Very quickly, on the question of independence, Bill C-6 was fundamentally flawed. It was actually statutorily biased in favour of the federal government. It gave the minister a say in appointments and gave no say to the AFN.
With respect to delay, Bill C-6 actually statutorily protected the right of the minister to indefinitely delay consideration of the bill. That's a kind of negative way of looking at it. It wasn't as if they were saying they wanted to block claims indefinitely; it actually said that you can never go beyond consideration, if a minister has said he's still considering it. The delay issue was not adequately addressed in Bill C-6, and there were no time checkpoints such as we see now.
In terms of criteria, the problem with Bill C-6 is that it didn't deal adequately with the problem of unilateral undertakings. And there were some questions of a very technical nature dealing with whether it adequately dealt with pre-Confederation claims.
As to monetary jurisdiction, we were talking about $7 million to $10 million with Bill C-6; we're talking about $150 million now.
So if you look at the big-ticket items, Bill C-6.... I'm on record with an opinion I wrote in 2002 that was very negative about Bill C-6. You can see my opinion about this one. I'm not enthusiastic about this bill because I'm an easy sell; I think the merits of this bill are much stronger than those of Bill C-6.
Maybe, with the wisdom of history, Bill C-6 was a necessary exercise to go through to finally get to the right decision, just as there are sometimes false starts before you get there. I'm not trying to be unduly critical of earlier efforts. Whatever intentions were, it didn't work.
This one has learned some lessons—everybody learned something from the Bill C-6 experience—including those shown in the amendments that were put forward at the time, and now I think we actually have a solid product.