Thank you, Madam Chair.
Thank you for the invitation.
My thanks also to the C.D. Howe Institute for its support with the publication last month of my paper on the subject of the Immigration and Refugee Board's file review policy.
The file review policy involves the rapid acceptance of asylum claims without conducting a hearing or asking any questions of the claimant. For example, between January 2019 and February 2023, the IRB accepted 24,599 asylum claimants into Canada without asking them a single question. This policy remains in effect, and I think it's problematic for a number of reasons.
Firstly, it has not worked. During the relevant time, the backlog of claims increased from 17,000 in 2016 to 300,000 in 2025, an increase of more than 1,400%.
Secondly, the policy may also increase risk to Canada. The refugee hearing functions as a screen for national security risk and fraud. During the hearing, if questioning raises a red flag, the IRB member must stop the hearing and notify the minister to give the minister the chance to intervene. If the IRB accepts claims without conducting hearings or asking questions, those risks will never be detected, the minister's ability to intervene will be nullified and the risk to Canada will increase.
The policy may be interfering with the ability of board members to freely assess the evidence in their files in ways that are inconsistent with the law of administrative tribunals by imposing a mandatory file triage structure in which persons other than the person with authority delegated by Parliament are assessing the evidence in each file and making implied recommendations to adjudicators. This interferes with the independent assessment of the evidence in their files and pressures board members into making fast, positive decisions without asking questions.
Also of concern, the IRB appears to have implemented this policy on its own unilaterally without consulting ministers or cabinet, despite the fact that the policy has direct implications for the statutory mandates of the ministers of IRCC and Public Safety, and that shouldn't be possible. The IRB is an administrative tribunal. It does not have the authority on its own to make policies that directly implicate the mandate of the Minister of Public Safety or the Minister of Immigration.
For example, in the U.K., France, New Zealand and Australia, a policy change like this would have required the approval of ministers, cabinet and, possibly, Parliament.
I think this may point to a structural problem with Canada's model. Canada's IRB may be too independent; it reports to no minister. For that reason, it can't be seen clearly and its actions cannot be predicted. More broadly, the IRB's acceptance rate, or recognition rate, has now increased to 80% of claims decided on the merits, excluding claims that are withdrawn or abandoned.
By comparison, in 2024, Ireland accepted 30% of claims on the merits, Sweden accepted 40% and Germany accepted 59%. Research suggests that acceptance rates are a significant factor in asylum seekers' choice of a destination country. The IRB's extraordinarily high rate of acceptance may be attracting more asylum claims to Canada.
In conclusion, I would make two recommendations.
The first is that the file review policy be brought to an end and the regular in-person hearing restored.
The second is that ministers and cabinet should assume responsibility for asylum policy in Canada. It may be worth considering the transfer of the functions now performed by the IRB to a setting that places them within the oversight of government in a way that provides a sufficient degree of independence for each tribunal, but which also results in a direct reporting relationship to ministers and cabinet. That was one of the recommendations for the refugee protection division in the independent review commissioned by the Trudeau government in 2017. I think that's a good option worth considering for the four tribunals that comprise the IRB.
Thank you.