Citizenship and Immigration Committee on July 20th, 2016

[Chris Lewa]

Right. This is an extremely complicated issue. The first group of people who were displaced by violence in June 2012 have been sort of accepted by the government. The government actually organized their transfer to those camps. Then there was a second wave of violence, as you know, in October 2012, and some of the people came from the south of Rakhine state, where there was also violence, to Sittwe. Initially, the authorities did not want to recognize them or let them even stay there because they wanted them to return to the area and set up a camp near their place rather than in Sittwe. But in the end, I understand that these people have been recognized and now receive food assistance from the WFP, but through the government.

The problem is a third category of people, who are referred to in Rakhine state either as “economic IDPs” or “livelihood IDPs”, according to which organization one talks to. These people were not displaced by the violence, but by their lack of access to a livelihood in the villages. Since they can't move, they can't go to markets and can't find work outside, and thus have decided to sell their houses, leave their villages, and go to the internally displaced camps to try to get assistance there because they can't otherwise survive. That's an ongoing process. These are the main problems nowadays. The authorities do not want to recognize these people. They want them to go back to where they came from, to their villages, not to start adding to the the numbers of people in the camps grow.

The situation is actually very complex there. They have received a donation so far—that's all.

[Salma Zahid, Liberal, Scarborough Centre, ON]

What can Canada do, as part of the international community, to make sure that its international development aid reaches these people in those camps, as well as the other IDPs? You know resettlement is not the only solution. There are many other ways. What can Canada do as part of the international community?

[Chris Lewa]

Well, as I mentioned in my recommendations, I think there is a need for strong advocacy with the Government of Myanmar to make sure that they are committed to addressing the situation and finding a solution to resolve at least the situation of the Rohingya, which includes, of course, citizenship, freedom of movement, and resettlement or relocation of these people to their place of origin. As I said, as you can understand, it's not going to be easy. But the advocacy part, to put pressure on the Myanmar government not to fall short on this, is absolutely important—and, of course, supporting, perhaps financially, the provision of services. I understand there is a big shortfall in funding both from the WFP and.... When I was visiting, I was told that the rations were going to be cut down because of lack of funding. I think Canada already contributed, but perhaps it could increase some contributions, or at the same time.... I don't know. It has to be seen in Myanmar, of course, how best to help. But the international community also have produced a “Rakhine Response Plan” to try to get some funding for different activities, not only food, health care, education for the children, but also for water and sanitation, etc.

As you know, also, there was a head of mission group set up in Yangon after the election in 2015, which is led by the Danish ambassador, but also with the participation of the U.S. ambassador, the EU, Australia, and Turkey. Interestingly, Canada is not part of this. They have tried to get a common message to the government. I know that the two key messages from these discussions have pushed for freedom of movement and access to services, and also that the citizenship issue be addressed. It is trying to get a common platform to join that advocacy by government, the diplomatic community, as well as by the UN agencies and international NGOs in Myanmar.

[Salma Zahid, Liberal, Scarborough Centre, ON]

Thank you so much.

[The Chair, Liberal, Borys Wrzesnewskyj]

Mr. Virani, you have one-and-a-half minutes.

[Arif Virani, Liberal, Parkdale—High Park, ON]

Ms. Lewa, thank you very much. I understand you were a witness here in Canada at the Subcommittee on International Human Rights, where you talked about the issue of the Rohingya at the time. They produced a study, which I've read. It relates to a question asked of you by my colleague Mr. Tabbara. At that time, as well as during the course of the study—so in 2012 and 2015—the study indicates that “Human Rights Watch...produced two reports documenting the violence [against the Rohingya and] concluded that the violence against the Rohingya during those clashes amounted to ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.”

What I want to ask you about is the response of Canada in 2012 to that Human Rights Watch report. Was there any change in Canada's response at that time to this report by Human Rights Watch that crimes against humanity were being committed against Rohingya Muslims?

[Chris Lewa]

I'm sorry, but I'm unable to answer this question because I haven't followed all the different actions that Canada has been taking over the past few years. Perhaps Human Rights Watch would know better than I, but definitely, yes. I want to point out—perhaps Mr. Tabbara also mentioned it—that recently I was in Geneva for the lunch of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Prince Zeid Ra'ad Al Hussein. He released a report on the situation of Rohingya and other minorities in Myanmar to the Human Rights Council. As you know, this report again raised questions about the situation in Rakhine state that amounts possibly to crimes against humanity.

[The Chair, Liberal, Borys Wrzesnewskyj]

We're over time.

