Citizenship and Immigration Committee on March 15th, 2012

[Dr. Eileen de Villa]

I'm sorry, we are getting an electronic message that our conference is over. Can you still hear us?

[The Chair, Conservative, David Tilson]

We can still hear you. I don't know where that came from. It was not from us.

What happened? How can they do that? Instead I have to look at Davies.

This is all on the record, by the way.

We will suspend.

[The Chair, Conservative, David Tilson]

We will reconvene our meeting. We have three witnesses.

From the World Sikh Organization of Canada here in Ottawa, we have Mr. Balpreet Singh, who is a lawyer.

By video conference from Richmond Hill, from the Centre of Excellence in Security, Resilience, and Intelligence of the Schulich Executive Education Centre, we have George Platsis and Walter Perchal.

Good afternoon to all three of you.

Mr. Singh, you have 10 minutes to make a presentation to the committee.

[Balpreet Singh, Legal Counsel, World Sikh Organization of Canada]

Thank you. Good afternoon. I would like to thank you all for having me here today.

The World Sikh Organization of Canada was established 28 years ago as a national representative body of Canadian Sikhs, and also as a non-profit human rights organization to advocate on behalf of the human rights of all individuals regardless of their background.

Canada's visa and consular officials are on the ground to ensure Canadians are safe and those who are a danger to Canada or have been suspected of having involvement in human rights abuses aren't allowed to enter our borders.

It's absolutely imperative that our visa officials have the full support of all of us, including the Canadian government, to do their job and make those hard decisions.

I'd like to turn your attention to an incident that took place in May 2010, in which I believe quite the opposite happened. In May 2010, an uproar took place in India with respect to a decision by our visa officers to deny Canadian visas to members of India's security forces. The individuals were found inadmissible due to alleged human rights violations and also the threat of espionage. After intense pressure from India and some Indian media, the Canadian government apologized for the visa rejections. A statement was issued that clarified that the position of the visa officers in New Delhi doesn't reflect the Canadian government's position.

In addition the statement read, and I'll quote:

...this unfortunate incident has demonstrated that the deliberately broad legislation may create instances when the net is cast too widely by officials, creating irritants with our trusted and valued international allies. For this reason the admissibility policy within the legislation is under active review at this time.

I believe this incident highlighted how our visa system, and by default, our security can be compromised by political and diplomatic pressures. It's our position that these visa rejections were, in fact, well thought out and appropriate, and those individuals had no place in Canada.

I'd like to take a look at the three cases that were highlighted by Indian media with regard to the visa rejections. The first was a Punjab police officer by the name of R.S. Khattra who had applied for a Canadian visa to attend the World Police and Fire Games in British Columbia. He had been posted to an area in the Punjab that suffered severe human rights violations during the late 1980s and 1990s. According to the Indian newspaper The Tribune, in a letter sent to Mr. Khattra, Canadian embassy vice-consul Sharon Hogan stated that he must be fully aware of the widespread, systematic extrajudicial killings and human rights violations by the Punjab Police during the operations, but he did not intervene to stop them.

The letter also read, according to the Indian media:

You are at the very least wilfully blind to the crimes against humanity committed by the Punjab Police in Amritsar district. During the investigation, arrest and interrogation, [during] your posting, you may have been directly involved or at the very least helped to increase the effectiveness of the Punjab Police in Amritsar district at a time when a large number of police forces in the area were involved in the commission of crimes against humanity.

As a human rights group that has knowledge of the area as well as this time, we feel that was a completely legitimate observation. Rather than apologizing for Ms. Hogan's position, Canada should have fully supported it.

Mr. Khattra himself is personally implicated in human rights violations just in the 1990s, but a simple Google search will reveal that as recently as February 2010 and again in November 2010 he was accused of kidnapping, illegal detention, and ransacking the houses of suspects. Such a person has no place in Canada.

The second case that was highlighted by the Indian media was a denial of a Canadian visa to a deputy director of the Indian Intelligence Bureau. The officer was denied a visa on the grounds that he could engage in active espionage or subversion, or violence that would or might endanger the lives and safety of persons in Canada. Those are very serious concerns and not at all unfounded.

