Mr. Chair, the statement is here.
We've looked at the issue of how far we should go in reducing the distinction between natural-born children and adopted children and whether we can reduce it to this extent. The feeling after looking at court cases, particularly a case a number of years ago that started with the human rights tribunal and eventually led to the Federal Court of Appeal, was that we had to reduce as much as possible distinctions between natural-born and adopted children, and that would include reducing or eliminating the prohibitions under citizenship.
In the case of natural-born—or biological—children of Canadian citizens who are born abroad, there are no security or criminality prohibitions. In having those kinds of prohibitions for adopted children, the feeling is that you'd be making a significant discrimination between adopted children and natural-born children.
In reviewing that, we also need to look first at whether it would likely lead to a section 15 failure in the charter—I think the assumption is that it probably would—and whether there could be a section 1 defence of that. The challenge is to be able to argue in a section 1 defence that it's more likely for adopted children than for natural-born children to be criminals.
In asking the question, you almost give yourself the answer. Certainly we don't have any evidence in front of us that would suggest that adoptees are more likely to be criminals or security concerns than natural-born children.