Evidence of meeting #68 for Industry, Science and Technology in the 39th Parliament, 1st Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was prices.

A recording is available from Parliament.

On the agenda

MPs speaking

Also speaking

Sheridan Scott  Commissioner of Competition, Competition Bureau, Department of Industry
Richard Taylor  Deputy Commissioner of Competition, Competition Bureau, Civil Matters Branch, Department of Industry
Sandy MacLaren  Senior Economist, Economic Development and Corporate Finance Branch, Department of Finance
Lise Potvin  Director, Sales Tax Division, Tax Policy Branch, Department of Finance
Howard Brown  Assistant Deputy Minister, Energy Policy Sector, Department of Natural Resources
Philip Jennings  Director General, Petroleum Resources Branch, Department of Natural Resources
Geoff Trueman  Chief, Air Travelers Security Charge, Sales Tax Division, Tax Policy Branch, Department of Finance

3:30 p.m.

Conservative

The Chair Conservative James Rajotte

Order, please.

I know we don't have everyone here, but I'm told that we may have votes some time after five o'clock, so we should get started. We need only three members to hear from witnesses.

This is meeting number 68 of the Standing Committee on Science, Industry and Technology. Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), we are studying gas prices and refinery margins.

We have two sessions today of an hour each. For the first, we have two people from the Competition Bureau. Ms. Sheridan Scott is the commissioner of competition. She's a regular at our committee.

Welcome, Ms. Scott.

We also have Mr. Richard Taylor, the deputy commissioner of competition, from the Competition Bureau, civil matters branch.

Welcome, Mr. Taylor.

I believe, Ms. Scott, you'll be presenting on behalf of both of you, and then you will be available for questions from members. You can begin at any time.

3:30 p.m.

Sheridan Scott Commissioner of Competition, Competition Bureau, Department of Industry

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, for inviting us here today to participate in your study into gasoline prices and refining margins.

As you mentioned, Mr. Chair, I'm accompanied today by Richard Taylor, who's deputy commissioner for the civil matters branch.

As do all of you, I understand the importance of gasoline to Canadians in our everyday lives, as well as to the economy in general. None of us wants to pay high prices, whether for gasoline or any other product, and I think it would be fair to say that we as Canadians are all particularly sensitive to gasoline prices, as we see them displayed on the street corner every day.

Before I address some of the specifics of this topic, I think it's important that there be a clear understanding of what the bureau's overall mandate is. We seek to ensure an efficient and competitive marketplace by enforcing the Competition Act and by advocating that regulators rely on market forces to the greatest extent possible.

We don't advocate competition for its own sake. We advocate competition because the market and the robust competition that supports it, rather than government regulation, are the most effective means by which to enhance consumer welfare.

On the enforcement side, the bureau receives a large number of complaints every year. We look at whether a complaint raises any issue under the Competition Act and at the severity of the violation. Where there is sufficient evidence of a violation of the act, the bureau routinely investigates and takes enforcement action.

The act includes criminal provisions against price fixing and price maintenance, and non-criminal or ''civil'' provisions dealing with mergers and abuse of dominant position, among others.

In the course of our enforcement work, when authorized by the courts, we routinely use the investigative tools available to us, including: the power to subpoena documents and require oral testimony; the power to search and seize evidence; and the ability to wiretap.

But often, our work does not require these particular powers. Instead, we use research and other investigative tools to explore issues and factors that may be inhibiting market competitiveness. These tools are the basis for our outreach work to inform market participants about the Competition Act, competition issues and competition generally. And they provide the foundation for our efforts to fulfil our mandate to act as an informed advocate for competition.

I'd like to very briefly deal with the issue of refineries.

As with anything else within our mandate, the bureau is concerned with potential violations of the Competition Act. High prices, or in this case high refining margins, are not of themselves indications that there has been a violation of the act. There has already been much discussion in Parliament, in the media, and elsewhere as to the various factors, whether in other parts of the world or in North America, that might have contributed to the current situation. I would defer to my colleagues at Natural Resources Canada who are appearing after us. They are probably better placed to have that discussion on the specifics of the factors.