Maloy Krishna Dhar, a former joint director and 29-year veteran of that same force, the Intelligence Bureau, and a former colleague of this individual was, in fact, posted in Ottawa for a diplomatic posting from 1983 to 1987. In his memoirs, titled Open Secrets, on page 293, he says that his mission in Canada was to penetrate gurdwaras—Sikh places of worship—and Punjabi media, create assets in the Sikh community, and also to generate "a few 'friends' amongst the Canadian Members of Parliament”.

He writes on page 302 of his memoirs: “I do not intend to disclose the details of the intelligence operations that were carried out between Mani, Shashi”—his colleagues—“and me in deference to the niceties of diplomatic protocol. But we did a lot and reached appreciable penetration in the key Sikh inhabited cities in Canada.”

Rather than supporting our visa officers' conclusions and reasons, which were once again completely valid, the opposite happened. The Indian media reported that the IB officer was granted a visa after the Canadian High Commissioner was summoned to the Indian foreign office and told of India's displeasure over the earlier decision.

The third and final example that was highlighted in the Indian media was the denial of a visa to a member of India's Border Security Force. Eric Verner, first secretary of immigration, wrote in the denial letter that the former BSF member was associated with a notoriously violent force, and that the BSF had engaged in systematic attacks on civilians and has been responsible for systematically torturing suspected criminals.

That position would be supported by human rights groups all across the world, including our own. According to Human Rights Watch's 2012 report, BSF members have indiscriminately killed 900 individuals on the Bangladesh-India border in just the past 10 years, with no prosecutions. In January 2012, a video of BSF personnel brutally torturing a Bangladeshi citizen was made public. Human Rights Watch said that the BSF was a force out of control.

Mr. Verner's reasoning to keep this individual out of Canada was completely sound and supported by human rights groups. Once again, for some reason, we backed down. Throughout this incident, some Indian media attacked Canadian consular officials as being preachy moralists who don't understand the complexities of a country. A columnist for the Sunday edition of The Pioneer in New Delhi, which is a well-read newspaper, said,

Since there are no accepted global yardsticks, Canada has set up its own war crimes section where, presumably, gullible, starry-eyed youngsters, fresh from university and an internship with some ridiculous human rights activist body, sit in judgment over the Indian army.

Rather than defending our visa officers, who have the expertise to make these decisions, we backed down and promised to review the admissibility policy in the current legislation. This, with respect, was the wrong thing to do. People responsible for human rights violations have no business in Canada, whether they are from India or anywhere else. With respect, this is not an anti-India position. WSO, my organization, supports increased trade with India. Many of us have family roots in India, so it's important for us to see both countries do well.

Keeping out human rights violators isn't just in the interests of Canadians, but also of Indians. A senior editor of The Times of India—one of the most well-read newspapers in India—Manoj Mitta, in a speech here in Ottawa in 2010, which was later republished on his blog, said:

As a journalist tracking legal and human rights issues, as an independent observer of the Indian state's record in these areas, I was delighted to discover the civilizing potential of your rules forbidding entry to those involved in attacks on civilians or terrorism, systematic or gross human rights violations or genocide.... As an independent journalist, I cannot help expressing disappointment at your government's retraction on the visa issue.

To summarize, it's absolutely essential that we support our visa officers and their expertise in making these decisions. What has to come first is safety and not politics.

With the brief time I have left, I'd like to turn my attention to another issue. I know this committee has heard evidence from some witnesses to the extent that the greatest threat Canada faces right now is Muslim immigration. The cases of some European countries have been cited as an example of what pitfalls await here if we don't crack down. I would caution you not to accept such impressionistic evidence. The freedoms we enjoy in Canada and the culture of tolerance we have fostered and embodied in our charter make us very different from Europe or other countries in the world. The rights that we have here go a long way to prevent marginalization and alienation of minority groups, and by default, prevent radicalization.

As a Canadian Sikh, I know my community was the subject of baseless allegations of rising extremism in 2010. Two years later, time has proven that no such thing exists, and young Canadian Sikhs are more engaged today in Canada than they ever have been before, whether it's politics, the army, or police. Two years ago, the political rhetoric said that extremism was rising. I would ask that you look at these allegations of radicalism in the Muslim community with a large level of skepticism.

