Citizenship and Immigration Committee on April 19th, 2018

[The Chair (Mr. Robert Oliphant (Don Valley West, Lib.)), Liberal, Rob Oliphant]

Good morning, everyone. I'm calling this, the 105th meeting of the Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration, to order, as we continue our study of the Immigration and Refugee Board's appointment, training, and complaints process.

Thank you to the three witnesses who are with us today.

As we've been continuing the study, you have both the advantage and the disadvantage that we're well into the study. You can add some insight for us, but also the committee will probably now ask questions that are based on the testimony we've already heard.

I'm going to suggest we begin with you, Ms. Jacobs, since you are coming to us by video conference from Windsor, mainly because we know you're there and sometimes we lose a person on video conference. Then we'll go to Ms. Flaherty and Ms. Houle. Thank you.

[Laverne Jacobs, Associate Professor and Director of Graduate Studies, Faculty of Law, University of Windsor, As an Individual]

Thank you for the invitation to appear before the committee. I apologize for not being there in person, as I had hoped.

My name is Laverne Jacobs. I'm a law professor at the University of Windsor. I write and teach on topics in the fields of administrative law and law on disabilities. My work seeks to put into place contemporary understandings of access to justice. Over the past 15 years I've authored several publications in the field of administrative law. My research has focused on tribunal independence, transparency, accountability and oversight, and the workings of administrative bodies. Between 2015 and 2017, I was editor-in-chief or co-editor-in-chief of the Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice. Finally, between 2005 and 2012, I held order in council appointments as a member of the Accessibility Standards Council of Ontario and as a part-time member of the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario.

In my opening remarks, I would like to address three main topics. The first is the training of IRB members. The second is the complaints process and independence. The third is best practices for tribunal codes of conduct and their complaints procedures. However, before I get into these three main topics, I would first like to briefly situate the issues this study is addressing within some larger currents within administrative law.

Over the past decade, there's been a shift in administrative law in terms of the values that are held to be most important. Between 1979 and 2008, one saw an increased interest in providing deference to administrative decision-makers and their various choices. This is amply seen in the administrative law jurisprudence and literature. However, in the last decade or so, there's been a growing recognition of the importance of the administrative state to vulnerable populations, and an increased call for greater accountability and substantive access to justice for vulnerable individuals. What's missing in administrative law, however, is the cohesive theory of administrative justice for addressing these new demands. This committee has an opportunity to help shape what administrative justice should look like in contemporary times.

It's clear from the issues raised in this study—namely sensitivity in adjudication to the situation of applicants who may be persecuted, sensitivity to sexual orientation and gender identity issues, and sensitivity more broadly—that there are at least four crucial elements that should exist in any administrative law system if it is to provide administrative justice. These elements are, first, that decision-makers should show empathy. Second, adjudicative systems should be trauma-informed or at least aware of the impact of trauma on those before them, and try to avoid retraumatization. Third, an administrative justice system should be self-reflective. It should learn from the challenges and errors that have taken place within the system. Fourth, any administrative justice system should be transparent, to the extent that it can be, about its processes and about the reasoning behind its decision-making.

Traditionally, Canadian administrative law has focused on four values—efficiency, expediency, expertise, and fairness—and worked with the tensions that arise among them. I think it's time for administrative law to move forward in developing a concrete system of administrative justice that not only addresses the traditional values but also strives to fulfill the more recently articulated goals as well.

This framework lies behind my analysis of the three issues that the committee is facing, which I will turn to next. I'm happy to elaborate during the discussion.

First, with respect to the training of IRB members, based on the evidence that has been presented by Professor Rehaag, the discrepancy rates in admissions arise from the inability of certain adjudicators to assess credibility. Other evidence has raised the additional problem of insensitivity to claimants. In my opinion, these issues should be addressed through training. IRB members need to have ongoing training on ways of assessing credibility and avoiding implicit bias. Instructional examples need to be examined collectively, in training sessions for board members, to discuss why and how adjudicators move from the facts that they receive to the outcomes that they give. In doing this training, it's important to refrain from pressuring individuals to decide in certain ways, as doing so would violate the independence of adjudicators and would be contrary to Supreme Court jurisprudence. What should be emphasized in training is how to check for implicit biases. Moreover, the result of conduct complaints should be anonymized and used as training tools for the collective board.