What the bureau is concerned about with respect to the gasoline refining industry over any other industry or sector of the economy is one thing: has there been a violation of the Competition Act?

From our perspective, the issue would be whether refiners come together to constrain capacity. We would take very seriously any reduction in refining capacity that was due to anti-competitive behaviour. To date, we have seen no evidence of this, and there are also some reports that a number of companies are proposing to build new refineries in the near future.

I would also like to point to the work of the US Federal Trade Commission, which has concluded that the amount of refinery capacity is not the result of anti-competitive conduct. In its post-Katrina report, it states, and I quote, that:

The evidence suggested that the rate of capacity growth was a response to competitive market forces that made further investment in refining capacity unprofitable.

This in no way means that, in the future, the bureau may not reach a different conclusion. As I said earlier, we are continuously monitoring this industry for evidence of violations of the act. I would stress however, that in order for the bureau to act, we need evidence to demonstrate that there has been abuse of dominance or price fixing. Members of the public can bring us evidence and we also have an immunity program which has proved quite successful.

Let me repeat that should the bureau find evidence of anti-competitive behaviour, whether in the gasoline or in any other sector, it will take appropriate action.

High prices are a concern to the bureau when they are the result of violations of the Competition Act. When we find evidence that firms have conspired to increase prices, we take appropriate action. Let me now turn to what the Competition Bureau does with respect to the gasoline sector. The Competition Bureau actively follows wholesale and retail gasoline prices to determine whether they are the result of market forces or anti-competitive acts. When there are price spikes, we will look even more closely. In fact, historically this has been the market the bureau has followed most closely. We have put more resources toward monitoring this market for anti-competitive acts than any other. We will continue to do so and we will take further action under the Competition Act when appropriate.

As I'm sure you're aware, the bureau has investigated the gasoline sector over the years, and in six major investigations has found no evidence to indicate that periodic price increases were the result of a national conspiracy or abuse of dominant position by firms in the market. On the other hand, bureau investigations have led to 13 criminal trials related to gasoline or heating oil prices; eight of these trials resulted in convictions. As I said, where evidence exists, we act.

I should note that the Competition Bureau receives complaints from consumers about price gouging. While price increases are not easy for consumers, high prices in and of themselves do not constitute a violation of the act any more than low prices do.

In a market economy, it is generally accepted that under most circumstances government should not determine what is an appropriate profit margin: it is certainly not within our power under the Competition Act to do so. In a market economy, businesses are generally free to set their own prices at whatever levels the market will bear. Simply because prices go up does not mean that there has been a violation of the Competition Act or that we should regulate.

Individual gasoline suppliers taking advantage of tight supply to increase their prices would not raise issues, because charging high prices at times of actual or anticipated excess demand is not contrary to the act.

This can include entering into a consent prohibition order with the parties in question or, when appropriate, by pursuing criminal charges under the conspiracy provisions of the Competition Act. When we find evidence that prices are high because of an abuse of dominance, we likewise have a range of options, which can include entering into a consent agreement with the parties in question or applying to the Competition Tribunal for an order to stop the conduct.

It should be noted that the federal government has no jurisdiction over the direct regulation of retail gasoline prices. Except in the event of a national emergency, only the provinces have the authority to regulate gasoline prices.

As you know, four provinces have opted to set maximum gasoline prices—and the evidence in all four cases demonstrates that market forces, not regulation, lead to lower prices.

I reviewed all this because I believe it is important that there be a clear understanding of the role of the Competition Bureau. We do not set prices, nor do we have an opinion on appropriate profit margins, regardless of the industry. Our role is to ensure that all industries follow the rules of the game as set out in the Competition Act. Where we find evidence of violations of our act, we respond with vigour.