Certainly, what we need to avoid is racial or religious profiling of entire communities based on innuendo. That's a turn away from our Canadian values and absolutely inappropriate. Our safety and the security of our borders aren't an ethnic or religious issue. Our focus has to remain on techniques and steps to improve screening and security, and these steps have to apply to all, regardless of their nationality, ethnicity, or religion.

Those are my comments. Thank you.

[The Chair, Conservative, David Tilson]

You were almost right on time. Perfect.

Mr. Platsis and Mr. Perchal, you have 10 minutes between the two of you.

[Lieutenant-Colonel Walter Perchal, Program Director, Centre of Excellence in Security, Resilience, and Intelligence, Schulich Executive Education Centre]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and honourable members.

My colleague, Mr. Platsis, and I would like to thank you for inviting us to testify today regarding this important issue. We serve as program directors for the Centre of Excellence in Security, Resilience, and Intelligence at the Schulich Executive Education Centre, part of the Schulich School of Business—a global top-ten business school at York University in Toronto.

The centre has emerged in response to growing concerns of a diverse group of public and private sector stakeholders. Within a context that defines the central motivating driver as increasing rates of change in society colliding with limited ability for adaptation, we're increasingly less prepared for the plethora of changes that define the 21st century, thus defining the probability of failure in both public and private institutions.

Within that context, the centre focuses on three particular areas of concern. The first is security. We are confronted by international instability, and at the same time we face emerging challenges, such as cyber-threats and terrorism by multiple actors in their various forms. The second is resiliency. We view that proactivity is better than reaction. The third is intelligence as both a force protector and a force multiplier, acting as the single most effective proactive measure.

This serves as our point of departure for today's discussion, and while the centre represents and affects the public, private, and academic sectors, as well as nations friendly to Canada, the comments and opinions made during this testimony are our own, do not reflect the view of any of the institutions we are affiliated with, and should be attributed accordingly.

The realities of the 21st century insist that the proliferation of information technology has allowed single individuals to be significant threats to the state, equalling the likes of many of the groups we are currently concerned with. Empirical evidence supports this view. In this reality the core issues of the immigration file are ones of security and intelligence, not technology or procedure or even defence. In an ever-changing environment where threats expand on an exponential basis, any meaningful progress on this issue requires a progressive, integrated, and cooperative approach.

The members should know that we see immigration as critically important to Canada. How policy is handled and developed plays a crucial role not only in the demographics and economics of Canada but also in the culture and the identity of this country. Since we are children of immigrants, our interests are defined by the remarkable possibilities that Canada's diverse multicultural society represents, and how it can serve as a template for the world. For all of that, we therefore believe that the net benefit of an effective customs and immigration policy will be that entry into and exit from Canada are more efficient and less intrusive, thus ensuring Canada's security. However, within this view our concerns focus not on intentions but on the vulnerabilities that the current state of immigration policy defines.

With that said, I pass over the remainder of my testimony to my colleague Mr. Platsis.

[George Platsis, Program Director, Centre of Excellence in Security, Resilience, and Intelligence, Schulich Executive Education Centre]

Thank you.

Mr. Chair and committee members, I thank you, as well, for inviting us, and I do echo the comments of my colleague.

There is a concept known as domain awareness, and respectfully, Canada is not aware of its domain. Given Canada's lack of sufficient intelligence capabilities, we seldom know if individuals or cargo accessing Canadian territory pose a threat to the nation, be it of health, safety, or even economic natures. Within that context, unfortunately, a paradox exists, where foreign nationals gather intelligence on us, allowing them to use our systems and procedures against us.

For all of that, we have three major areas of concern.

Internally, there is a failure to share intelligence and analysis within Canada, something that is well documented in chapter 2 of the fall 2011 Auditor General's report—a chapter related to the issuance of visas.

Externally, Canada is not being sufficiently plugged in to the international intelligence community, particularly the Five Eyes. This is partly a function of Canada's inability to share information, as we have no agency mandated to gather intelligence on foreign nationals not residing in Canada.

Thirdly, Canada has policies and practices that are viewed as vulnerable to access by certain individuals wishing to gain entry into North America.

In this light, the government should ask this. Why it is that so few applications from known regions of unrest, such as North Africa, Pakistan, and the Middle East, are not identified as potential risks to Canada?

