Procedure and House Affairs Committee on June 20th, 2023

[Rachel Blaney, NDP, North Island—Powell River, BC]

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

We really want to thank you for your time and attention today, Ms. Samson.

I know you will be sending some information to our clerk. We will have that translated in both official languages and circulated around. Should anything else come to mind, please do not hesitate to reach out.

Once again, on behalf of PROC committee members, thank you for your time and attention today. We wish you a good rest of the day.

With that, committee members, we will suspend to do the quick switchover for our next panel.

The meeting is suspended. Please don't go far.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

Good morning, everyone.

We are going to call the meeting back to order.

On our next panel, we have Mr. Ward Elcock, former director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service; and from The Bureau, Sam Cooper, investigative journalist.

You will each have up to five minutes for an opening statement.

Mr. Cooper, we will start with you. Welcome to PROC.

[Samuel Cooper, Investigative Journalist, The Bureau]

Thank you. It's an honour to be called to testify.

My name is Sam Cooper and I am now reporting for my own journalism platform, The Bureau. The Bureau's first two stories are relevant to your examination today of information I reviewed in documents regarding Beijing's “Threatening Canada's elected officials to deter criticism”.

First, I wish to inform the committee of how I collected knowledge on these matters in the past decade. While covering foreign investment in Vancouver real estate, I started researching foreign interference in connection with the public statements of former CSIS director Richard Fadden in 2010.

In September 2014, for The Province newspaper, I authored a story entitled, “Is China influencing B.C.’s municipal politicians?” The story, using access to information, examined CSIS documents.

In March 2015, for The Province, I authored another story entitled, “Chinese police run secret operations in B.C. to hunt allegedly corrupt officials and laundered money”.

I believe these stories provide historical context for this committee.

Now I'll go to the 2021 federal election.

I’ll quote from now-public information in my June 17 article for The Bureau, which was an extended interview with MP Erin O'Toole.

In the published interview, I told Mr. O'Toole:

I've reported about this January 2022 Privy Council Office intelligence report, sourced from 100 CSIS reports...what the document said, is that a “small number of MPs in the 2021 election reported concern for their families, their privacy, their reputations, and their reelection chances, as a result of targeted CCP activity.”

Mr. O'Toole answered:

...that's very troubling to hear. I'm not surprised, because when I was briefed on the examples of intelligence that were shared with me.... And some of the activities were so intense in the Greater Toronto Area and the Lower Mainland of British Columbia, it would not surprise me if people were followed. Tabs kept on people, intimidation, voter suppression.

I questioned Mr. O'Toole again, saying:

I learned from sources aware of CSIS investigations in 2021, that CSIS officers found that Chinese officials in Toronto were following one MP during the campaign.

They were also allegedly approaching voters in relation to this candidate. And CSIS found this activity, I was told, coordinated and alarming.

Mr. O'Toole answered:

Well, that seems to coordinate or correspond completely with the fourth element that I included in my speech in the House of Commons.

Which is one clear example of voter suppression in a riding in Canada.

Finally, I'll quote from the preamble to my interview with Mr. O'Toole in my article. In it, I explain that I personally received a CSIS threat brief in 2021 after my book on Chinese foreign interference in Canada was published.

I wrote this in my June 17 article for The Bureau:

So, a CSIS officer met me in Ottawa.... I was told that Chinese security agents in Canada are dangerous. And they were tasked to look into my background, study the impact of my book, and to discover my reporting sources.

I believe this information provides important context for the committee on the Chinese Communist Party seeking to influence or intimidate journalists in the same way it seeks to influence or threaten Canadian politicians.

I look forward to your questions, but I am sure the honourable members understand I take the protection of my sources very seriously. Please understand I cannot answer questions about identifying confidential sources, or speak about editorial or legal processes regarding my prior reporting.

Thanks.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

Thank you.

Mr. Elcock, welcome to PROC. The floor is yours.

[Ward Elcock, Former Director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, As an Individual]

Madam Chair, thank you very much for the introduction.

I don't have any prepared remarks, but I'm happy to try to answer any questions members may have. Obviously, I am still subject to security of information legislation, so there are limits to what I can say, even from my memories.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

That's very concise. Thank you for those comments.

We will enter into six-minute rounds, starting with Mr. Cooper and followed by Mr. Turnbull.

Go ahead, Mr. Cooper.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

Thank you very much, Madam Chair.

Thank you to the witnesses.

I will direct my questions to Mr. Cooper—no relation.

You reported that Beijing's Toronto consulate directed clandestine funding through proxies in the 2019 election.

Can you elaborate on how this scheme worked?

[Samuel Cooper]

Again, I'm going to have to be very within the lines of the reporting that I did, and not speak to the collection of sourcing, whether it be from persons with awareness of investigations, or persons with awareness of the January 2022 Privy Council Office special report sourced from 100 CSIS reports.

I have commented that this document, according to my understanding, is sourced from investigations that started in the Toronto area in January 2019. The document very clearly states that, from my recollection, the Toronto consulate directed clandestine funding into an election interference network.