That said, I want to touch on another related topic. I am a firm believer that an informed consumer is an empowered consumer. In the gasoline context, there's information out there to help consumers. The Competition Bureau has some information on its website to assist consumers in understanding this market. For more details, I would recommend the fuel-focused website maintained by Natural Resources Canada. It provides clear and timely information on fuel prices and markets, as well as ways to manage energy costs. Current and factual information on price changes will help Canadians understand how the global petroleum markets affect their lives.

In addition, industry could and should do more to help consumers understand and take advantage of pricing patterns. Consumers could benefit from additional information documenting local retail price cycles, information that consumers could use to plan purchases. A good example of this is Shell Australia's website, which provides tips for consumers to find the best time to purchase gasoline.

I would now be pleased to answer any questions you may have.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

3:40 p.m.

Conservative

The Chair Conservative James Rajotte

Thank you very much for your presentation, Ms. Scott.

We will begin with our first round of six minutes for questions and comments, and we'll begin with Mr. Bevilacqua.

3:40 p.m.

Liberal

Maurizio Bevilacqua Liberal Vaughan, ON

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Ms. Scott, thank you so much for your presentation.

As you know, this is an issue that I think members of Parliament on both sides of the House have to deal with on a daily basis. We get many letters and requests from our constituents as to how this happens: how do they get up one morning and the price is a certain amount and then the next day it's changed quite a bit?

I want to ask you if you feel the Competition Act gives the Competition Bureau enough powers to deal with this particular issue?

3:40 p.m.

Commissioner of Competition, Competition Bureau, Department of Industry

Sheridan Scott

I think it's important, and I'm going to try not to use up your six minutes, although I would like to provide a fairly comprehensive answer to this question, because it does come up fairly frequently, and I'd like to try to be as clear as I can about the types of behaviour that we might be looking at and where we believe the act is sufficiently strong and where we believe it is not.

The complaints that we often receive from consumers—and many of those that are directed to MPs and are sent on to us to look at as well—frequently deal with price gouging and not price fixing. Price gouging refers to a rapid rise in price in response to a scarcity of supplies. That's how we generally see price gouging, and it's often what people believe they're experiencing in the gas industry. A good example of clear price gouging would arise, for example, in the context of the ice storm, when the price of generators skyrocketed. There's a scarce commodity, and many consumers are interested in purchasing it.

This is an issue that can arise, as well, in the oil and gas industry, and you'll certainly be hearing from the NRCan representatives on how those prices might move in response to scarcity in the supply of gasoline, which we have been experiencing this fall.

In terms of our ability to deal with price gouging, these are not teeth that we think are missing from our act. We don't believe it is appropriate to have prohibitions against price gouging contained in the Competition Act, and there are a couple of reasons for this.

First of all, we believe that trying to control those sorts of price movements can frustrate the operation of market forces and might indeed be contrary to the aims of the Competition Act, because frequently the rise in prices is a response to actual or anticipated shortages by suppliers.

More importantly, having jurisdiction to wade into issues of price gouging would require us to determine either the proper rate of return to a company or what a specific reasonable price would be. Our view is that it would be difficult, if not impossible, for us to carry that out. It would be work that would be difficult, if not impossible, for us. It's certainly akin to the regulation of an industry, so it would also raise issues about whether this would fall to the provinces rather than to the federal government; the federal government has jurisdiction in times of national emergencies to regulate prices, but not to regulate prices for commodities on a day-to-day basis.

Some provinces have actually decided that they should regulate rates; they do it to smooth out rates, as opposed to determining what a reasonable price is. Certainly it does that, and consumers appreciate it, but it does not lead to lower prices in the marketplace. Indeed, a recent study published in Nova Scotia a couple of months ago indicated that their regulation of gas prices has led to slightly higher, rather than lower, prices. Then you would have to take into account the cost of regulation as well, and that comes out of taxpayers' dollars.

These are a number of matters for you to consider, but our net view on price gouging in particular is that this is not something that is missing from the Competition Act, nor would it be appropriate to include something like it in the Competition Act.

