Indigenous and Northern Affairs Committee on June 7th, 2022

[Gary Vidal, Conservative, Desnethé—Missinippi—Churchill River, SK]

Thank you.

I'm going to drill a bit there, Mayor. You're talking about bridging the gap and putting pen to paper, so in the context of a post-mortem, you're going back and analyzing what worked and what didn't work. Could you maybe just be a little more specific on the things that need to be better so that you will be better positioned next time? Whether it's the 2015 wildfires or the pandemic of the last couple of years, what very specific recommendations would you suggest for that regional group? What should be put pen to paper, as you said, to learn what we can?

[Nick Daigneault]

Thanks, Gary. We would definitely need to come up with a framework as to what it looks like, so that all levels of government can make those suggestions. Obviously, what we're giving up when it comes to the emergency measures is our authority to the committee. What exactly is the devil in the details? What does that mean? What authority would the regional emergency coordination team have, and then where would we as the mayor in councils and chief in councils also step in? Lots of those little details need to be hammered out in order for us to all feel comfortable at the table as to what authority the regional EOC would have and what authorities we would retain.

Obviously, it's financial resources. What are we committing to this regional EOC, and then what are the frameworks around responses? What do we have in our backyards in terms of resources, and what are we lacking? We need to really get into that level of detail in order to make this work.

[The Chair, Liberal, Marc Garneau]

Thank you, Mr. Vidal.

We'll now go to Ms. Atwin, who will share her time with Ms. May. You have a total of five minutes.

[Jenica Atwin, Liberal, Fredericton, NB]

Thank you, Mr. Chair. I'll go as fast as I can.

Thank you to our witnesses today for this incredibly important and fascinating discussion.

I'm going to continue down this line around communications, because I can't think of anything more important in the event of a disaster. Maybe I can talk a bit with Ms. Brown. You represent such a collective of communities. Are there issues around cellphone coverage, Wi-Fi access? How does communication generally happen if there is an emergency situation? How would your members get to know what's going on?

Thank you.

[Sara Brown]

We definitely have lots of challenges around communication. Some communities have very compromised Wi-Fi—harken back to dial-up. We have lots of challenges with cell coverage. It's getting better, but it does not exist between communities; it exists only within communities, and that in itself creates lots of problems. As well, we have a vulnerability in that right now there is no redundancy. We are often offline for days at a time, even in a major centre like Yellowknife, when somebody has dug up our cable in northern Alberta or northern B.C. and we're offline. We're already very vulnerable. If you added the layer of some sort of event, it would just be so much more so.

[Jenica Atwin, Liberal, Fredericton, NB]

Thank you.

I'll ask Mayor Daigneault as well. You mentioned using local radio and social media. Have you received any feedback from your community members about how effective that was, or if it reached the majority, the different demographics?

[Nick Daigneault]

Yes, I'm certainly glad you brought that up.

We've also had to rely on the good neighbour system as well. I know that not everybody logs onto social media, especially our elders. They rely on what we call the moccasin telegraph. We ask them if they could at least go and knock on a window or a door and spread the information door to door. We're a small community, so we know who's who, and we know who would struggle with logging into Facebook or any other social media. Like I said, the good neighbour system is also informing them by word of mouth, going directly to their house.

[Jenica Atwin, Liberal, Fredericton, NB]

I'll pass it to Ms. May now. Thank you.

[Elizabeth May, Green, Saanich—Gulf Islands, BC]

Thanks so much, Jenica.

I'll try to ask this question as quickly as I can to Professor Huebert. You talked about the governance structure as federal and territorial and first nations governance. I'm also looking at the circumpolar governance, the question of the Arctic Council, and whether it can play a role, or if it's fatally flawed, for instance, by Russia's right now being in the chair. Does it hold promise for security and sovereignty for us?

[Dr. Robert Huebert]

The Arctic Council was specifically designed not to deal with security, and that was one of the requirements that the Americans had. It is my belief that the Arctic Council will now transform, the way the G8 transformed into the G7. It's too important for the rest of the countries, but the reality is that the Russians will never come back to an Arctic Council that includes seven members that are NATO members. Remember, Finland and Sweden are now pursuing NATO membership, therefore Russia is not going to come back.

Does this mean that we now have the opportunity to give the Arctic Council a greater human security role? I think there would be a great appetite for addressing many of the issues we're dealing with here with the Emergencies Act. Remember that the Arctic Council is the only international organization that has given standing to the indigenous peoples of the North. No other body, until UNDRIP comes forward, even gets that consideration in international law.

