I suggested three or four recommendations at the end of my opening statement. I honestly believe we do need to fuse the intelligence better and flag it better. I think that my successor has taken some steps in that direction.
As I've said, I made some early attempts with the creation of this DM intelligence committee, which had always focused on strategic level foreign intelligence assessments. I wanted to focus a little bit more on domestic stuff that was happening inside Canada, intelligence that was actually actionable. When you do a very strategic foreign intelligence assessment that say is looking at what is country X doing in region Y, it's not necessarily immediately actionable. But I and a number of colleagues, including David Vigneault, the director of CSIS, said there's stuff coming out that we're not necessarily looking at and thinking about what we need to do in terms of follow-up. So I created that committee.
I think it's a legacy issue. I think it had been there for a long time. I created the deputy minister intelligence assessment committee when I was the head of the international assessment secretariat from 2008 to 2010. I think it was a gap and that's why I created a different committee with a focus both on the strategic assessments and the operational level intelligence.
Does that answer the question that's probably coming as to did anything with respect to Mr. Chong or other targeted MPs come before that committee? No, it didn't. That committee was having teething problems as well.
I'd love to come back and talk about some other ideas. Maybe I'll get another chance.