Mr. Saroya, for five minutes, please.

[Bob Saroya, Conservative, Markham—Unionville, ON]

Ms. Lewa, what is the difference between Bengalis and Rohingyas? I understand they're the same people. Burmese want to call them “Bengalis”, and Rohingyas want to call themselves “Rohingyas”. What is the difference? What is the confusion? Why is that?

[Chris Lewa]

I think its origin is in history, because during the British colonial rule, which started in 1823, there was a large migration from India. At the time, India was part of the British empire, including what is Bangladesh and Chittagong today. Muslims have been living in Rakhine state for much longer than that. These are the original people who call themselves Rohingya, but many others also migrated during this British colonial time. Of course, that was 200 years ago. I think they should be considered as citizens, as they are in many other countries where there was colonial rule in Asia and other parts of the world.

In Myanmar you have the Rakhine community, which is strongly Buddhist and extremely nationalistic. That region, before the British, used to be a separate kingdom. The Rakhine claim that this kingdom was theirs, and because of the British, there was this migration of Muslims or Rohingya, but they don't call them “Rohingya”. They call them “Bengali” because they are similar in religion, in culture, and in language to the people from Chittagong in Bangladesh. They are born in Myanmar. Their families, parents, and grandparents are born in Myanmar. Even today, for the Rakhine and most Burmese, the public—it's not just the government—wants to see these people as foreigners and outsiders. They came here to invade our country, and for the Rakhine it's an existential threat. That's why they push the term “Bengali”, because although Bengali is anthropologically an ethnicity and not a nationality, in Myanmar it is understood as being Bangladeshi. That means you are an outsider and a foreigner, and that you should go back to Bangladesh.

As you know, there has been tension with Bangladesh when the Myanmar government claimed that the Rohingya are Bangladeshi, and Bangladesh claimed the Rohingya are from Myanmar. I think the whole issue is that Myanmar, and the Rakhine in particular, do not want to accept Rohingya in Rakhine. I have to say that from my various trips in the region, I think the main issue, beyond the fact of ethnicity, which is by law, is religion. In the camps I mentioned, among the 120,000 internally displaced, there are also a small number—I didn't mention them because they are not very significant—10,000 or so, of Kamein. The Kamein are Muslim, and they are a recognized ethnic group in Myanmar, but they face exactly the same fate as the Rohingya. They are also pushed into IDP camps. They have citizenship, but they cannot move.

That's why I have always suggested that citizenship alone is not going to solve the problem. It has to be approached holistically, and tensions have to be reduced. I think the government has to take steps at the national level, and not just in Rakhine, to stop all this hate speech and the incitement to violence against Muslims. I'm happy that last Friday the government set up a committee at the national level to address hate speech and incitement to violence. Maybe that's the first step, which hopefully is positive.

I just wanted to mention that.

[Bob Saroya, Conservative, Markham—Unionville, ON]

They were denied voting rights for the first time. What was the reason given?

[Chris Lewa]

Initially, there was a vote in parliament to allow it, because at the time they were holding temporary ID cards. In the past, holders of these temporary ID cards were allowed to vote, because they were considered by the government as not really being stateless, but as being doubtful citizens that need to be verified. So during all of the past elections in the 1950s, 1960s, and even in the 1990s, the Rohingya have been allowed to vote. However, just before the election in 2015, there was a discussion about organizing a constitutional amendment referendum, and the law for that included temporary cards.

Suddenly, the Rakhine, especially the monks, started leading protests and demonstrations throughout the country, saying they would use violence if the government did not stop the Rohingya from voting. Of course, the next day, on February 11 of last year, then president Thein Sein, suddenly announced that from then on, the white cards, the temporary ID cards, were cancelled. So now the Rohingya cannot vote because they have no ID cards.

[The Chair, Liberal, Borys Wrzesnewskyj]

Thank you.

Mr. Fragiskatos, you have five minutes please.

[Peter Fragiskatos, Liberal, London North Centre, ON]

Ms. Lewa, I wish to pick up on the question by my colleague, Mr. Virani. In their study of the Rohingya, the subcommittee studying international human rights proposed or suggested in their report “the establishment of a formal office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights in Myanmar, in part to facilitate independent inquiries into potential human rights violations and violence against ethnic and religious minorities.”

Do you think this is a sensible approach?

[Chris Lewa]

Absolutely.

I think that is a common goal of many of the NGOs, together with UN agencies. Yes, it would be very important. However, so far the government, including the Suu Kyi government, has not yet given any clear sign whether or not they would allow this office.

