesting to me that you did say in your testimony earlier that you did talk to the Prime Minister once about foreign interference, if I got that correctly.

But in the list of dates of the briefings provided to PROC, there was nothing in there that mentioned that. Was this a different sort of communication process?

Again, I'm just trying to clarify the information that I have before me.

[Vincent Rigby]

I looked at that list as well. I think what happened was that it was a briefing that was done, I believe, in early 2021. It was listed—and again, this would have to be confirmed; you would have to go back to PCO—as a briefing done by David Vigneault. David Vigneault was the lead briefer. I was with David. It was actually a joint briefing between the NSIA, me and David Vigneault.

[Rachel Blaney, NDP, North Island—Powell River, BC]

Thank you. That is helpful for me.

You said very clearly that you have some concerns about the process and that when you were in the role you put some things together, and there are some other ideas that you have.

One of the things that I think you were saying in the last questioning was about the committee of intelligence and that you were looking at what was happening internationally and that foreign aspect but also within the country.

I'm wondering if you could talk a little bit about what you were seeing within the domestic actions. If you can't talk specifically, I understand that. What were the processes you were looking at and how were you trying to make that information clearer so that when it was delivered to the Prime Minister it could be understood in a way that action could be taken?

[Vincent Rigby]

I think the deputy minister of the intelligence assessment committee, which was in place before.... Again, there were very high-level foreign intelligence strategic assessments looking at the big picture—geostrategic issues, functional issues, etc. I wanted a greater focus on domestic issues, because of hostile-state activities, so I looked at the environment. Whether it was China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, whatever the case may be, or violent domestic extremism threats inside the country, all those kinds of issues—technology, nefarious attempts at investment by foreign actors—I wanted a little bit more of a window into some of that intelligence. If they weren't actual strategic assessments, I even wanted to look at single-source reporting, intelligence reports that were not necessarily analyzed, but we all looked as them and went, wow, that's kind of important. Let's talk about it. What are we going to do about it, but then where do we need to send it? Do we need to send it up to the political level?

When I was in the job, this was very nascent. That committee was up and running for six months. I don't know where that committee is now, how often it meets. It was meeting every two weeks, and there was a standard agenda. The first agenda item was strategic international assessments, the second item was actionable intelligence that we needed to discuss, and the third item was broader coordination issues across the community.

I think that reflects my attempt to try to get on top of this in early days; and then I had my 30 years, and I left at the end of June. I would have loved to worked on that a little bit more if I had stayed in the job longer.

[Rachel Blaney, NDP, North Island—Powell River, BC]

Thank you for that.

I'm wondering in the work that you were doing over the time period that you had, if there were any discussions about how to address information that may impact members of Parliament and candidates during elections and the process that you had. What I think is most frustrating as we go through this is that members of Parliament were not notified that there were things happening about them, and now of course you know, and Ms. Thomas has talked about this, that they're going to do the absolute opposite, which is just give information as quickly as possible. I'm wondering if there was any discussion. Was that something you were looking at, and how were you looking at it?

[Vincent Rigby]

I'm sorry. I have to be careful here, because I can't get into specific advice that I gave to the Prime Minister and the conversations that happened.

I mentioned to you at the end of my opening remarks some of the things that I think we need to do a little bit better in terms of transparency. Certainly there were discussions about giving briefings to all members of Parliament with respect to foreign interference, a general sense to all MPs of the dangers of foreign interference, not just in the context of elections, but more broadly other attempts at coercive foreign interference efforts. There had been a little bit of a talk about that.

Certainly there was a lot of talk about the security of ministers in particular and MPs more broadly. That's not specifically foreign interference, but it could move into the realm of foreign interference on a certain level. All that is to say that there was a great deal of talk about members of Parliament and their roles, including NSICOP, including their possible access to intelligence, talk about giving intelligence clearances, classified clearances, to leaders of the opposition, things like that.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

Thank you.

We are going into five minutes for Mr. Calkins, followed by Ms. Sahota. I would like to keep it tight so that we can try to get through a full round.

Mr. Calkins.

[Blaine Calkins, Conservative, Red Deer—Lacombe, AB]

Thank you, Madam Chair.

Thank you, Mr. Rigby, for being here today and for your years of service to Canada.

I want to go back to this international assessment secretariat. They were ultimately responsible, you said, for producing the weekly briefing that the Prime Minister got, which is the only one that you've assured us that the Prime Minister actually sees, so this obviously is the focal document according to your testimony.

What process did that take? Who signed off on that assessment secretariat? Did that go up the chain through the NSIA? Where did it go through the PCO? Where was the hand-off to the political level? Can you give us a sense of where that document chain would go?

[Vincent Rigby]

Just on what the PM saw or what the PM didn't see, that's to the best of my understanding, certainly when I was an NSIA. I want to be absolutely clear on that. I can't promise you that the PM didn't see some of the dailies, but all I'm saying is that there was one document in particular that was aimed at the Prime Minister on a weekly basis.

In terms of the sign-off, that is signed off, I believe, at the level of the head of IAS. When I ran IAS, I signed off on it, because I was the one who actually introduced.... I don't know if I introduced the daily, but I think it was a weekly back then, but I signed off on it. I tried to give the IAS as much freedom as possible in terms of producing the intelligence and signing off on.... I didn't want a long chain in terms of what went in or what went out. They knew the intelligence. They knew what was important.

[Blaine Calkins, Conservative, Red Deer—Lacombe, AB]

What I'm hearing you say is that, while you were there, the weekly would have gone through the hands or across the desk of the NSIA before it went to somewhere else in the PCO or before it went directly to the Prime Minister's Office.

[Vincent Rigby]

No, it would not go through my hands for sign off. I did not sign it off.

[Blaine Calkins, Conservative, Red Deer—Lacombe, AB]

Would it go directly from the IAS to the Prime Minister's Office?

[Vincent Rigby]

Certainly while I was NSIA. By the time I left, I don't know if that was still the process. Again, you would have to check that with PCO and confirm how it is done now, but that's the way it was done with me.

[Blaine Calkins, Conservative, Red Deer—Lacombe, AB]

That's the way it was done with you. So it would have gone straight.... It would have gone to everybody who had the authority to see that document in the PMO, or would it go to a specific hand-off person when you were there?

[Vincent Rigby]

There was a distribution list. Certain people saw it. Certain organizations saw it. Sometimes there were names. Sometimes there weren't names; they were just organizations.

David Johnston's report talks about that in terms of consistency, but there was a distribution list as to who saw it and who didn't see it.