I'll just identify for you what the other issues might be for us. There are other aspects in our act dealing with, for example, abuse of dominant position or price fixing. In this connection this committee, in fact, in 2002 suggested that some changes could take place, and that those changes might assist us in being more flexible in intervening in the gasoline market as well as in a number of other markets. If you're interested in our perspective on those, I'd be happy to add, but I suspect your constituents are mostly concerned about the price gouging issue.

3:45 p.m.

Liberal

Maurizio Bevilacqua Liberal Vaughan, ON

That's right.

First of all, I want to take the opportunity to congratulate you on the leadership you've been given amongst competition bureau commissioners in the world. Can you explain to me if that international experience helped you in dealing with this particular issue, and are there lessons we can learn from your international experience?

3:45 p.m.

Commissioner of Competition, Competition Bureau, Department of Industry

Sheridan Scott

For sure—it's a very interesting question.

Two weeks ago I was at the meeting of the International Competition Network, which is the group that represents 100 antitrust agencies around the world, and I'm now the chair of the steering group. We have lots of chances to get together with our counterparts. Gas pricing is a big issue that we actually discuss among ourselves.

It's quite interesting that it's very important in some jurisdictions and not at all important in other jurisdictions. The Japanese don't have this as an issue, and I discussed it with my Japanese counterpart. He says this is not an issue that leads to any public concern. My British counterpart explained to me that it used to be a more significant issue, but it's not a matter that consumers raise with them particularly frequently now.

Where we do have common cause is with the U.S. There the Federal Trade Commission has jurisdiction similar to ours. I was quoting a little bit earlier from the results of one of the studies that the FTC did in response to the spike in gas prices following Hurricane Katrina. I would say that the approach of the Federal Trade Commission is very similar to ours; its analysis is very similar to ours. It's concerned about jurisdiction over price gouging, which it does not believe is appropriate for an antitrust agency.

We've certainly exchanged notes. The head of the FTC offered to send me up the binder that she is developing to try to help explain what these changes in gas prices are all about. So we do have exchanges of information as well.

3:50 p.m.

Conservative

The Chair Conservative James Rajotte

Okay, thank you, Mr. Bevilacqua.

We'll go to Madame Brunelle.

3:50 p.m.

Bloc

Paule Brunelle Bloc Trois-Rivières, QC

Good afternoon and thank you for meeting with us. You know that the price of gas is a very important issue for the citizens we represent, because it has an impact on the economy and on the price of essential goods, such as food.

In your presentation, you told us that, as far as the oil refinery sector was concerned, the issue of most concern to the bureau is whether or not the Competition Act has been contravened. You said that, in your opinion, it was important to ascertain whether or not the refineries agreed amongst themselves to decrease capacity. If I understand correctly, we could talk about collusion.

Moreover, a few years ago this committee discovered that the oil companies could turn a reasonable profit with a refinery margin of between 4 to 7¢ per litre. In April, for instance, we saw the refinery margin increase to 19.5 ¢ per litre and, by the end of May, this margin was sitting at 27¢ per litre.

You can therefore guess what question I'm going to ask. Can we do anything about this? Do you feel that you have the requisite authority to do this? How can we explain the situation to people? We come up with theories. We say that the number of refinery operations has declined significantly.

I would like to hear what you have to say on the subject.

3:50 p.m.

Commissioner of Competition, Competition Bureau, Department of Industry

Sheridan Scott

To begin with, you talked about a reasonable profit. As I explained, it is not up to us to set prices or determine what constitutes a reasonable profit. We can do this type of analysis to see whether or not there is a reason for suspecting anti-competitive behaviour. Just because one price is higher than another does not mean that there has been collusion or anti-competitive conduct.

I will turn the floor over to my colleague, who can explain how we view the situation. We are part of the North American market, if not the global market. We make comparisons, perhaps not every year, but we do compare our margins with those of the United States to determine whether or not there really is a collective aspect to them. I believe that the representatives from Natural Resources Canada who will be testifying before this committee will be able to discuss this matter with you. They monitor market prices much more closely than we do, because this is part of their mandate and not ours.