To address these concerns, we propose a layered approach of multiple lines of defence, with one of them being a DFAIT recommendation of admissibility based on intelligence that is responsive to national security concerns, not domestic and foreign political pressures.

Validated, sound intelligence ensures legitimate visitors and business travellers, refugee claimants, and immigrant workers and entrepreneurs are let in, and war criminals and terrorists are kept out.

Under such a structure, people without legitimate claims would not even get near Canadian territory, and we feel such an approach would have helped avoid the recent revelations of war criminals living in Canada.

On the discussion of biometrics, we have found them to be useful, with the NEXUS system being a good example. The question should be how the technology is used, not if it is useful. In fact, it is inefficient and even a waste of funding for Canada to invest in biometric technologies without proper intelligence backbone structures to make these technologies worthwhile.

Generally, there are two camps regarding biometrics. The first camp says use them as a mechanism to confirm identity, and the second says cross-reference them against shared databases with a view to understanding the history of a person.

Respectfully, the suggestion of the first camp adds little value. Sophisticated forgery, albeit expensive in some cases, is readily available throughout the world and can easily circumvent this security initiative.

I would ask you to consider the following scenario.

An individual from Africa or Asia enters Albania, a relatively easy country to enter these days. From Albania, this individual makes their way to an EU member state, such as Italy, Bulgaria, or Greece, where gaining access to Canada from an EU member state becomes infinitely easier. However, along the way this individual could have changed their identity by obtaining false documentation, documentation that can include forged and phony biometric data. This possibility certainly exists, and criminal groups have the technological means to do this.

Finally, this individual reaches a Canadian entry point. Cross-referencing their data against false documentation tells the CBSA official one thing—the biometric data matches the false documentation. And it is only at this point that Canadian agencies would begin to build a file on this individual.

Reconsider the same scenario, this time where data is cross-referenced into a larger Canadian database, which also includes the Five Eyes, because Canada has ventured into a cooperative effort with its allies. All of this adds a significant value to Canadian authorities, so they can get a better understanding of the individual's history.

The primary issue here is that Canada has little international capacity for matters of intelligence, and it is only compounded by limited international cooperation on these same matters.

The minimal information we have today is compiled from our missions, yet these missions lack resources, such as intelligence capabilities, leaving screening officers with little to make meaningful assessments. This situation is only exacerbated as, in many cases, screening officers may not even be Canadian nationals. Simple things such as talking with local law enforcement is difficult to accomplish as we lack resources and networks.

We suffer from internal issues as well. If the RCMP or CSIS has somebody on their watch list, but they do not inform CBSA, it is not the fault of CBSA that they let the individual into the country. It is the fault of the system for not ensuring that necessary agencies can easily integrate and share their information. What this demonstrates is that Canada needs to know more about the individuals before they approach Canada. This, in a nutshell, is domain awareness.

The situation becomes even more daunting because of inadequate ongoing training and an overreliance on technology, which risks both increased danger and complacent behaviour. Investing in sophisticated technology here in Canada is of little use to us if we have no information to cross-reference the technology against. Better pre-screening requires investment abroad, not here. There are simple tactics that could give Canadian authorities the necessary resources to address claims swiftly, and more importantly, that would allow them to make the right decisions.

For all that, there's an underlying issue that cannot be overlooked: cyber-threats. If Canadian agencies decide to work in a more collaborative effort, which in our opinion they should, there's the issue of information assurance. If Canada goes down the route of biometrics and similar technologies that build a database of personal information, we suggest that CIC and CBSA have IT security measures that are at least as good as those of the RCMP and CSIS, if not better. Without these measures, these agencies become prime targets for foreign agencies seeking to find information on their own nationals or the nationals of rivals. In essence, a lack of information assurance on Canada's part becomes a treasure trove for foreign agencies.

Part of the problem that exists within the Canadian context, and we cannot overemphasize this, is one of resource management and resource utilization. Ironically, this is a function not of technology but of human resources. There are individual Canadians and Canadian institutions that have the knowledge and expertise, and the domestic and international networks. They can play a critical, positive, and important role in this dialogue. Unfortunately, in Canada's current state, individuals and institutions are sidelined, rendering their invaluable resources not only underutilized, but in many cases, not even recognized. The Canadian structure is either unaware, unable, or unwilling to engage these individuals.