However, if the office is opened, I hope it will do more than just provide technical assistance, but also have the power of investigation into violations of human rights in the country. In some countries, the OHCHR is only set up for technical assistance, but that's not enough. I think that in Myanmar there is still a need to address many other challenges and problems related to human rights.

[Peter Fragiskatos, Liberal, London North Centre, ON]

Thank you very much, Ms. Lewa. I don't mean to cut you off, but I only have five minutes and I do want to address some very important issues.

In 2011 and 2015 as we just heard, Human Rights Watch put forward the position that ethnic cleansing was taking place in Myanmar with respect to the Rohingya minority. Did the Government of Canada at that time reach out at all to the Arakan Project, or to you, to express concern in any way?

[Chris Lewa]

Actually, no. I have been a bit surprised because I used to be funded by Canada, and in the last couple of years I haven't had any contact at all. I'm glad now that some of the parliamentary committees have invited me to testify. Thank you.

[Peter Fragiskatos, Liberal, London North Centre, ON]

I'm very happy about that too.

Mr. Boyd, statelessness is an issue that has a direct link to vulnerability. If you're stateless, you are vulnerable by definition.

You mentioned Kenya in your presentation. Could you speak about the Nubian minority? Do you have any details, in terms of the consequences of statelessness for the Nubian people and the Shona people? I know that their plight is of concern to human rights advocates within Kenya and outside of Kenya.

[Drew Boyd]

Where we work, on the coast, we are interacting mostly with the Swahili people, who are their own separate ethnic group or tribe, as well as pastoralists from Somalia and their descendants. In terms of the Nubian group, I can't comment directly because they are not within our purview.

[Peter Fragiskatos, Liberal, London North Centre, ON]

My final question is for Ms. Lewa.

Is there a direct connection between statelessness and internal displacement? Is the international community equipped with the mechanisms to deal with these sorts of problems? There is, as you know Ms. Lewa, a UN convention dating back to 1960 to deal with the plight of stateless peoples, but I wonder if you could comment on that.

[Chris Lewa]

Well, obviously there is. As you see, to be a citizen is to at least have access to basic rights, and it is the case that stateless people don't have that.

As to how to solve this problem, of course I don't have a straightforward answer, but it's interesting, because the 1982 citizenship law in Myanmar itself is not in line with international standards and creates statelessness rather than trying to avoid it. Also, for the Rohingyas it's not just the law itself. There are provisions in this law that would allow Rohingyas to be recognized as citizens, but the problem is the implementation of the law. The way the council of ministers is supposed to take decisions on citizenship has so far never provided any answer. Of course, then, there is a link to vulnerability, as also in terms of refugee movement, which I covered particularly in my presentation. As I said, you can be a refugee, but at least you have a hope to go back to your country, whereas when you are a refugee and stateless as well, this is more difficult.

I have to say that one of the biggest problems in Myanmar is the fact that if a Rohingya is caught in detention, as are those in Thailand, for example, even if they wanted to go back to Myanmar—they shouldn't really have to, because they are refugees, but even if, in some cases, people don't care and just say that they want to get out of detention—Myanmar has systematically refused to readmit any Rohingya.

That means that the problem of indefinite detention is not just in Thailand; it's also in India and in Bangladesh. When governments are not providing refugee status, these people also end up in detention.

[Peter Fragiskatos, Liberal, London North Centre, ON]

Thank you very much.

[The Chair, Liberal, Borys Wrzesnewskyj]

Thank you, Ms. Lewa.

This is a question for Mr. Boyd. The Arakan Project has an early warning system to identify groups that are at risk of potential genocide. Are there currently any such groups, and if so, could you provide documentation to this committee at your earliest convenience so that we can consider it in the future?

I'd like to thank all the panellists for appearing today.

At this point, we will suspend for two minutes to allow the next panel to appear.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Borys Wrzesnewskyj]

Welcome back. Our committee hearing will resume.

We have before us on this second panel, Mr. Rabea Allos, director of the Catholic Refugee Sponsors Council; Reverend Majed El Shafie, founder and president of One Free World International; and from Operation Ezra, Nafiya Naso and Lorne Weiss.

I welcome all the panellists. We will begin with Mr. Allos, with seven minutes for your presentation, sir.

[Rabea Allos, Director, Catholic Refugee Sponsors Council]

Honourable members of the Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration, good morning to you all.

