Thank you.
Mr. Chair and committee members, I thank you, as well, for inviting us, and I do echo the comments of my colleague.
There is a concept known as domain awareness, and respectfully, Canada is not aware of its domain. Given Canada's lack of sufficient intelligence capabilities, we seldom know if individuals or cargo accessing Canadian territory pose a threat to the nation, be it of health, safety, or even economic natures. Within that context, unfortunately, a paradox exists, where foreign nationals gather intelligence on us, allowing them to use our systems and procedures against us.
For all of that, we have three major areas of concern.
Internally, there is a failure to share intelligence and analysis within Canada, something that is well documented in chapter 2 of the fall 2011 Auditor General's report—a chapter related to the issuance of visas.
Externally, Canada is not being sufficiently plugged in to the international intelligence community, particularly the Five Eyes. This is partly a function of Canada's inability to share information, as we have no agency mandated to gather intelligence on foreign nationals not residing in Canada.
Thirdly, Canada has policies and practices that are viewed as vulnerable to access by certain individuals wishing to gain entry into North America.
In this light, the government should ask this. Why it is that so few applications from known regions of unrest, such as North Africa, Pakistan, and the Middle East, are not identified as potential risks to Canada?
To address these concerns, we propose a layered approach of multiple lines of defence, with one of them being a DFAIT recommendation of admissibility based on intelligence that is responsive to national security concerns, not domestic and foreign political pressures.
Validated, sound intelligence ensures legitimate visitors and business travellers, refugee claimants, and immigrant workers and entrepreneurs are let in, and war criminals and terrorists are kept out.
Under such a structure, people without legitimate claims would not even get near Canadian territory, and we feel such an approach would have helped avoid the recent revelations of war criminals living in Canada.
On the discussion of biometrics, we have found them to be useful, with the NEXUS system being a good example. The question should be how the technology is used, not if it is useful. In fact, it is inefficient and even a waste of funding for Canada to invest in biometric technologies without proper intelligence backbone structures to make these technologies worthwhile.
Generally, there are two camps regarding biometrics. The first camp says use them as a mechanism to confirm identity, and the second says cross-reference them against shared databases with a view to understanding the history of a person.
Respectfully, the suggestion of the first camp adds little value. Sophisticated forgery, albeit expensive in some cases, is readily available throughout the world and can easily circumvent this security initiative.
I would ask you to consider the following scenario.
An individual from Africa or Asia enters Albania, a relatively easy country to enter these days. From Albania, this individual makes their way to an EU member state, such as Italy, Bulgaria, or Greece, where gaining access to Canada from an EU member state becomes infinitely easier. However, along the way this individual could have changed their identity by obtaining false documentation, documentation that can include forged and phony biometric data. This possibility certainly exists, and criminal groups have the technological means to do this.
Finally, this individual reaches a Canadian entry point. Cross-referencing their data against false documentation tells the CBSA official one thing—the biometric data matches the false documentation. And it is only at this point that Canadian agencies would begin to build a file on this individual.
Reconsider the same scenario, this time where data is cross-referenced into a larger Canadian database, which also includes the Five Eyes, because Canada has ventured into a cooperative effort with its allies. All of this adds a significant value to Canadian authorities, so they can get a better understanding of the individual's history.
The primary issue here is that Canada has little international capacity for matters of intelligence, and it is only compounded by limited international cooperation on these same matters.
The minimal information we have today is compiled from our missions, yet these missions lack resources, such as intelligence capabilities, leaving screening officers with little to make meaningful assessments. This situation is only exacerbated as, in many cases, screening officers may not even be Canadian nationals. Simple things such as talking with local law enforcement is difficult to accomplish as we lack resources and networks.
We suffer from internal issues as well. If the RCMP or CSIS has somebody on their watch list, but they do not inform CBSA, it is not the fault of CBSA that they let the individual into the country. It is the fault of the system for not ensuring that necessary agencies can easily integrate and share their information. What this demonstrates is that Canada needs to know more about the individuals before they approach Canada. This, in a nutshell, is domain awareness.
The situation becomes even more daunting because of inadequate ongoing training and an overreliance on technology, which risks both increased danger and complacent behaviour. Investing in sophisticated technology here in Canada is of little use to us if we have no information to cross-reference the technology against. Better pre-screening requires investment abroad, not here. There are simple tactics that could give Canadian authorities the necessary resources to address claims swiftly, and more importantly, that would allow them to make the right decisions.
For all that, there's an underlying issue that cannot be overlooked: cyber-threats. If Canadian agencies decide to work in a more collaborative effort, which in our opinion they should, there's the issue of information assurance. If Canada goes down the route of biometrics and similar technologies that build a database of personal information, we suggest that CIC and CBSA have IT security measures that are at least as good as those of the RCMP and CSIS, if not better. Without these measures, these agencies become prime targets for foreign agencies seeking to find information on their own nationals or the nationals of rivals. In essence, a lack of information assurance on Canada's part becomes a treasure trove for foreign agencies.
Part of the problem that exists within the Canadian context, and we cannot overemphasize this, is one of resource management and resource utilization. Ironically, this is a function not of technology but of human resources. There are individual Canadians and Canadian institutions that have the knowledge and expertise, and the domestic and international networks. They can play a critical, positive, and important role in this dialogue. Unfortunately, in Canada's current state, individuals and institutions are sidelined, rendering their invaluable resources not only underutilized, but in many cases, not even recognized. The Canadian structure is either unaware, unable, or unwilling to engage these individuals.
Domain awareness will allow us to work more closely with our national allies. As the domain becomes more secure, Canadians should enjoy more freedoms, greater ease of travel, potential—