I would say that, yes, we're going to have an Arctic Council. It will be different, just as the G7 is different from the G8, but we have an opportunity here if we are willing to go forward with bold leadership.

[Elizabeth May, Green, Saanich—Gulf Islands, BC]

Thank you.

Mr. Chair, do I have time for one quick, additional question?

[The Chair, Liberal, Marc Garneau]

You have one minute.

[Elizabeth May, Green, Saanich—Gulf Islands, BC]

Good.

I don't know if this would go to Sara Brown or somebody else. This is much more granular. I've heard it referenced that the Canadian Rangers are our line of defence in our north, but they don't even have.... As I understand it, we don't even buy the equipment for them. They don't have snowmobiles provided.

What is the status of the Canadian Rangers, and what should we be looking toward, given an increased security threat in the north?

[Sara Brown]

I'm afraid I couldn't provide that kind of granular detail. I could certainly research it and get back to the committee.

[Dr. Robert Huebert]

The one person you need to talk to in that regard would be Whitney Lackenbauer, who is the honorary lieutenant-colonel for the 1st Canadian Ranger Patrol Group. He's probably written every single book there is on the Canadian Rangers. He would be completely up to date on that.

[The Chair, Liberal, Marc Garneau]

Thank you very much.

I understand that particular person is coming next week to the committee.

Ms. Gill, you have two and a half minutes.

[Marilène Gill, Bloc, Manicouagan, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I would like to ask Mr. Huebert, Ms. Brown and Mr. Daigneault another question about their own priorities.

I would like to know how protecting Arctic sovereignty and increasing defence activities will have a positive effect on other potential crises. There can be political crises and military crises, but also climate crises. Ms. Brown talked about infrastructure, among other things.

Other than the communications issue that has already been discussed, I would like to know how the protection of sovereignty can be done in conjunction with the increase in defence activities.

Ms. Brown, you may begin.

[Sara Brown]

It's, again, the connections. How can we make those connections happen? How can we already be dialoguing, when we go into a crisis, so that all we're doing is changing tracks and not trying to re-establish relationships? I think that's the most important thing.

As I mentioned a couple of times, it's making sure the communication tools are there, making sure there's access to the Internet and cellphone service. All those things are absolutely critical to the success of any response.

[Dr. Robert Huebert]

If I may, there is one solution that has great promise in this regard. I've already mentioned the Arctic security working group. In 2005, the group had the director of Health Canada come forward, and they had a discussion at which they presented to the body—I attended some of the meetings—the outline of the possibility of a pandemic of a respiratory disease that basically cripples the country.

We did a tabletop. We tried to have communications, but it basically stopped in 2005 or 2007. The Arctic security working group and other bodies like it have to do two things. First of all, they have to think of bad problems. We can't just simply assume these problems will not come. The second part then becomes practice.

If we were able to have the type of ability, and the funding, to see how badly we do things... It's when we see how badly we do something that we come up with the best practice. We then go forward and say, “We have this problem that we don't think is a problem. Pandemics. Let's pretend one actually comes, and see what the communications are like.”

If we had had more than a tabletop in 2007, I dare say we would have had a much better preparation for 2020. You need that big thinking. That comes from a constant ability to look at these problems as they're coming, and then having the necessary funds. Fund the federal government to say, “Okay, territories, indigenous governments and municipal governments, we're going to give you a bit of an open budget here to address and play out the problem.” You do that, and I guarantee that the communication issue that Sara was talking about, and many of the central problems that we have.... We will be that much better prepared for it.

[The Chair, Liberal, Marc Garneau]

Thank you very much.

We'll go to Ms. Idlout, for two and half minutes.

[Lori Idlout, NDP, Nunavut, NU]

[Member spoke in Inuktitut, interpreted as follows:]

Thank you.

I have a question for Dr. Huebert. You did not respond. We're talking about infrastructure for Inuit communities, but we also know that the Inuit need resources and finances so they can be active in security measures and be a part of the security force.

[Dr. Robert Huebert]

Absolutely. The first part, of course, gets back to a point that was made. You need resiliency in the communications. This means that having simply one cable and one means of Internet connection is not good enough. When Yellowknife goes down, you can well appreciate the problems that you're talking about in the outlying communities. The government has to ensure—it has to be funds from the federal government, because the territories will not have the necessary resources—that you have multiple means of information access and availability.

The next part is transportation. This goes to the infrastructure capability. You need to have the ability to move. That means, of course, ensuring that you have not only the runways beyond the forward operating bases, but also the communities' means of being able to get to each other in the event of an emergency. This is something the Russians did prior to the resumption of the war in 2022. They made sure that each and every one of their northern airfields was brought up to full standards. Go beyond the four forward operating bases and think in that context.

