When he says, “A lot of countries rushed into deals with the U.S. They weren't really worth the paper they were written on”, what does he mean? Well, he means a couple of things. He means that those agreements maintained tariffs at a level that was unacceptable, would have been unacceptable, continues to be unacceptable and would certainly be unacceptable to us. Those deals often involve the exacting of a form of tribute in the form of requests for investment in the tens or hundreds of billions of U.S. dollars in exchange for a deal.
The good news is that in Canada, things are going in the other direction. The foreign direct investment into Canada is at an 18-year high. I'm very pleased that the Canada Strong fund, which was just announced today, will attract and allow Canadians to participate even more in that form of investment. When the Prime Minister refers to these other deals not really being worth the paper they're written on, it is a very clear differentiation between the position on this side of the table and the position espoused by some on the other side of the table. I don't think our colleague Monsieur Ste-Marie from the Bloc espouses this position in the same way. To rush into a deal involves baking in the various concessions that the administration is trying to achieve with these tariffs.
I'll also observe about these tariffs that something very interesting was clear throughout today's testimony. Until April 2, there was actually more investment happening. We heard from some of the testimony today that the position those companies were in was actually quite a positive position. They were feeling that form of confidence that comes from.... This is in the context of when the section 232 tariffs were in place. The 232 tariffs were in place, not at the level they have been since April 2, and these businesses were feeling confident. They were making investments.
I know that my colleague from Guelph, when it's her turn to speak, will mention Ms. Hasenfratz from Linamar and the kinds of investments that she refers to. We know that the kinds of investment Mr. Volpe champions on behalf of his sector are ones that continue to be made. We know the auto sector investments, and the SMEs that serve the auto sector—investments in the billions of dollars in the Ford plant in Oakville, the third shift in Stellantis, the NextStar investments in Windsor and the PowerCo investments in St. Thomas. Investment is happening. Investment is happening despite the 232 tariffs that have been levied. It's just the very specific April 2 measure that has tipped these specific firms into unprofitability.
That's something we take very seriously, which is why we agreed to the study and why we got very granular in terms of hearing from the witnesses and trying to get some very specific tactical advice and tactical sense of what was required to come to their support. However, this motion doesn't refer to any of that. This motion does not refer to the investments that have been made, despite the 232 tariffs, at the levels that were pre April 2. A very specific set of decisions on April 2, we know, has had a very damaging impact. The tariffs are now applying to the full value of the good and not just the steel content of the good.
The Prime Minister also said the following in relation to where things are: “There's no value in misrepresenting your position, sugarcoating things unnecessarily, not being clear on where you're going to stand.” I think it's an important piece of counsel for members across the way. This motion appears to invite an invitation to conclude a deal. You know, the 101 on negotiations is something called a BATNA, or best alternative to a negotiated agreement. If you state up front that you must have a deal, you will get a bad deal. That is a demonstration of weakness. On this side, we're actually....
This isn't just a political point. This is a point that can lead to real harm. If the Conservatives continue to campaign on getting a deal at any cost, and if the Conservatives continue to campaign on reviving an auto pact that is three generations of auto policy behind, with no regard to the actual situation that we are in today, then we are at a real risk of the administration identifying that division within Canada and exploiting that towards trying to drive the deal that is most damaging to Canada.
We have had a taste of this in the past. We have not had the member for Bowmanville—Oshawa North sub in to this committee, but I know that in his visit to the U.S. and to the White House, he made some representations about how Canada was dealing with this negotiation, and they were damaging. His public remarks about his White House visit—apparently and unfortunately in the absence of the Conservative international trade critic, with whom I think we could have collaborated in a more collegial way on a common set of objectives—were a damaging intervention.
Now we have this intervention, which calls to “finally” deliver an agreement, not recognizing that the Prime Minister, through his leadership and through his interventions, has actually been doing the key work of protecting a number of sectors. The work to be done by this committee is to hear the real, felt needs of the mould-makers and the associated sectors of chemicals and plastics—and we've also heard from a few automakers and others—and find those tactical supports that government could then use and respond to.
I think this is a real error in judgment. When I saw the wording of this motion, I wondered if we should invite the Conservatives to amend their own motion to say that the committee is calling on the Prime Minister to capitulate, to say that we'll sign any deal, because when you lead with “we will do a deal” and the details are from an era that is 30 years gone, then you're basically calling for capitulation.
The section 232 tariffs exist under the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, which allows the U.S. secretary of commerce to investigate the effects of imports on national security and gives the president authority to adjust imports via tariffs or quotas if a threat is found. It was rarely used until the Trump administration came along. In fact, the first positive determination came in 1973, for oil imports. It resulted in licensing fees and import quotas, and the U.S. Congress actually moved to limit this power in 1975 to restrict President Gerald Ford's ability to act on petroleum.
The statute was rarely used, particularly after the creation of the World Trade Organization, but this legacy of an older piece of legislation was picked up by the administration in 2017. We know some of the investigations that resulted.
Canada did some very aggressive negotiation at the time, in collaboration with the Canada-U.S. Trade Council. It was great to have Mr. Volpe, who has experience of that trade council as well as the new trade council. Thanks to some very expert work, we were able to limit the damage there.
The Biden administration generally maintained the steel and aluminum tariffs while moving away from the aggressive, broad-based use of the tool, but they did conduct other section 232 investigations, because the free trade consensus that we had in North America—which was already brittle, especially in the United States—was permanently changed by President Trump's first election. Unfortunately, the Biden administration actually showed more continuity than change with the Trump administration on those matters.
We know that section 232 investigations and related investigations continue to target specific critical supply chains, such as semiconductors, pharmaceutical ingredients and critical minerals. We know that Congress has viewed the overuse of section 232 with concern, because it takes away their powers, and in fact we've seen the U.S. Supreme Court move in a related direction on some other emergency economic tariffs that the Trump administration has brought in.
In that context, to invite an agreement at any cost is very damaging to Canada. I think we can do the work, identifying and resonating and empathizing with moving in support, as this government has done, sometimes with and through the advice of committees like this one. We can differentiate between that real work that needs to be done, and capitulation. If we lock in anything like the section 232 tariffs that came after April 2, it is going to be the death knell. We can't lock these in. We can't get anywhere close to locking these in. We have to hold strong. We have to hold strong together as a country.
We have to hold strong as a Parliament to invite a common front on this. The administration is looking for those places of weakness, as we saw with the visit by the member for Bowmanville—Oshawa North to the White House. There was some real damage that resulted.
I'm opposed to this motion for these reasons.
In my opinion, the motion basically tells the administration to the south that we are going to go bankrupt and they will win. Their story is already that they win and we lose, and this motion will reinforce that story in the negotiations.
As we heard in testimony, the witnesses themselves told us that American businesses that trade are also suffering from the tariffs. There is the threat that these industries will leave not only Canada, but also the United States to go to Mexico, China or other countries.
It is up to us to stand together as a country, not only with Canadian industries and businesses, but also with supply chains in the United States. We have to make common cause with them.
For those reasons, we are opposed to the motion. It's not in Canada's interest. We want to follow the leadership of the Prime Minister, who reminded us just today that these kinds of agreements at any cost hurt the countries negotiating them.
We must remain strong and united together.