I think the deputy minister of the intelligence assessment committee, which was in place before.... Again, there were very high-level foreign intelligence strategic assessments looking at the big picture—geostrategic issues, functional issues, etc. I wanted a greater focus on domestic issues, because of hostile-state activities, so I looked at the environment. Whether it was China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, whatever the case may be, or violent domestic extremism threats inside the country, all those kinds of issues—technology, nefarious attempts at investment by foreign actors—I wanted a little bit more of a window into some of that intelligence. If they weren't actual strategic assessments, I even wanted to look at single-source reporting, intelligence reports that were not necessarily analyzed, but we all looked as them and went, wow, that's kind of important. Let's talk about it. What are we going to do about it, but then where do we need to send it? Do we need to send it up to the political level?
When I was in the job, this was very nascent. That committee was up and running for six months. I don't know where that committee is now, how often it meets. It was meeting every two weeks, and there was a standard agenda. The first agenda item was strategic international assessments, the second item was actionable intelligence that we needed to discuss, and the third item was broader coordination issues across the community.
I think that reflects my attempt to try to get on top of this in early days; and then I had my 30 years, and I left at the end of June. I would have loved to worked on that a little bit more if I had stayed in the job longer.