Another part is, of course, the marine communications and navigation that are going to be coming as climate change becomes more of an issue, opening up the waterways. Think in terms of multiple communications, navigation and connections. That ultimately means infrastructure for the northern communities.

[The Chair, Liberal, Marc Garneau]

Thank you very much.

That concludes our first panel.

I would like to thank our witnesses today, Professor Huebert, Mayor Daigneault, and Ms. Sarah Brown, for their participation.

Thank you for your testimony and for answering our questions. We apologize. We started a bit late, but thank you. You will help the committee in its work, and we very much appreciate it.

With that, we will suspend, just for a minute, as we prepare for our second panel.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Marc Garneau]

I call the meeting back to order.

We will now resume, with our second panel.

I would like to welcome our three witnesses. We have Mr. Richard Shimooka, senior fellow at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute. We have in the room with us Grand Chief Derek Fox of the Nishnawbe Aski Nation and Mr. Michael McKay, director of housing and infrastructure for the Nishnawbe Aski Nation.

The way we work this is you will each have five minutes for opening remarks, and then we'll get into questions.

Without further ado, I'd like to invite Mr. Richard Shimooka to make his opening remarks for five minutes.

[Richard Shimooka, Senior Fellow, Macdonald-Laurier Institute, As an Individual]

Thank you, honourable Chair.

Thank you also for the opportunity to speak among this distinguished panel of guests.

I'm going to confine my comments today to the heart of security: aspects of northern security geostrategy and the ability of the Canadian Armed Forces to respond to them, as these are really the areas of my expertise.

The security dynamics within the Arctic are going through a fairly significant shift. Prior to January of this year, one could argue that the Arctic posed a challenging security environment, given the growing geographical accessibility of the region due to climate change and the steady increase of tensions between regional powers, most notably with Russia.

From 2010 onwards, the Russian Federation in particular invested in its northern capabilities, including the development of integrated Arctic bases and an increasingly powerful icebreaker fleet, and modernizing its nuclear submarine force. Russia's ambition is to provide at least a strong presence in the north to assert its sovereignty, which includes contested claims with Canada.

Relatedly, Russia has also announced a refurbished strategic nuclear force with exotic new weapons, several of which are intended to degrade NORAD capabilities in a potential nuclear conflict. At the same time, diplomatic engagement in the Arctic has been holding steady, at least compared to other areas of our bilateral relations following Russia's invasion in Ukraine.

The war in Ukraine over the past few months has significantly altered the strategic landscape; however, many of the capabilities that Russia utilizes for Arctic security have not been employed in that conflict and thus remain a potential threat. Russia's assets available to operate in the north will likely plateau for the time being, whether due to lack of funding or lack of access to key components in western countries. If the current regime remains in power, Russia is likely to remain hawkish in pressing its sovereignty claims, which would become a flashpoint for future conflict.

There are also much less acute challenges that require response. Disputes over and access through Canadian territory in the north require the government to possess the wherewithal to maintain its sovereignty over the region. These disputes are often with close allies, such as the United States, and they are exceedingly unlikely to result in direct military conflict. While diplomatic tools remain the most likely way to resolve these issues, Canada still must maintain the civil and military capabilities across the entire spectrum as a potential response.

That being said, Canada's capabilities in the north are growing, but significant deficiencies remain. The recent announcements on defence spending specifically targeted towards northern security and modernizing NORAD are welcome, but these address only certain challenges, and it is far from certain that they'll be deployed under the current estimated timelines and costs. For example, the government has recently announced the selection of the F-35 as a replacement for the CF-18; however, there are doubts as to whether it can phase in these aircraft according to the schedule it has announced.

The navy's ongoing acquisitions of the Harry DeWolf class ships will be an excellent addition to Canada's northern presence. These vessels will assist in increasing the country's northern presence and make major strides in providing a wide range of capabilities to coastal communities above the Arctic Circle.

Lastly, Canada faces some key deficiencies. As I discussed in a recent Hill Times article, Canada's fixed-wing search and rescue fleet seems to be in trouble due to the selection of the CC-295. The aircraft has numerous technical and performance deficiencies that make it unlikely to enter service in its intended role, which may require a third competition to fill this capability. Furthermore, Canada has no effective counter to Russian or even allies' nuclear submarines, which can be effectively countered only by other nuclear submarines.

I hope this gives a good overview of the general state of security in the north. I'm happy to elucidate any area during the question period for this meeting.