Procedure and House Affairs Committee on June 20th, 2023

[Ward Elcock]

Madam Chair, in response to the honourable member's question, it's rarely hard for intelligence services. Once they get beyond the idea that you're collecting secret intelligence and you've decided you have to share it, most intelligence agencies want to share intelligence information with higher levels of government. The problem in this country—and that's across pretty much all levels, whether we're talking about Parliament, about government, about the bureaucracy or whatever—is that we're not a country that has much concern about national security.

Most Canadians have very little concern about national security and have had little interest over the years. It's not surprising then that sometimes the flow of information beyond the intelligence agency is not as good as it should be if people have no interest.

Unless we build more of a culture of national security—we don't necessarily have to rise to the level of our neighbour to the south, which is a little more obsessed with the subject—and both Canadians and government at all levels develop a broader understanding of national security issues and care more about them, then the reality is that the flow of information will not happen because nobody is really interested.

[Rachel Blaney, NDP, North Island—Powell River, BC]

Thank you for that.

The current CSIS legislation says very clearly that if an MP is targeted, it's really up to the minister to decide what information is given to members of Parliament.

Of course, we know there has been a change to that process, through a ministerial directive, but I'm still concerned about that. In your view, is it time for us to review that section of legislation, and is there a better process to review it into a more regulated format?

[Ward Elcock]

Madam Chair, I think one can over-complicate the issue of providing flow of information. There are challenges to providing information to anybody beyond the service, because what you're talking about is counter-espionage operations, which are very sensitive and very difficult, so the disclosure of information that discloses the existence of investigations is complicated.

The flow of information to members of Parliament really ought to be couched around the level of risk and whether there is a real level of risk. If there is a real level of risk, then information should flow in some way. For example, it was not a minister or a member of Parliament, but there was a murder recently in British Columbia and there was a report in the paper that there was a threat briefing for that individual from CSIS. There were obviously death threats in respect of that individual. That's very serious and at that point you clearly want to try to make sure information flows.

Whether all information about all levels of foreign interference needs to flow is a big question, and I doubt very much whether it's in the interests of counter-espionage operations for all of that information to flow in order to protect those operations.

[Rachel Blaney, NDP, North Island—Powell River, BC]

Well, another discussion we've had here is around education and having broader education for Canadians on the whole, so they better understand what foreign interference could look like and at least have that critical thought.

You talked about building a culture of concern.

Do you think that education of members of Parliament, all levels of government and everyday Canadians would be a key part of that process?

[Ward Elcock]

The hope, Madam Chair, on the part of many people in the intelligence and national security community was that talking more about issues of national security would cause people to care more about it. I suspect that probably doesn't really happen. I suspect it requires something more like the current discussion. Although I don't like the way in which it has happened and it's entirely inappropriate, it clearly has stimulated some discussion. Unfortunately, I think some of it has been overly mired in politics, and partisan politics in particular.

[Rachel Blaney, NDP, North Island—Powell River, BC]

Thank you for that.

When you talk about a culture of concern, how do we create that? What's your opinion on that?

[Ward Elcock]

Madam Chair, I think the way to create that is ultimately for Canadians to have an interest in national security issues, to pay attention to those issues and to demand that their elected representatives also pay attention to those issues.

In my view, elected officials are wise people. If they know that the average Canadian doesn't care about national security, I suspect there are not many elected officials who are going to spend a lot of time on national security issues. If Canadians demand that people pay attention to those issues, then there will inevitably be more discussion of them and we will perhaps arrive at a place that most of our allies arrived at years ago.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

Thank you.

We'll go to the second round with Mr. Cooper, followed by Mrs. Sahota.

Mr. Cooper.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

Thank you, Madam Chair.

Mr. Cooper, in your June 15 article in The Bureau, you indicate that the NSICOP report from 2019 on foreign interference states “there were important gaps in the documents” disclosed by the PCO to NSICOP.

Are you able to elaborate upon that in any way?

[Samuel Cooper]

I have read the documents, and that story you cite included a number of quotations and I would say my very rigorous analysis of the document and the findings. The panel examined 620 intelligence documents, representing over 4,000 pages of material. They noted that CSIS was very forthcoming in disclosures, the RCMP was forthcoming, and Public Safety Canada contributed “little” was the wording.