Domain awareness will allow us to work more closely with our national allies. As the domain becomes more secure, Canadians should enjoy more freedoms, greater ease of travel, potential—

[The Chair, Conservative, David Tilson]

Mr. Platsis, you're way over your time. Perhaps you could make a concluding statement.

[George Platsis]

Sure. I'll summarize.

In summary, we should note that we have only begun to address the myriad issues. The immigration and security file is a cause in which you are all united. You have all been mandated as representatives of the people. However, your first responsibility is the security of the Dominion and the people. Vigilance is the price that must be paid, and constantly paid, for if we do not, we risk opening ourselves to ignorance and manipulation.

We thank you. If you have any further questions, we would be delighted to answer them.

[The Chair, Conservative, David Tilson]

Thank you to all three of you.

Mr. Opitz has the floor.

[Ted Opitz, Conservative, Etobicoke Centre, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Gentlemen, welcome all. Thank you very much for being here today.

I have seven minutes, so I'm going to hit you with a lot of questions. Please keep your answers fairly brief, because I would like to get as much out as we possibly can.

Mr. Platsis, just a while ago you spoke about domain awareness. It could be more broadly interpreted as situational awareness. You mentioned that CSIS, CBSA, and the RCMP are unable, presently, to share information.

Can you expand on this and on how collecting some of this info can be aggregated and shared among these agencies?

I note in your biography that you have worked in Washington extensively. Perhaps you can draw on some of those experiences.

[George Platsis]

Thank you, Mr. Opitz.

Yes, I think to broaden this discussion we need to look at it initially in a historical context. The RCMP and CSIS, and expanding out into other groups, like all organizations, are not immune to cultural barriers.

Since you mentioned my Washington days, there's a saying that intelligence begins at the local level and it works all the way up to the national level. Within that context, we are constrained by silos. Each organization, as a function of its culture, operates individually. Something that Professor Perchal and I work closely on is trying to break down these silos so that the RCMP, CSIS, and CBSA can all talk to each other.

In my days working in the disaster and emergency management field, we had a saying: “The time to exchange business cards is not when the disaster occurs,but well before that.”

I think as a very initial first step, the agencies need to start talking to each other, which I think, based on plenty of information that's available in the open source, is something they are not doing.

[Ted Opitz, Conservative, Etobicoke Centre, ON]

I know at some of the missions abroad, as you said earlier, part of that gathering can also start on the humint level, which I think they can pass on.

I'm going to ask you very quickly about the Five Eyes. You mentioned the Five Eyes without defining them. For the benefit of everybody—because I see they're nodding—can you quickly tell us what the Five Eyes means?

[George Platsis]

Sure. The Five Eyes are the five countries: the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia. This has been a collaborative effort on intelligence gathering that I think ranges back 50 to 60 years. These are natural allies, who shortly after World War II realized they had shared interests.

[Ted Opitz, Conservative, Etobicoke Centre, ON]

Great.

I'm going to address Colonel Perchal now. From your military background in particular, I'd like you to talk about a couple of things very quickly. In your opinion, what are the greatest threats to Canada at this time?

Why don't we just start with that? What are the greatest threats you think are facing us right now?

[LCol Walter Perchal]

Thank you, Mr. Opitz.

There's a lot. The biggest threat is the one we've defined as our point of departure. That, of course, is the fact that the rate of change that is continually accelerating, which affects us in every possible dimension of national activity, is far outpacing the capacity of our institutions to adapt to that change.

Consequently we have a growing delta between the capacity, for example, of law enforcement to deal with new criminal activities; our capacity to acquire information that is critical to us, particularly with respect to considerations associated with this file; and the list goes on rather endlessly.

What we believe is absolutely essential to the security of the Dominion is very simply that we need to be proactive and start leaping forward in time, as opposed to relying on traditional institutional measures, which very clearly are failing.

Specifically with respect to this file—I don't want to diverge from the committee's interest because this is a very long answer—the system cannot be adequate when there is a guesstimate that there are between 200,000 and 500,000 undocumented individuals currently living in this country.

