Thank you for the opportunity to address the committee today.
We members of the CBA section spent the last several weeks studying this bill in as much detail as time allowed. As you are aware, it's a very complex piece of legislation, with major impacts on immigration and refugee law.
We have some detailed written submissions that set out a number of concerns we have with the bill. I'm going to focus on two issues that encompass a number of points within the bill today. The first is the scope of the legislation itself, and the second is the expansion of powers being delegated by Parliament to the minister.
The CBA section is particularly concerned with the omnibus nature of the bill. In particular, with respect to the stated objective to pass this legislation on a very short timeline—before June 29—given the scope of the changes, there is a very short amount of time available, and even in that short amount of time, we've identified a number of different problems with the bill.
The scope of the changes is massive, and understanding these reforms is further complicated by the layering of multiple sections—previous acts that have yet to come into force, parts of IRPA that haven't come into force.
On top of that we have the changes that were made by the Balanced Refugee Reform Act, Bill C-11. Layered on top of that, we have changes in Bill C-31 that make changes to the sections of IRPA that were not in force and changes to the Balanced Refugee Reform Act, and other, further changes.
Just trying to understand all of that and cross-referencing the amendments is quite a task in and of itself. The Library of Parliament, which has done an admirable job in trying to summarize the legislation, indicates that the creation of RAD, for example, would take place immediately upon royal assent. I should hope that is incorrect, as the Immigration and Refugee Board is not in a position to implement RAD upon royal assent. The error made by the Library of Parliament is understandable given the multiple coming-into-force clauses within the bill.
So we have nested clauses within the bill that even the Library of Parliament is having challenges to understand. The minister himself has demonstrated a lack of understanding of fundamental aspects of this legislation.
Clauses 18 and 19 of the bill would unequivocally change the law to make cessation a basis of inadmissibility and loss of permanent resident status. As a lawyer who regularly works with the Latin American community, I can tell you that this change has potentially devastating consequences for thousands if not tens of thousands of permanent residents.
I'll give you the example of a Chilean refugee who fled the Pinochet regime in the 1980s, who has been a permanent resident and contributing member of Canadian society since that time. The new cessation provisions would mean that person could, at any time, be taken before the board for cessation proceedings, and there would be no defence. The changes in Chile are clear; the Pinochet regime fell many years ago.
Such refugees would not only lose their permanent protected person status, but they would lose their permanent resident status, they would have no appeal, there would be no consideration of humanitarian factors, and they would then be removed as soon as possible.
Aside from the nature of the provision itself, what's of particular concern to the CBA is the fact that the minister appears not to understand the nature of the change. In fact, he has repeatedly and adamantly claimed there is no change in the cessation provisions before the House and in the public sphere. I'll just read from the Montreal Gazette, March 8, 2012, a letter written by Minister Kenney. He says:
Your editorial wrongly claims that Bill C-31...includes a new power that allows the minister of citizenship and immigration to revoke permanent-resident status from refugees in Canada.
He goes on to say:
Bill C-31 only modifies the current law by changing the current redundant process for revoking fraudulently obtained refugee status and permanent residency in two separate steps, to a one-step process at the independent IRB that revokes both simultaneously. It is an administrative change, and not a new authority.
This is clearly incorrect.
There is a consensus among lawyers. The consensus between the CBA, the Canadian Association of Refugee Lawyers, a number of other people who have studied this bill, the Library of Parliament, and the department itself make it clear that this interpretation is incorrect.
The minister himself appeared before this committee, and appeared to admit that was not what was intended and that he was open to an amendment. We hope that amendment would in fact be made. I do hope that will be followed through by this committee.
What is of particular concern is the speed with which this complex legislation is being passed without the time to properly study it. You're being asked to pass a bill on a very short timeline and we don't know how many more unintentional consequences there will be—and there are—in this bill.
With all due respect, no one whom I'm aware of has been able to study this bill in depth. That includes me and Mr. Kurland. And I'm not pointing at Mr. Kurland or the people who are appearing before this committee, but in terms of all of the unintentional consequences, we simply haven't had time to study in depth this piece of legislation.
The problem is compounded by the lack of details. When IRPA was passed in 2002 there were concerns raised that there was a shift to legislating by way of regulation. The trend continues with this bill. For a lot of the parts of this legislation, we've not seen the regulations that are going to fill in the details. We have biometric provisions that simply say that the government is going to set this out in regulations. It's very difficult for us to comment about that. As to whether or not biometrics is a good idea or not, there are no details in this bill. Then there are the removals as soon as possible and the timelines.
In other respects, the details are not even by way of regulation, but by way of ministerial order. For example, with respect to the designated countries of origin, they will not only be designated by ministerial order, but the very criteria by which they will be designated will also be decided by the minister. There is nothing in the act that would prevent the minister from setting the levels at 100% so that any country could be designated at will.
One of the more striking examples of the expansion of powers is with respect to investigative detention, which significantly widens the CBSA's powers. Currently, paragraph 58.(1)(c), which was introduced in 2002 shortly after the terrorist events of September 11, allows for the detention of permanent residents and foreign nationals at ports of entry on suspicion of a security threat and violation of human or international rights. The government justified this at the time as anti-terrorist legislation. Inadmissibility for security and these types of rights violations is quite rare.
The bill proposes to greatly expand these powers to include detention for mere suspicion of almost any form of criminality, even minor criminality in the distant past, whether or not a person has ever been arrested or charged. For example, a 20-year-old permanent resident suspected of using fake identification to get into a bar while visiting the U.S. would be subject to detention with little or no recourse while the minister investigated the suspicion of inadmissibility based on what could be the offence of uttering a forged document. It carries a maximum penalty of 10 years or more and is therefore considered serious criminality under the act. This same permanent resident could arguably be detained on the same basis 20 years later.
The bill would grant exceptionally broad powers of detention to officers, with little or no direction with respect to their application. That is the breadth of what we're talking about.
I present this as an example because it's of particular concern that Parliament is delegating its power, whether it's to the minister or to officers, when it's not properly circumscribed. That type of delegation does not contribute to law and order. It in fact undermines the rule of law upon which this institution is based. I hope that as parliamentarians you take pause with respect to the delegation of these types of powers with little direction.