I would like to thank you for the kind invitation. I'm honoured to be here today to speak on behalf of the Catholic Refugee Sponsors Council, CRSC.

CRSC provides a national voice to respond to the needs of the world's refugees for resettlement. There are about 100 sponsorship agreement holders or SAHs across Canada, and about 30 of them are Catholic agencies. In 2015, combined, the Catholic SAHs privately sponsored more than 7,500 refugees; about 50% were Syrian nationals. Iraqi nationals were the second-largest group, in addition to Somalian and Afghan refugees. Brochures about the organization are available in French and English.

In the time I have today, I'd like to talk about two things. First I will talk about the persecution of the most vulnerable refugees: religious and other groups. Second, I will talk about the protection of the indigenous peoples of Iraq.

In any refugee crisis, we need to distinguish between protection needs and resettlement needs. The first goal for the international community is protection of all refugees locally until a durable solution is available. A durable solution would be voluntary repatriation after the end of the war or crisis, or local integration in the host country, or resettlement in destination countries. The option for resettlement in destination countries is usually preserved for the most vulnerable, who cannot be repatriated to their homeland or locally integrated in the host country simply because they cannot go back to their normal lives.

In the case of Iraq and Syria, the vulnerable groups are ethnic and religious minorities, political activists, women at risk, LGBT communities, atheists, converted and secular Muslims.

Historically, the problem of the most vulnerable groups in the Middle East is compounded whenever the government of the day is too weak to implement the law or condones going after certain groups. In the 1940s, for example, the Iraqi government condoned attacks on the Jewish community, and many were forced to flee after their properties were confiscated. According to an Ottoman census in 1917, the Jewish community in Baghdad was about 20% of the total population. Today, there are only five.

Historically, going after religious and ethnic groups was common. It happened to the Jewish community before happening to other religious groups today. The Iraqi Jewish community were mostly resettled in Israel and other countries and managed to remain vocal and strong. That is why resettlement of minority, ethnic, and religious groups needs to be prioritized, to ensure that they live on.

From 2003 on in Iraq, the government was too weak to preserve law and order, and this allowed militias and extremist groups to go after ethnic and religious minorities, as well as other vulnerable groups mentioned earlier, without fear of punishment. The same occurred in Syria after the civil war of 2011. The rise of the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, ISIL, made matters worse, and ISIL went on a religious cleansing war against all minorities and other vulnerable groups. Christians were forced out of their ancient homeland with the help of their historical neighbours. Yazidis and LGBT community members were killed and their women enslaved. Those groups will find it extremely difficult to be repatriated to their homeland, because their lives will never be the same. They know they will be targeted as soon as the government is weak.

As far as indigenous people are concerned, the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples was adopted by the General Assembly in 2007 by a majority, 144 states. Four voted against, and there were 11 abstentions. Canada officially adopted and promised to implement the declaration in 2016. In January 2016, Minister Carolyn Bennett announced:

...we are now a full supporter of the declaration, without qualification. We intend nothing less than to adopt and implement the declaration in accordance with the Canadian Constitution.

This support does not apply to the indigenous people of Canada only; Canada now is committed to indigenous peoples worldwide.

The declaration sets out the individual and collective rights of indigenous people as well as their rights to culture, identity, language, employment, health, education, and other issues. The goal of the declaration is to encourage countries to work alongside indigenous people to solve global issues like development, multicultural democracy, and decentralization.

The indigenous people of Iraq are being targeted by ISIL and other extremist groups not only because of their religion but because of their culture and ethnicity. Canada and other countries should prioritize their protection by resettling them in safe countries, because there is no foreseen solution in the immediate or long term.

The Aramaic-speaking Chaldeans, Assyrians, Syriacs, Mandeans, and Yazidi are the indigenous people of Iraq. They are the descendants of those who ruled ancient Akkad, Assyria, and Babylonia. More generally speaking, they are descendants of ancient Mesopotamians. They speak dialects of the Aramaic of the Assyrian and Babylonian empires and have their own written script.

They began to convert to Christianity in the 1st and 2nd centuries AD, formerly having followed the ancient Sumerian-Akkadian religion known as Ashurism. The same groups were targeted by Turkey during the Armenian genocide of 1915, which was recognized by the Canadian Parliament in 2004.

The Canadian government, as well as other governments, needs to give special attention to ethnic and religious minorities in Iraq and Syria, in particular Syrians, Assyrians, Mandeans, and Yazidis, because they are the indigenous people of the land. Without this protection and resettlement, those communities will disappear forever.