As members know, the story has had great impact. We're here today because of that story. I do need to not speak very freely about the sourcing or the methods that I understand. I need to stick to, simply, the stories, which speak for themselves.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

I recognize that, but the Prime Minister, in response to your reporting, has repeatedly claimed that he was never briefed about both candidates receiving money from China. Now, it's my observation that that statement is very carefully crafted and deliberate, because it seems to me to be unlikely that Beijing would simply transfer funds directly to a candidate and that the scheme would be significantly more elaborate than that.

Based upon the intelligence you reviewed, did Beijing indirectly fund candidates in the 2019 election through this clandestine network?

[Samuel Cooper]

Before answering your question, I'll refer back to..... I know members paid close attention to the speech by MPErin O'Toole. From my recollection, on his CSIS threat briefing, he spoke of concrete funding of a misinformation product through the United Front Work Department directed from Beijing. From my understanding of his speech, funds were paid in Canada to fund a misinformation product. Essentially, from my understanding of his speech, it was to attack Mr. O'Toole's reputation.

It's fair to say that, conversely—and I've explained this in a number of interviews about my reporting—Beijing uses carrots and sticks. If we're talking about the concrete funding of a misinformation product, a stick to attack a member of Parliament, it is very reasonable, and according to sources with awareness of the investigations, to understand that the consulate was also directing funds into an election interference network comprising many different types of individuals. It comprised, from what I understand from having read in a Privy Council Office intelligence assessment, media entities who were controlled by the Chinese Communist Party.

Did Beijing fund candidates? It's my understanding it funded a network, which was directed to support Beijing's preferred candidates.

As member O'Toole told me in my interview for the first story, he wasn't going to speak to the exact methods of transfer. I don't know if CSIS has visibility on exchanges, physical exchanges, such as wire transfers. Perhaps Mr. Elcock can clarify that.

Technology has advanced, but I know that CSIS both has and studies FINTRAC records. I believe and understand that FINTRAC records will provide revelations on direct methods of transfer and where money went.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

Mr. O'Toole did cite, essentially four ways in which Beijing interfered in the 2021 election. Based upon your review of intelligence relating to the 2019 election, is it accurate to say that the same or similar methods were employed?

[Samuel Cooper]

I believe it's accurate to say that the United Front Work Department has a very large and sophisticated network of community proxies. I just reported, in my first story for The Bureau several days ago, citing the NSICOP 2019 foreign interference review, that the consul general in Vancouver, round about 2015, boasted of controlling over 100 community groups.

I have written a number of reports pointing towards the control of community groups and community leader proxies to support certain candidates. This support can come through, according to the documents I read, funds for media and logistical support.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

Thank you.

Mr. Turnbull.

[Ryan Turnbull, Liberal, Whitby, ON]

Thanks, Madam Chair.

Thanks to the witnesses for being here today.

Mr. Elcock, I've been paying particular attention to some of the interviews you've been giving in the media over the course of the past few months. There have been many times when I've thought the remarks you've made have been quite insightful on matters of foreign interference.

One thing in particular that you've said multiple times is that you felt that these intelligence leaks over multiple months have been kind of a slow drip and that they were likely politically motivated. Can you explain why you would say that?

[Ward Elcock]

In trying to determine who the leaker is, one alternative is that there was a political motivation. I can't be certain about that because I obviously don't know who the leaker is. At this point, as far as we know, nobody knows who the leaker is. Certainly that would be a possible motivation.

It has been striking, throughout the process, however, how the information flow was managed. I assume it was not dripped out to the news media or to the various reporters who had the information, but that it flowed over a shorter period of time. However, has been very carefully dripped out to keep the story going as much as anything, perhaps. The idea of political motivation is hard to avoid.

[Ryan Turnbull, Liberal, Whitby, ON]

Thank you.

Mr. Cooper, I'll turn to you now.

On March 22, you published an article with the headline, “Liberal MP Han Dong secretly advised Chinese diplomat in 2021 to delay freeing Two Michaels”. Do you stand by this headline?

[Samuel Cooper]

I don't write the headlines, but I stand by the story. I know that Global News stands by the story. There is a legal procedure under way.

The story speaks for itself and the statement of defence speaks for itself. The story stands.

[Ryan Turnbull, Liberal, Whitby, ON]

Despite the fact that the article used the term “allegedly” at least about 10 times, the newspaper chose to frame the headline excluding that language in the headline. Was that done on purpose?

[Samuel Cooper]

I said at the outset that I won't speak to editorial processes or legal procedures, but I can assure the honourable member that legal vetting and editorial vetting of these stories is extremely rigorous. That's all I'll say about that—

[Ryan Turnbull, Liberal, Whitby, ON]

Why didn't you include “allegedly” in the headline, Mr. Cooper?

[Samuel Cooper]

This is a matter for editorial procedures and legal vetting procedures.

[Ryan Turnbull, Liberal, Whitby, ON]

Did you review the transcript of the supposed conversation between MP Dong and the consul general?

[Samuel Cooper]

I told the honourable member at the outset that I'm not going to speak to editorial processes, identification of sources or legal procedures around this story. I'll repeat it again.

[Ryan Turnbull, Liberal, Whitby, ON]

Thank you.

Will you table the supposed transcript, which does exist, as we've learned from the Right Honourable David Johnston's report? If you have or haven't reviewed that—I understand you won't talk about it—will you table the transcript with this committee please?