Second, with respect to the complaints process and independence, an issue that has been raised before the committee is whether it is acceptable for complaints to be made through a process in which the final decision-maker is the chair of the IRB, or whether an independent final decision-maker or even an independent complaints process should be instituted. In my opinion, while the 2017 complaints procedure is an improvement over the last, it is best if the chair of the IRB does not make the final decision on conduct complaints.

In an already politicized climate, where public confidence in the IRB has suffered a blow, having the chair decide whether a member has violated conduct requirements will not lead to restoring public confidence. As a general principle, and outside of the particular situation of the IRB, questions will always be raised as to whether a chair is favouring decisions that protect the image of the tribunal. The process also risks interfering with members' adjudicative independence. For these reasons, I disagree with the submission of my colleague Ron Ellis on the issue of an independent final decision-maker.

Third, what are best practices for designing administrative tribunal codes of conduct and complaints proceedings? Codes of conduct are a relatively new phenomenon in Canadian administrative law. In Ontario, the 2009 Adjudicative Tribunals Accountability, Governance and Appointments Act requires every adjudicative tribunal to create a code of conduct. Little guidance is offered, however, as to what should be included in this document. There is also little literature on the design of tribunal codes of conduct. Across the country the practice of keeping codes of conduct is piecemeal.

ln terms of best practices for tribunal member complaint procedures, the procedure should have an investigating panel and a final decision-maker to which the investigating panel presents recommendations. Both the investigating panel and the final decision-maker may be from the same reviewing entity, as seen, for example, in the Conseil de la justice administrative, Quebec's administrative justice council. The final decision-maker should be distinct and at arm's length from the investigating panel.

Does the final decision-maker need to be in the form of a panel? There are not many examples to study for the answers to this. For adjudicative bodies, a panel incorporating members of a group of administrative tribunals has been used in Quebec. An integrity commissioner has been used, under the City of Toronto Act, for local boards. However, the local boards tend not to be adjudicative but polycentric in nature.

In my opinion, the matter comes down to the extent to which it is necessary at the final decision-making stage to have a member of the administrative tribunal who understands its inner workings and can convey that knowledge. If that seems unnecessary for the tribunal in question, a sole individual who is an independent third party with knowledge of ethics, such as the Office of the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner, could perform the job.

At the same time, the current commissioner is the past chair of the IRB. This too can cause a reasonable person to have concerns about fairness in the process. I would therefore suggest that the commissioner's office be used but that the current commissioner not be involved in any matters relating to the IRB.

Last, based on a reading of a number of tribunal codes of conduct, I suggest that four elements should be present in a tribunal code of conduct: a statement of its purpose; civility and ethical requirements; breaches, sanctions, and the process for determining complaints; and a description of how the complainant will be involved.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Rob Oliphant]

Excellent.

Thank you very much. You were faster than you thought you would be.

Ms. Flaherty.

[Professor Michelle Flaherty, Professor, University of Ottawa, As an Individual]

Good morning, Mr. Chair.

Thank you very much for inviting me to come before the committee.

My name is Michelle Flaherty, and I am a law professor at the University of Ottawa.

I teach administrative law at the University of Ottawa, and I have published in that area. I am also a member or a vice-chair of a number of administrative tribunals within Ontario. My hope today is to bring both an academic perspective and a very practical perspective to some of the work the committee is doing. In my comments today, I wish to speak to you in practical terms about how administrative law principles can guide the important work you are doing in reviewing the work of the IRB. I'm going to speak about three aspects: the appointment process, the complaint process, and training.

To turn first to appointments, in my view the appointment process is the first and most important tool available for promoting excellence at the IRB. I wish to echo what you have heard from other witnesses in terms of the importance of both depoliticizing that process and ensuring that the appointments are merit-based. Although I am speculating to some extent—and I know there have been some concerns raised about conduct of past members of the IRB, as well as assessment of credibility—in my view I really question whether those types of issues would have arisen in the context of a merit-based appointment process.

Depoliticizing the appointment process is not a novel idea. I would point to a number of other jurisdictions, most notably Ontario, where that is the common practice. Indeed, in Ontario there is legislative language that requires that appointments be made based on a competitive and merit-based process, and I am referring here to the Adjudicative Tribunals Accountability, Governance and Appointments Act.

