Thank you very much, first of all, for your very kind remarks. I deeply appreciate them.
Let me give you some numbers. Looking at comparative markets, including Europe, from 2022 to 2025, Chinese-built battery electric vehicles went from near zero to a dominant share in Indonesia—93%. Mexico went from 28% to 90% in two years. Brazil went to 85%. Israel went to 81%. Australia went to 78%.
In Europe, we've likewise seen tariffs being inadequate in constraining that increase. We've seen huge increases just over the last year of electric vehicle sales. It's not merely electric vehicles produced by western brands at joint venture factories in China, such as Tesla, but Chinese brand EVs made in China that have secured a dominant position in major global markets. Because they can't enter the United States, they are being deflected in many respects to Europe, which is a major purchase market for them. That has huge ramifications for European production, which we could get into in more detail if you like.
The quota alone doesn't solve the dependency problem. It manages volume, but not the structural dependency created through Chinese-origin software, dealer networks, brand loyalty and political constituencies that resist future restrictions. Tariffs are the only tool that has reliably worked. The EU put definitive countervailing duties on BYD of 17%, on Geely of 18.8% and on SAIC of 35%, on top of the standard 10% MFN duty as of October 2024.
Even so, Chinese automakers now hold 5% to 6% of the total European car market, rising fast through electric vehicles. Rhodium Group, for example, estimates that duties of 40% to 50% would be required to materially shift the trajectory. Otherwise, what you're going to see is the hollowing out of Europe's industrial base.
The U.K. offers a cautionary tale on a model. It has no tariffs. BYD, I'm told—