Thank you for allowing me to be here. I apologize that I'm not able to attend in person. Somewhat ironically, the teachers in Saskatchewan are in a rotating strike position, and I've been having to pick up my kids for lunch hours, so we were unable to leave until last week.
I really am honoured to be before this committee. I think this is a very important bill. I have been following the debates in the House and in this committee quite closely.
In looking at the bill as a whole, I want to argue before this committee—and I have submitted my speaking notes—that as presented, it is a logical extension of Canada's industrial relations system, which is based, and has historically been based since its inception in the 1940s, on the notion of industrial peace.
In short, I want to argue that anti-scab legislation as presented in this bill is an important tool to further promote the Government of Canada's long-held policy goal. In the words of industrial relations scholars Jon Peirce and Karen Bentham, this is “to regulate strikes with an eye to protecting the public interest and maintaining public peace and order”.
In making this argument, I don't want to repeat the points that have been made by unions and businesses in critiquing or supporting the bill. Rather, I want to take up the challenge that was raised before this committee on April 11 by some of the presenters, who said, “much of what has been said to date is simply not rooted in documented reality.” They claim that the literature proves two things clearly. One is that “Replacement worker bans result in more strikes”; the other is that they result in “longer strikes”.
I fundamentally disagree with this interpretation of the data. It is, in my opinion, a narrow reading of the literature on strikes and lockouts in Canada. I'll further seek to explain my argument—which is laid out in more detail in my submission—by looking at the two jurisdictions that have introduced anti-scab legislation: Quebec and British Columbia.
There are a few things before I get to that particular point.
When we look at Canada's industrial relations system, it's built on this idea of industrial peace. Since the 1940s, the Canadian government's provincial counterparts have designed an industrial relations system that is very much designed to restrict the ability of organizations like unions to withdraw their labour at will. They can only do it in very specific times and in very specific circumstances. They have to go through a significant set of legal hurdles to withdraw their labour, and that's declared a legal strike. I could get into that in more detail if people want, but I'm sure you are aware of it.
They can only strike after declaring an impasse in bargaining. Usually, in most jurisdictions, they can only do so after a mandatory cooling-off period before mandatory conciliation. All strikes must be authorized by a vote of the membership. The list goes on and on.
My argument would be that the governments in Canada have already put up significant hurdles for unions to withdraw their labour and to declare a legal strike, all with the policy goal of declaring industrial peace.
Once a legal strike has been declared, though, the one remaining hurdle that contributes to more intensity on the picket line—and we have documented this with qualitative research interviewing strikers over the past 40 years—is that when scabs are used, there's a high likelihood of more intense violence on the picket line. That is a well-documented result of the use of replacement workers in Canada and in Canadian strike history.
Taken together, what I would summarize, using the examples so far, is that legal rules in the Canadian system already place numerous restrictions on workers' ability to strike. In so doing, when workers take that legal action, they're not doing it in any willy-nilly kind of way. They're following a very specific set of rules that were developed over the last 80 years or so.
However, we're still left with this conundrum of how we can maintain peace and stability on the picket line. I would argue that this bill goes a long way to doing that. We know this because two jurisdictions in Canada have implemented anti-scab legislation, and they're both long-standing. They've lasted the test of time, and they haven't been withdrawn by governments of any political stripe.
In Quebec, in 1977, the Parti Québécois government of René Lévesque passed an anti-scab bill to address some serious concerns with the construction industry. In 1993, the government of Mike Harcourt did something similar in British Columbia.
With regard to two claims that were made by witnesses on April 11, they argue there's a possibility that anti-scab legislation will contribute to more strikes and to longer strikes. However, when we look at the data historically, I find very little evidence to support this claim.
In 1977, when the Quebec government passed this legislation, strikes did indeed go up slightly, but from the 1980s until last year, they fell precipitously. This struck me when I was looking at strike data over the weekend.
The 2023 numbers were recently released. In 2023, Quebec went through a historic number of strikes, but it would be hard to make the argument that—