You said that there has been a decline in the number of refineries. We did a study, because we are responsible for mergers. There have been no mergers in the oil sector for ten years. If we look at the trend over many years, we can see that the current concentration in the sector is not any higher than it has been in the past.

3:50 p.m.

Bloc

Paule Brunelle Bloc Trois-Rivières, QC

You're saying that the decrease in the number of refineries has no impact on price. We can perhaps surmise that when events occur in one place or another in the world, there is an increase in the demand. A scarcity ensues and we can't meet the demand.

3:50 p.m.

Commissioner of Competition, Competition Bureau, Department of Industry

Sheridan Scott

We analyze whether or not the purpose of the concentration is to obtain dominance and whether or not competition in the market has declined. We have noted that the number of refineries has decreased, but that does not mean that we are finished with companies that may, according to our analysis, put pressure on the market. We believe, in fact, that the decrease in the number of refineries has led to greater efficiencies in the sector.

I will ask my colleague to say a few words about the comparisons that we have done, for instance, between the refinery margins in the United States and in Canada. The group of witnesses who follow us will be able to provide you with other details as well.

3:50 p.m.

Richard Taylor Deputy Commissioner of Competition, Competition Bureau, Civil Matters Branch, Department of Industry

We compared the refinery margins in the United States with those in Canada. We noted that they were practically the same. When the refinery margins increase in Canada, they increase by the same amount in the United States. All public sources are saying that right now this is a result of a gas shortage in the United States, meaning that the demand for gas in the United States is greater than the supply, which increases the margin significantly. The only way to restore balance would be to decrease the demand or increase the supply. That is what is going on right now with the gas imports from Europe.

3:55 p.m.

Bloc

Paule Brunelle Bloc Trois-Rivières, QC

Thank you.

Ms. Scott, I would like to discuss your power to investigate. In 2003, your predecessor told this committee that the Competition Act had serious loopholes. He said, and I quote: « [...] the current legislation does not provide the bureau with the authority to conduct an industry study ». He added that it would be better to have an overall study of the situation done by an independent organization that has the authority to convene witnesses and gather information.

Is the Competition Bureau that you represent still in favour of creating what was called at the time a bureau for monitoring the oil industry, as your predecessor, along with members of the oil industry, wanted to do?

3:55 p.m.

Conservative

The Chair Conservative James Rajotte

Briefly, Ms. Scott.

3:55 p.m.

Commissioner of Competition, Competition Bureau, Department of Industry

Sheridan Scott

Creating such a bureau would enable us to study the market, because the legislation has other gaps, as mentioned in the current committee's reports. We could do market studies, especially in the oil industry, where there is a great deal of public information, like the studies that we did since 1990, if there was some willingness to give us the tools that would give us more leeway. Now if we were given a little more authority to do market studies, we would be able to do it without being suspected of violating the legislation if, for example, we require certain documents.

That being said, we think that we have been able to do the work up to now. We would be ready to do these studies if we were provided with the necessary resources, because such studies are expensive. In England, they have the authority to do such studies, that cost several million dollars.

3:55 p.m.

Conservative

The Chair Conservative James Rajotte

Thank you.

We'll go to Mr. Carrie.

3:55 p.m.

Conservative

Colin Carrie Conservative Oshawa, ON

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

I want to take a moment to congratulate you. I read today that you charged 11 individuals through deceptive telemarketing provisions under the Competition Act.

3:55 p.m.

Commissioner of Competition, Competition Bureau, Department of Industry

3:55 p.m.

Conservative

Colin Carrie Conservative Oshawa, ON

Everybody here thanks you very much for that.

I'd like to start off with a two-part question.

In Oshawa I recently had a constituent tell me there was a shortage of gas and that some stations had no gas. The reason he called me was that at one station they put the price up to what he thought was very excessive. They were still open and were selling it at this price, and he thought it wasn't right.