The quotation I wrote in that story was that there were important gaps in Privy Council Office documents. That was a terse statement, and there was no context beyond that statement. I can make an educated assessment that.... As the honourable members know, the Privy Council Office is there to give counsel on national security matters to the cabinet. If there were important documents missing, it would lead me to speculate that perhaps there were records that would have provided more clarity on what was known about key risks. I can't give the member any more information than that.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

Okay. Thank you very much for clarifying that.

You noted in your interview with Erin O'Toole that you'd be reporting more on the Beijing police activities in Canada. You said, “We now have reports of...[Beijing] officials coming into Canada under false cover and acting within these so-called police networks. It's not just about buildings, it's about networks and community meetings.”

Can you elaborate upon that?

[Samuel Cooper]

Yes, I will be reporting on those matters further, but I think it's fair to share my generalized knowledge today about why my public interest standards are so focused on the issue.

I understand from many years of source disclosure and knowledge—including my own ventures into Hong Kong Canadian, Chinese Canadian and Uyghur Canadian diaspora communities—that there is an unacceptable level of fear within some of these communities about suspected foreign officials coming into Canada.

I reported on a case—again, I'm citing my book—about one of China's most wanted. Back in the late 1990s and early 2000s, a man named Lai Changxing.... There are enough court documents that the members can search his case. I think this context is important. He came to Canada and was engaged in an underground casino, money laundering and criminal activities. He was also, as evidence showed, quite connected to the various sectors of the Chinese security and intelligence apparatus, yet he got on the wrong side of some people in Beijing. They pursued him with police agents from the Ministry of Public Security and a special unit that came into Canada under false business visas.

I understand this activity has accelerated since 2015 in Canada. We now know of the police stations because of safeguard defenders, but it's about community networks with, my sources say, feared people acting with officials from China to question and intimidate people in the community.

Again, it's not about six or seven known buildings in Canada, as the safeguard defenders say. This is about networks and the flow of communications between the Ministry of Public Security and, as we see in the indictments in the United States, proxies who live, work and do business in communities. That's what I am concerned about in cities, including Toronto and Vancouver.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

Thank you.

Go ahead, Ms. Sahota.

[Ruby Sahota, Liberal, Brampton North, ON]

Thank you, Madam Chair.

Mr. Cooper, I want to give you the opportunity to clarify the question, again, regarding whether, before writing your first article, you reviewed some sort of transcript or listened to a tape.

I know you said you won't be speaking to legal proceedings or editorial decisions. Of course, we don't want you to reveal sources, but I believe that's a question you should be able to answer: whether you reviewed or read a transcript before coming up with the story on Han Dong.

[Samuel Cooper]

I'm sorry. Which story are you referring to?

[Ruby Sahota, Liberal, Brampton North, ON]

I'm referring particularly to the allegations regarding the member for Don Valley North.

[Samuel Cooper]

With apologies to the honourable member, I can say that I reviewed documents and spoke with sources with knowledge of the high-profile and sensitive investigations started in 2019, but I can't speak further to the nature of editorial and legal procedures surrounding that particular story.

[Ruby Sahota, Liberal, Brampton North, ON]

Was that document a transcript?

[Samuel Cooper]

I'm not going to answer that, because, as I said, I won't speak to editorial or legal procedures in detail surrounding stories. The story speaks for itself. We're referring to a story that is the subject of legal activity. The filed statement of defence speaks to all the information you will get on that.

[Ruby Sahota, Liberal, Brampton North, ON]

Global News's legal statement says they were, in particular, allegations and not factual findings.

Would you agree with this, Mr. Cooper?

[Samuel Cooper]

The story is in regard to information from sources who make allegations. It's very clear that there have been no prosecutions or findings of fact regarding that story or any of the matters we're here speaking about.

[Ruby Sahota, Liberal, Brampton North, ON]

The issue that I have—

[Samuel Cooper]

If the member would let me finish.... We are here today in a very generalized way, because we don't have a foreign interference registry. We have recommendations in NSICOP 2019—

[Ruby Sahota, Liberal, Brampton North, ON]

I think I have my answer. Thank you, Mr. Cooper.

[Samuel Cooper]

Please let me finish. This government studied—