Thank you very much, honourable committee members, for this opportunity to speak to you today.
The China Institute, which I head since leaving government, is the only think tank in Canada focused solely on China. Others cover all of Asia or other issues. We cover economy, social issues, political issues and bilateral relations.
Frustrated when I went to the China Institute as it's first director about the lack of good data on foreign and Chinese investment in Canada, we created, at a considerable expense of our own, a comprehensive database. It tracks right back to the parent Chinese company, be it in Hong Kong or on the mainland.
For example, Statistics Canada counts less than $20 billion CAD of Chinese investment, and the Chinese Ministry of Commerce is similarly flawed. There are flaws at both. They have their own utilities.
We have collated over $93 billion CAD of Chinese investment in this country. We sell a subscription. I'm not here to advertise it, but our subscribers include the Library of Parliament, Public Safety Canada, GAC, ISED, Natural Resources Canada, the U.S. embassy and USTR. We have many subscribers also from law firms and private business.
We use very smart Ph.D. students, largely. Using a range of logarithms and databases in Canada, Europe, the United States and China, we pull together all of this information.
We went back as far as 1993, when Chinese investment was almost non-existent. The big acceleration took place in this century, in 2003-04, when China began to make investments of $2 billion to $3 billion, largely in the energy sector but also in mines. Then there was the blockbuster deal of 2013, the acquisition of Nexen by CNOOC. That was, at the time, the largest Chinese investment ever abroad. There have been much larger ones since.
Chinese investment peaked in that year, reaching $21 billion of investment. It dropped in 2018-19 to between $2 billion and $4 billion. We expect this decrease to continue in 2020 due to three reasons: the global economic recession, the bilateral difficulties in the Canada-China relationship and also China's own stricter rules about who can take money out and what they can buy. For example, Anbang has been told, “Don't be buying retirement homes. Stick to your core business, which is insurance.”
From my perspective, maximum market intervention is not a good thing. Foreign investment has, for centuries, quite literally, helped this country develop, as it has the United States. Traditionally that capital has come from Europe and the United States, but as the centre of gravity moves towards Asia, it has changed. It is important, particularly in capital-intensive resource industries. We have lots of them. They do need capital.
Foreign investment can bring much needed innovation, and it also can bring inclusion in supply chains, but there is always a risk involved, and in China—I can be frank as I'm no longer in government—state-owned enterprises are not independent actors. Even private firms can be state-controlled. Not all SOEs are created equal. There are almost 300,000 of them. Some of them might be state-owned enterprises focused on food production in a small municipality in China, which are low risk.
I'm more nervous, quite frankly, about a private Chinese company buying a high-tech firm for $20 million, where the IP can either be carried away in a briefcase or go down a fibre optic cable. I'm more nervous about that than I am about a $100-million investment in a coal mine, where everything is up and visible on the surface, China is taking the product, Parliament is supreme, and in extremis they can stop that exit. IP, once it's gone, is gone. That, to me, is the risk. You need a more sophisticated analysis than just looking at SOEs versus private companies, which isn't to say that SOEs can't perform badly.
In Africa, where I have some experience looking at Chinese investment, sometimes the SOEs have better practices, more environmentally sustainable and better labour practices, than some of the pirate firms, which behave very badly indeed. It's not a one-size-fits-all thing.
Greenfield investment is generally better in my view. I know of a wire wool manufacturer in a community with very high percentage of African Americans in the American south. It went bankrupt. China came in, bought the firm and rehabilitated it with a lot of money of its own. The mayor of that town is very happy, and unemployment has gone down. Similarly I'd argue, in a Canadian example, Feihe International put $225 million into a greenfield investment to produce infant formula. That's a company that started off as an SOE and then was privatized.
It's not easy, even when you look hard, to tell sometimes what is an SOE and what isn't—