The first part of my question is this. What can our constituents do when they see examples of this? What is the procedure if they see something they think is price gouging?

I understand there are four aspects that make up the price of gasoline. Could you explain these four elements and how they individually determine the price of gas so that we can explain it to our constituents a little better?

3:55 p.m.

Commissioner of Competition, Competition Bureau, Department of Industry

Sheridan Scott

All right. On your first question in respect to the shortage of gas and the increase in price, we actually see it as a normal response in the marketplace. When there's a shortage of supply, the price goes up. It's supply and demand.

On the concern about trying to introduce controls on price gouging, if it's indeed price gouging—and I don't know if it's price gouging, because it's a very difficult definition—we think it's interference in the marketplace and sends the wrong signals.

It doesn't mean it's easy for consumers. It's extremely difficult. It's why I said in my comments that we would welcome the role of NRCan, which is doing a very good job in this area right now, and also the industry to give consumers more information so that they can understand the cycling of gas prices in the market.

Again, we follow this market very closely, looking for anti-competitive acts. NRCan follows it even more closely than we do, and we see these cycles. Tuesday evening may be a little less expensive than a Friday. We often hear the question on why the price of gas goes up on a Friday. If you've read economics 101, it's kind of obvious. People tend to travel on the weekends. There's a greater demand for gas on the weekends. It's not surprising that gas prices go up on the weekend.

One can sense a cycle in these prices. We think it's helpful for consumers to be better armed so they can identify the cycles and make purchasing decisions in the marketplace that reflect the supply and demand.

In terms of the four elements, I will again turn the mike over to Richard, who is very conversant in this area.

I would also say that you would probably get more help and details from the NRCan folks who will be following us, but we certainly have quite a strong awareness of how those price parts move.

Richard.

4 p.m.

Deputy Commissioner of Competition, Competition Bureau, Civil Matters Branch, Department of Industry

Richard Taylor

Thank you.

One of the four components that we would normally look at in terms of a litre of gasoline is taxes, which range from 33% to 35%, but because taxes vary across the provinces we mostly look at gasoline in a fashion we call ex-tax. When we compare it to the U.S. we see that ex-tax our price for a litre of gasoline is very similar. The three components other than tax, if we talk about an ex-tax price, are crude oil, which currently, 2000 year-to-date, represents 67%; wholesale margin, which year-to-date is about 25%; and then the retail margin is about 8%. That would make up the three components.

Obviously in the times we are experiencing right now, the retail margin, which is 10¢, 11¢, or 12¢ normally, has shot up and it is currently declining. Last week it declined about 5¢ and now averages about 14¢. In the periods of the peaks, particularly in the spring, it's shooting up over 20¢.

It's not a question of crude, which is the single largest determinant of the price and historically has been the big item that has increased. What we're seeing more often, particularly in the spring and after natural disasters, are spikes in the refinery margins due to concerns about supply.

4 p.m.

Conservative

Colin Carrie Conservative Oshawa, ON

Thank you very much.

We have heard a lot of talk about the refining margin. I'm curious, if the government changes regulations for cleaner fuels because they want cleaner fuels for the environment, would that increase the cost of refining? Have we in the last year or so changed fuel regulations so that there may be increased cost there?

4 p.m.

Commissioner of Competition, Competition Bureau, Department of Industry

Sheridan Scott

I don't know if Richard has anything to add, but quite frankly, I think that's probably something where you'll find significantly more expertise on the following panel than ourselves. We really are following pricing in the marketplace.

Richard.

4 p.m.

Deputy Commissioner of Competition, Competition Bureau, Civil Matters Branch, Department of Industry

Richard Taylor

I would only add that since the U.S. now consumes 43% to 45% of the world's supply of gasoline and we consume 3%, then when the U.S. does something to cause changes in the supply conditions, that causes problems around the world and a price effect around the world. They have, as you know, in California very stringent restrictions, and they have increased their national emissions standards are well. That has made some difference down there, which affects us indirectly, because if their prices go up, our refiner is priced to that market.