In my view, the appointment process is critical to the work the IRB does. It allows the board to build an adjudicative body based on skilled and capable decision-makers. It gives the board the right building blocks to use in the work it does. As Ron Ellis points out in his submissions, it's a way of cutting off at the pass some of the problems that can arise later. In fact, once we're in the realm of dealing with complaints, arguably it's too late and the alleged harm has already been done.

An effective and merit-based appointment process, in my view, is the best way to address potential problems at the IRB. In my submission there are three key qualities that should be looked for in a merit-based appointee. First, I think it's important that the person have experience, knowledge, or training in the subject matter and the legal issues dealt with by the IRB. Second, ideally the candidate will have an aptitude and experience in adjudicating fair, impartial, effective, and efficient hearings. The final key quality is cultural competency and sensitivity to the issues that are raised and dealt with by the IRB.

I think it's important to note that we don't live in a world of ideal candidates. Not all—or even many—of the potential candidates will have all three of those qualities. In my view, the board needs to have the latitude and discretion to hire and appoint members with a blend of those skills.

I'm concerned that, for example, if you insist on subject matter expertise—in other words, if to be eligible to apply to the IRB, a person needs to have experience in dealing with immigration and refugee matters—you may then fall short in terms of the appointees' abilities in adjudication or cultural competency.

I think this approach of hiring or appointing people with a blend of skills is consistent with what is done at other administrative tribunals. I can tell you that it's consistent with my own experience. I have been appointed to tribunals because of my subject matter expertise, but I have also been appointed to tribunals because of my adjudicative expertise, even though I may not have had a sufficient level of subject matter expertise at the outset.

This, in my view, is where training comes into play. Training should try to centre on the three competencies I identified earlier. It should try to build upon and complement adjudicators' existing knowledge and abilities. It can further enhance subject matter expertise, enhance cultural sensitivity, and improve and facilitate the adjudication of matters. Therefore, teach adjudicators how to hold a fair, efficient, and impartial hearing.

I understand that concerns have been raised about IRB members' abilities to assess credibility. In my view, training is an important part of addressing that issue. There is an existing legal test, and there is a rich body of jurisprudence that courts and all the administrative tribunals across the country use in assessing credibility.

In my view, rather than interfering with those important and rich legal principles, I submit that the more appropriate approach is to first implement a merit-based appointment process, so that individuals are assessing credibility not based on ideological or political reasons but on the evidence available to them. Second, it should continue to train members on how best to assess credibility, how to apply those legal principles, the relevant and irrelevant factors, the aspects to which they need to be culturally sensitive, and the manner in which they can and ought to express their credibility findings in ways that are both intelligible and transparent.

Finally, I want to speak about the complaint process. In keeping with administrative law principles, I agree that a complaint process is an effective mechanism to address misbehaviour by adjudicative tribunal members, including comments and behaviour during the hearing.

Importantly, however, a complaint process cannot be used to interfere with the content of the decision, and I believe this is an important distinction for three reasons. First, there is an existing audit process—a means of ensuring that the content of decisions is appropriate. If a party is unhappy with a decision, it may appeal or seek judicial review on that matter. Courts have been specifically tasked with, and are best equipped for, assessing the appropriateness of the content of the decision.

Second, in my view, little is to be gained by setting up a complaint process that operates in parallel to the courts. If that's done, which of the two matters goes first? All kinds of logistical issues are raised. What if the courts and the complaint process arrive at different conclusions? What does the outcome become at that point? Consider the resources and time required to address challenges to the same decision in different venues. The litigation could be interminable.

Third, there are significant hazards in an overreaching complaint process. The principles of impartiality and independence require that adjudicators make decisions without undue influence and pressure. A complaint process concerning the content of a decision may be construed as undue pressure in the sense that adjudicators may feel they risk sanctions if they decide in a particular manner. These types of pressures raise important fairness considerations, and they leave the administrative decision open to challenge upon review.

I'd like to close with a few brief comments about the role of the chairperson in the complaints process. In my view, there is no inherent bias or unfairness in the chairperson of the tribunal playing a decision-making role in the complaints process.

