Good morning, Mr. Chair and members of the committee. Thank you for the invitation to appear today.
My name is Neil Bisson. I'm a retired intelligence officer with the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, the director of the Global Intelligence Knowledge Network and the president of the Ottawa-Gatineau chapter of the Pillar Society, which is an organization comprising former Canadian intelligence professionals dedicated to supporting the Canadian intelligence community and advancing national security awareness in Canada.
I'm here today to provide a national security perspective on Canada's electric vehicle policies as they relate to Chinese EVs.
At the outset, I would like to be clear. This is not a discussion about electric vehicles themselves, nor is it about limiting competition or innovation. This is about understanding the national security implications of introducing Chinese EVs into Canada and into its critical infrastructure ecosystems, including communications, transportation and the electrical grid.
During my career as an intelligence officer, I assessed three major components of every source: motivation, suitability and access. Motivation reflects intent, suitability reflects capability and access determines whether the information is obtainable. As I continue through my opening statement, I will demonstrate how Chinese electric vehicles can be used by the People's Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party against Canadian national security interests.
CSIS and the CSE reporting consistently identifies the PRC as an enduring and sophisticated threat that conducts widespread cyber-espionage and influence operations against government, academia, private industry and civil society to advance its strategic, military and political goals. This reflects clear and sustained motivation by the PRC.
According to the CSE, the PRC operates one of the world's most extensive intelligence systems, using advanced cyber-capabilities to target government systems, critical infrastructure and research sectors. This includes compromising thousands of devices within Canada, targeting innovation for intellectual property theft, engaging in transnational repression and using disinformation and artificial intelligence to influence democratic processes.
The Government of Canada has already recognized the national security risks associated with PRC-linked technologies. Huawei and ZTE were banned from Canada's 5G networks after intelligence agencies warned that integration of them could provide potential backdoor access to sensitive government, commercial and personal data.
Canada has also acted against surveillance technology, ordering Hikvision to cease operations following concerns that its systems could enable covert surveillance, access video feeds and collect biometric data at scale.
In addition, PRC-linked digital platforms have been used to influence Canadian society, with officials identifying during a recent federal election a coordinated information campaign on WeChat that sought to shape narratives and influence voters through inauthentic amplification.
Taken together, these examples demonstrate the PRC's suitability for exploiting telecommunications infrastructure, surveillance technologies and digital platforms operating within Canada.
This brings us to access. China's 2017 National Intelligence Law requires companies to co-operate with state intelligence services, which means that access held by those companies can ultimately become access for the state.
Modern electric vehicles are highly connected, software-defined platforms that continuously collect and transmit large volumes of data, including geolocation, driver and passenger behaviour and communications, environmental mapping and external camera recordings. In effect, each Chinese-manufactured EV is an extraordinary source of valuable data—the potential eyes and ears of the PRC—and we are on the verge of importing and dispersing tens of thousands of them across Canada.
Chinese EVs will also be connected to the electrical grid through smart charging systems, home energy integration and emerging bidirectional technologies, becoming part of a broader, interconnected energy ecosystem. Any system that is connected to critical infrastructure and capable of external communication introduces potential avenues of exploitation, including data collection, system access and disruption.
The PRC has already targeted Canada's energy sector. In Quebec, a Hydro-Québec researcher was recently charged for allegedly sharing sensitive battery research information with PRC-linked entities.
Open-source reporting indicates that some Chinese electric vehicle manufacturers integrate technologies developed within the same state-directed ecosystem, including software platforms, advanced sensors and connected infrastructure.
The issue is not whether a single vehicle poses a threat, but whether Canada is prepared to introduce into its transportation networks tens of thousands of connected, Chinese-developed systems that are built and operated within an environment where the CCP has demonstrated both the motivation and capability to conduct espionage and foreign interference.
Providing this level of access, particularly as these systems integrate within broader networks, including our energy grid, introduces new and potentially long-term vulnerabilities. Once access is established, it becomes difficult to detect and even harder to reverse. The decisions made concerning the importation of Chinese EVs will determine whether Canada manages this risk or introduces significantly more of it.
Thank you.