Thank you, Mr. Chair.
I will give my opening remarks in English, but members may ask me questions in the official language of their choice.
I would note that I am speaking to the committee as a professor at the Royal Military College.
The rules-based international order has been the cornerstone of Canada's security, prosperity and democracy. That order is under duress and Canada is under existential threat because Canada has lost the initiative and is increasingly alone among allies and partners. Canada's political and economic sovereignty depends on its ability to take the initiative to shape the terrain. Manifestly, simply reacting has not served us well.
For this reason, the government is investing aggressively in instruments of statecraft, notably the Canadian Armed Forces, and the economic means to sustain that investment. However, the government also seems to understand that the federal civil service and Canada's economic ecosystem, including research and innovation, are not optimized to deliver on that agenda. The government standing up three new agencies in a matter of months is indicative that money is not enough; the government will need a restructure of the civil service, the country's economy and its knowledge infrastructure to deliver on its agenda.
By way of example, for 30 years, governments have put in place policies and procedures to shrink the Canadian Armed Forces and impede spending. The government cannot grow and re-equip the Canadian Armed Forces with policies that were intentionally designed to shrink and constrain it. To deliver on its agenda, the government will have to transform that architecture, which effectively means the government will have to assume greater political, financial and reputational risk. For a quarter of a century, governments have been unwilling to do just that. Instead, they had the CAF assume all the risk. That may have worked in a world where expeditionary military missions were discretionary and instruments of statecraft were dispensable. However, that approach has come at a cost, which is the trust of our allies.
Canada no longer has that luxury. To safeguard its sovereignty, Canada needs an industry that can deliver on defence priorities at speed, scale, mass and class. To that end, the government is confronted with three questions: what to buy, how to buy it and how to pay for it.
What Canada needs to procure is laid out in NATO's 2025 procurement requirements, on which allies currently fall 50% short. We have a lot of catching up to do in a very short time.
On some requirements, Canada and allies can only deliver on a longer timeline, while others, such counter-drone technology, require immediate investments. The European Union, for example, has increased its investments in this area by 400% year over year. If Canada is to be taken seriously in its supposed pivot to Europe, we must show that we are adding actual value to our allies.
The problem is that the shelves are empty. To this end, the Prime Minister touted a defence procurement agency during the election, but has now announced a Defence Investment Agency. Canada needs to invest in what it intends to procure.
An investment in defence is necessarily an investment in innovation and high technology, but Canadian universities, research and development and, to a lesser extent, industry are ill-postured to deliver on defence technology. Political priorities have tended to be on cutting steel and creating jobs. Instead, the priority needs to be on design authorities—that is the code, algorithms and AI that drive the armed forces of the 21st century.
Of course, that is incompatible with cozying up to China. To the contrary, Canada's defence investment strategy requires a research security framework far more robust than what the federal government currently has in place.
How to finance it all is a grand bargain that Canada's European and Indo-Pacific allies have been asking for over the past decade. Allies and partners looking to become less dependent on China have only Canada and Australia as their democratic options to turn to. The same is true for liquefied natural gas exports. Europe has traded energy dependency from Russia for the United States. Europe now procures half of its liquefied natural gas from the United States.
Exporting natural gas and critical minerals is the best way for Canada to be a loyal ally to European and Indo-Pacific allies and partners. The revenue will pay for investments in Canadian defence and industry, pay down the debt, enable new welfare spending and develop technologies to support the green energy transition.
Europe's energy costs are two to four times as high as they are in Canada. Canadian energy exports make Europe more productive, competitive and innovative and reinforce European democratic institutions. Canadians need to realize that failure to export energy to Europe amounts to subsidizing Russia's war of aggression on Ukraine.
For the government's defence industrial strategy to succeed and transform the Canadian economy, and for Canada to take the initiative and regain its standing with allies and respect in the world not only requires only a bold commitment to a multi-year plan; it also requires a multipartisan approach in Parliament. For Canadian sovereignty to prevail, political parties need to forge a broad consensus to pull together on the same side of the rope. Canada's defence industrial strategy is the litmus test to that end.