The chairperson manages decision-makers, and the management role is analogous to the role that he or she would play in terms of the complaint process. I would caution against making assumptions about bias. In my view, the role of the chair is to promote the success of the IRB, both in terms of accomplishing its statutory mandate and in ensuring public confidence.

In closing I would reiterate Ron Ellis' comment, which is that the chairperson's interest should generally align with the purpose of the complaint process, and that there is no one in the system who is more invested in having good and trusted adjudicative members than the chair, whoever that person may be.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Rob Oliphant]

Thank you very much.

We will continue with Ms. Houle.

[France Houle, Associate Dean, Undergraduate Studies, Faculty of Law, Université de Montréal, As an Individual]

Good morning. Thank you very much for your invitation. I will make my presentation in French.

I am a lawyer and associate dean of Université de Montréal's Faculty of Law, and I also teach administrative law at the same university. I have done a lot of work on the appointment and training process for administrative tribunal members. In 2014, I published a book with some of my colleagues on an empirical investigation we conducted on Quebec's administrative tribunals. I brought a copy of the book and can leave it for you if you like.

In the book, we propose a bill to reform Quebec's administrative justice system and bring it into the 21st century. So I worked on that. I have also worked on a number of issues related to evidence and the assessment of credibility, including before the IRB. So I have written fairly extensively on the issue. Over the past few years, I have been asking myself more theoretical questions about our system of evidence in order to determine whether it is adapted to a number of adjudication systems, such as the one used by the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada.

I would like to talk to you about four points today. The first concerns the complaint process, and I will dedicate the majority of my speaking time to that issue. Afterwards, I will briefly talk about the process for selecting and training members, and for assessing the credibility of stories. I have written a dozen pages on the matter. Should you want to know more after the meeting, I have left a few copies of the document here.

Concerning the complaint process, I have read the observations of my colleague, Ronald Ellis, and I heard what Ms. Flaherty had to say. From the outset, I can tell you that I disagree with both of them.

I will mostly focus on what Mr. Ellis wrote about keeping the disciplinary investigation process for IRB members in-house. I disagree with his position both in terms of facts and in terms of the law.

When it comes to the facts, Mr. Ellis based his argument on the negative impact that external process may have on IRB members' morale. In my opinion, that statement has absolutely no factual basis. I will use the example of Quebec because of its administrative justice council—the counterpart to the judicial council—which applies to all members of Quebec administrative tribunals that perform a purely adjudicative function, like the IRB.

The council has existed for 20 years, and Mr. Ellis's concerns have not materialized. The process in Quebec is completely external to all administrative tribunals and basically functions as a judicial council.

Concerning the legal side of things, Mr. Ellis said the external process could also negatively impact IRB members' independence. For me, this argument is problematic in law, but before I give you my thoughts on it, I want to specify that I have not found sufficient and complete information to fully enlighten me on the process proposed by the IRB and its integrity office.

I will begin by talking about the complaint process for members of the Refugee Appeal Division, the RAD, and the Immigration Appeal Division, the IAD, who are appointed by the Governor in Council. Here is my issue with Mr. Ellis's and the commission's proposal. If those members were subject to that procedure, I feel that it would go against the procedure set out in section 176 and following of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, the IRPA. The legislation explains the complaint procedure that applies to those individuals. I find his reading of the IRPA to be very creative if he does actually hope to apply that procedure to members of the RAD and the IAD.

When it comes to members of the Immigration Division, the ID, and the Refugee Protection Division, the RPD, the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act is silent on the complaint process. The issue arising from a legal standpoint is that those members have the status of public service employees. In theory, those are employees of the public service. So one would think there would be a reporting relationship between the chair and the commissioners. The issue related to this is two-fold.

On the one hand, the legal basis is ambiguous. Even if we accepted the fact that those commissioners are employees within the meaning of the Public Service Employment Act, they cannot be subject to the chair's authority because they are very special public servants. They are administrative decision-makers whose independence is recognized, at least in the fulfilment of their adjudicative functions. I have trouble seeing what section of the legislation could be invoked to directly and explicitly support the existence of that power of the chair. In my opinion, in order to move in that direction, the legislation should be amended to explicitly state that, for example, by specifying that the chair can issue directives to members.

