Chair and members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today.
My name is Carey Frey, and I serve as the chief security officer at Telus.
With over 21 million telecoms connections, we take seriously our responsibility not only to connect Canadians but to protect them.
I want to begin with a simple statement of fact. Fraud is now a central feature of our economy. It is highly organized, international in scope and growing at a rate that no individual sector or government can contain on its own.
While Telus fights fraud daily, I want to offer a story that illustrates the type of fraud Canada is contending with today and say that the only model to fight it with is collaboration between industry, law enforcement and government.
Last November, Telus received a tip about a suspicious text message hitting phones in Toronto. These messages had links designed to impersonate legitimate payment websites. We launched an investigation and found nothing. There was no record of these messages anywhere in our network logs. That absence itself was a clue. We suspected we were dealing with an SMS blaster, which is a piece of complex telecommunications equipment that mimics a legitimate cell tower and floods nearby phones with fraudulent text messages. It's a portable cyber-threat used by criminals to cause chaos and defraud unsuspecting victims. We had never seen an SMS blaster deployed in Canada before.
Eventually, it became clear that someone was driving this device around Toronto, moving through communities and targeting thousands of phones at a time. Industry reached out to Toronto police to report the text messages and also reported the unauthorized airwave use to the Department of Innovation, Science and Economic Development, or ISED. These reports kicked off a five-month investigation called Project Lighthouse.
Thanks to the information-sharing efforts between industry and law enforcement, three individuals were arrested and now face 44 charges. In total, these individuals are responsible for more than 13 million network disruptions.
While the criminals' primary objective was to commit fraud, their technology also doubles as a new and destructive type of pre-positioned cyber-threat. These devices can disrupt 911 calls, cause network outages and be used to launch cyber-attacks against critical infrastructure from inside Canada's borders. They can even be used to install malicious software on nearby smartphones. These new tools of international fraud create threats to Canadians beyond financial losses. We must locate and disable these technologies rather than merely shield our citizens from their criminal application.
Project Lighthouse succeeded not because of a new law but through sustained collaboration across major financial institutions, Canada's telecoms, three police forces and several federal agencies. We prevailed because we established trust, information sharing and the willingness to act among all partners. This is the model Canada that should pursue.
Canada already has much of what it needs to fight fraud more effectively. The Canadian anti-fraud centre, sector regulators, law enforcement agencies and the private sector coalitions are there. What is missing is a central coordinating force that ensures that the best tools and intelligence reach the people who need them. That is a role only the federal government can play, and it should establish itself in that role before reaching for new powers.
Project Lighthouse taught us four lessons that Parliament can implement to combat fraud.
First, we need to strengthen co-operation across industry and government as well as globally to disrupt fraud rings that abuse our digital platforms. Trying to block individual frauds becomes an endless and futile game of whack-a-mole against international crime. Most digital fraud against Canadians operates abroad, making strong international collaboration essential to stop it. Within Canada, the federal government is best positioned to lead fraud prevention, disruption and response efforts across the public and private sectors.
Second, telecommunications companies could block more fraudulent traffic on our networks, but today liability risk constrains what we can do. Safe harbour laws protecting good-faith anti-fraud actions would help protect Canadians at no additional cost to taxpayers.
Third, provide law enforcement with the explicit mandate and necessary resources to effectively apprehend fraud perpetrators and dismantle their technical apparatus.
Fourth and finally, Parliament should look at existing policies and how they unintentionally assist fraud. For instance, the CRTC's customer confidentiality regulations restrict cross-industry information-sharing. Another example is the CRTC's device unlocking rules, which currently make it easier for criminals to defraud Canadians of their smartphones, leaving them with significant debt and damaged credit scores.
To conclude, Telus sees ongoing fraud against our customers—and, frankly, against all Canadians—every day. It is growing, but it is beatable if we act with coordination and urgency. Telus is ready to be a partner in that effort.
I look forward to your questions. Thank you.