Taking into account what we call the 1% rule—that 1% of them could present a significant threat to this country, again, within the context again of this file alone—that represents a significant national threat, and a potential threat in both criminal and terrorist activities.

[Ted Opitz, Conservative, Etobicoke Centre, ON]

Would you categorize that 1% as potential extremist threats?

[LCol Walter Perchal]

I think within that 1% you'll find a range of people, from those who just don't like us very much, to people who can present a very serious danger. Regrettably, historically, Canada has experienced elements of both of those extremes.

[Ted Opitz, Conservative, Etobicoke Centre, ON]

This question could be to either of you.

How would you find linking biometrics to the intelligence gathering protocols you're discussing?

[George Platsis]

I'll take the first stab at that.

I think this was brought out in the testimony. Biometrics serves little use if it has no information to be cross-referenced against. As mentioned, the information gathering starts abroad. We need to give our visa officers and embassies the capabilities and intelligence resources, so they can actually start finding out about a person abroad.

When we have this information, which is a Canadian database, biometric information can then be confirmed against that. That's as opposed to simply carrying around a card, or any biometric information, that says “I'm George Platsis”, when I can very easily manipulate the data on that card or passport to make my name “Joe Smith”.

That's my quick take on it.

[LCol Walter Perchal]

As a quick addition to that, I think biometrics is something we need to look at very clearly. But I think we're at an interim step.

Ultimately the biometric that will define activities and travel in the world is probably going to be DNA-based, but until we get to that time, we are reliant on databases. The more integrated they are, the more capable they are of exchanging multiple degrees of data on who allegedly claims to be who they say they are, and the more useful they will be to our defence.

[The Chair, Conservative, David Tilson]

Thank you, Mr. Perchal.

Ms. Sitsabaiesan.

[Rathika Sitsabaiesan, NDP, Scarborough—Rouge River, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I want to thank all of our witnesses for being here today.

I'd like to direct some of my questioning to you, Mr. Singh, since you're here. I have some questions with respect to the temporary resident visa program.

We've heard from multiple witnesses now and the statistics that the Library of Parliament researchers have provided also show there is a large discrepancy in the approval ratings of temporary resident visas between the Chandigarh office and the New Delhi office. Chandigarh has a refusal rate of approximately 50%.

I've also heard a number of examples, including in my constituency, where gurus are actually denied visas to come to Canada to attend gurdwara, or imams are refused from coming to mosques.

What are your suggestions for improving our visitor visa system?

[Balpreet Singh]

Thank you for the question.

You're right. I think the statistics we have is that 53% is the rejection rate at Chandigarh. We're approached by people who come to us and say that a family member has come here before and was rejected a second time. Gurdwaras, places of worship for the Sikh faith, have what's called a spiritual deficit right now, in that congregations are growing and there are not enough people to service those congregations. The issue has been that people who have been here in the past are even being turned down.

Certain areas, from the Punjab specifically, have a much higher rate of being turned down. For example, in the Amritsar district—which I mentioned in my presentation as being quite disturbed in the late eighties and early nineties—I understand that ragis, or preachers, are turned down regularly from that area, which is unfortunate, because the centre of the Sikh faith is, in fact, in Amritsar district.

What definitely needs to happen is some measure of consistency. If someone is here in the past, we can't figure out on our end why they wouldn't be able to come back again. I know gurdwaras have forwarded a number of suggestions with respect to better communication with them. Often these preachers will show up without the gurdwaras knowing that they're coming or not. So I think communication, definitely.... Consistency is also something that I would recommend.

[Rathika Sitsabaiesan, NDP, Scarborough—Rouge River, ON]

Okay, thank you.

It's not just the Sikh faith, it's the Islamic faith. Even in my constituency I've had it with Hindu priests, as well as pandits, coming and having problems getting a second visitor visa, or for many, even the first.

Changing gears, though, to the topic of detention, we've had multiple witnesses once again talk about detentions—and I could direct this to all of our witnesses—and the problems that detention poses for the immigrants themselves, whether it's temporary or permanent. The government's recently pushing through a bill, Bill C-31, which proposes mandatory detention for all of those who arrive to our country “irregularly”—what they call in an irregular fashion. What are your opinions on this?