On the other hand, I see another legal difficulty in terms of constitutional basis. The issue is that, if the chair or the integrity office director was allowed to directly exercise his or her authority over members' decisional activity, members' influence would be undermined, since they could potentially be influenced.

That potential influence has been identified as something to avoid by the Supreme Court of Canada, as was noted in the first decision the court rendered on the application of the guarantee of independence for administrative tribunal members. I am talking about the Matsqui case. The court stated that members must be protected from any external or internal influences. Please refer to page 283 of my study.

In addition, the court also establishes another principle according to which the degree of independence must be increased or decreased, while taking into account three factors: the tribunal's nature, the interests at stake and other indications of independence such as oaths.

In the IRB's case, the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act must be interpreted as providing IRB members with increased guarantees and especially those employed by the RDP, since the tribunal's nature is that of a purely adjudicative tribunal. That tribunal is the closest thing to a court of justice, so the guarantees must be increased.

The interests at stake also....

[The Chair, Liberal, Rob Oliphant]

I will need you to come to a conclusion.

[France Houle]

I will just finish this point.

The interests at stake are basic rights, especially when it comes to the Immigration Division and the Refugee Protection Division. That was mentioned in the Singh case.

Finally, IRB members must take an oath, as explicitly stated in the legislation. When we look at all that, we see that increased guarantees are really needed, which is why I think that having an internal complaint assessment process would be problematic.

I will stop here.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Rob Oliphant]

We'll begin questioning with Mr. Sarai.

[Randeep Sarai, Liberal, Surrey Centre, BC]

Thank you to all three of the panellists here.

My first question is to Ms. Houle.

It's very common for refugee complainants in the west, particularly in British Columbia where I hail from, to have it suggested to them, especially in the past, to transfer or move their files to Quebec as they are told that they can expect a much fairer decision. Hearing your testimony gives me some assurance as to why.

I have a quick question. Could you kindly afterwards submit a briefing, and maybe our analysts can provide it as well, as to what the Quebec selection process for the adjudicators is and what their complaint process is? I might have missed some of your presentation when you were first talking due to translation issues. I would like to know and compare it to the federal government's process, so I would ask you to do that.

My next question is to Ms. Jacobs.

We've heard that in many cases where the IRB member has a complaint lodged against them, there is a complaint and as soon as the complaint is lodged, miraculously, or for some uncertain reason, the member quits the board and there's no actual process done in it. Do you feel that regardless of whether one leaves a board or leaves a panel the complaint should still be heard and that it be a requirement, as many feel that they don't get a fair process and they're not vindicated in their complaint process?

What are your thoughts on that, Ms. Jacobs?

[Laverne Jacobs]

I think it's an interesting question and a somewhat tricky one.

For the most part what you see in practice is that tribunals, and I believe courts as well, have jurisdiction over the members who are there. Once a person has left, it would be very unusual for that review in council, or whatever it's called, to then still have jurisdiction over the person who has left. If it were to be done, it would have to be done through very clear legislative enactment. I have not seen it done very much in the work that I've seen in the tribunals I've looked at.

[Randeep Sarai, Liberal, Surrey Centre, BC]

Okay. Thank you.

Ms. Flaherty, you stated that there are three kinds of requirements for a merit-based appointment process. One is experience in the subject matter; another is aptitude to adjudicate; and the third is cultural competency. Experience is an easy one, something one could look at somebody's resumé or CV to see if they have it.

How do you suggest aptitude be taken into consideration? How do you look at aptitude, especially if someone has no judicial background, whereas, say, if a provincial court judge is being appointed to a federal body like the Supreme Court, you could look at previous decisions to see the basis for them? Even for a person who is not a judge, you can see their litigation background and perhaps get some aptitude criteria.

How do you get that from somebody who does not have legal experience or who has no adjudication background?

[Prof. Michelle Flaherty]

I think that second competency essentially aims at getting people with adjudicative experience. You're looking at people who have worked for other boards, worked in the judiciary, and have had some kind of decision-making power, and that aptitude will be demonstrated through that experience. Really what I'm suggesting is that it's not sufficient to look for people who have simply subject-matter expertise. You want a blend of people.

