I'd be glad to name them.
Professor Larry Chartrand in particular, a very highly respected aboriginal professor--of course, in my home city but I don't think that necessarily states a bias on my part--gave some very credible testimony on the interpretive provisions that were being suggested by a number of groups, including the Assembly of First Nations.
It was his argument that to put into text an interpretation of what should be considered within this act would be a limitation on the first nations communities themselves. By putting any text to an interpretive provision, we would be taking away the ability of the Canadian Human Rights Commission to be able to properly balance the collective rights and the individual rights that need to be contemplated by this repeal.
By putting text to these specific amendments, we are really limiting the hands of the Canadian Human Rights Commission to be able to find that proper balance. They will have only this text to look to. This will define what they can even begin to interpret. There has been no question that the Canadian Human Rights Commission has always had the ability to be able to interpret how they will bring their rulings in future cases on first nations reserves, where people feel their human rights are being abused.
When the transition period is over and human rights complaints are brought before the commission, they will have no choice but to respect the Constitution of Canada and, of course, section 35. But by bringing specific text to what we're suggesting to them is what they will need to follow, I feel we are greatly limiting their ability.
I feel this unfortunately suggests that we're the experts on the interpretation of these rights. It's the Canadian Human Rights Commission that I believe has done a magnificent job over the last 30 years at balancing the rights of Canadians, the minorities versus the majorities.
I think everyone in this room would agree that the Canadian Human Rights Commission has done an admirable job. This amendment by Ms. Crowder unfortunately will take away, in my opinion, much of their ability to interpret the provisions they will need as they apply their rulings subsequent to the transition period ceasing.
Perhaps I will leave it there. I'd like to speak to the points individually, but I'd also like to give some of my other colleagues and those having other opinions in the room an opportunity to talk about this.