You may not be looking for someone who has neither subject matter expertise nor adjudicative expertise. They wouldn't necessarily fall within the list of ideal candidates. However, if you're looking at adjudicators, people who bring professionalism in terms of how to run a hearing, how to pose appropriate questions, and how to assess credibility, I think you're drawing from the community of people with adjudicative expertise.

[Randeep Sarai, Liberal, Surrey Centre, BC]

I agree with you, but I'm just trying to see how one appoints according to a cultural competency. If somebody has a lot of experience, say, working with immigrants from a certain area, they have a lot of cultural competency in that but may not have competency on, say, LGBTQ issues. How does one balance those? It's hard to have somebody have cultural competency along the whole gamut of things. They maybe think they're very sensitive and very aware, but their sphere is very small, maybe just Southeast Asia or the Middle East. It may be LGBTQ issues and not regional issues.

How does one balance for cultural competency?

[Prof. Michelle Flaherty]

I think part of what you look for is people with the specific baggage of expertise or experience, someone who has a lived experience, but I think this is where training comes in. You want people who are open-minded and prepared to engage in training experiences so that they can broaden their experience and horizon. I think what you're looking for in the ideal adjudicator is somebody who has empathy—as my colleague mentioned—and who's open-minded and prepared to learn about other cultures and other people's experiences.

[Randeep Sarai, Liberal, Surrey Centre, BC]

So what you're saying is, look at those who have empathy and a willingness to learn about others, and the rest is more effective training once they are appointed to this process. Is that what I'm hearing?

[Prof. Michelle Flaherty]

That's my view.

[Randeep Sarai, Liberal, Surrey Centre, BC]

What are your thoughts on the new complaints procedure that was implemented in December 2017? Do you think it's adequate or do you think it should be changed?

[Prof. Michelle Flaherty]

I've reviewed the new complaints process, and I have heard some of the submissions that you've heard already from important stakeholders who've said they are content with what has been proposed, and they see it as an improvement. I think they've urged this committee to take sort of a wait-and-see approach.

It strikes me as appropriate. I think it is something that has teeth. My view, in terms of the role of the chair as well, is that there are mechanisms in there to ensure that there will be a fair adjudication of the complaint, and that includes referring the matter to an external investigator, so should there be a conflict or a concern, that might be dealt with externally.

My review of the complaint process, from where I sit at some distance from the IRB, is that it strikes me as an appropriate process that will bear itself out over time.

[Randeep Sarai, Liberal, Surrey Centre, BC]

Ms. Jacobs, what are your thoughts on the new administrative tribunal complaints process?

[Laverne Jacobs]

As I mentioned in my presentation, I believe that the complaints process can be manageable. I think that having the [Technical difficulty--Editor] ethics commissioner is a positive step. I think it's possible to use a complaints process in which the investigation is done by the commissioner's office as an external, but I think that the final decision-maker should probably still be an external, so it should still be at least the commissioner's officer, if not a review council.

The one strong concern I have is that the commissioner is the former chair of the IRB. I think there is not enough distance there, and so I would suggest that, if the commissioner's office continues to be used, the particular commissioner be removed from the process.

[The Chair, Liberal, Rob Oliphant]

Thank you, Ms. Jacobs.

We go now to Ms. Rempel.

[Michelle Rempel, Conservative, Calgary Nose Hill, AB]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Mr. Chair, I'd like to move the following motion, and I did table notice of motion of this on May 3, 2017:

That, pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), the Committee immediately study the illegal arrivals occurring at Canada's southern border; that the study include an investigation of the impact of the costs that these land arrivals have and will incur; that this study also investigate how these border crossings are being managed by the government and government officials; and that this study examine the options for amending the Canada-US Safe Third Country Agreement; that this study should be comprised of no less than three meetings; that Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC) department officials be in attendance for at least one of the meetings and that Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) officials be in attendance for at least one of the meetings; that the Committee report its findings to the House; and that Pursuant to Standing Order 109, the government table a comprehensive response thereto.

Mr. Chair, I realize we have witnesses here. For various reasons, I'd like to discuss a notice of privilege as well after this.

[The Chair, Liberal, Rob Oliphant]

I will let you know that the motion is in order. You have given notice, and this is your time. It is in order.

[Michelle Rempel, Conservative, Calgary Nose Hill, AB]

Thank you.

Mr. Chair, perhaps—