Thank you, Madam Chair.
Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. My name is Pierre Karl Péladeau, and I am the President and Chief Executive Officer of Quebecor. With me is my colleague Jean-François Pruneau, President and Chief Executive Officer of Videotron.
The federal government, after acknowledging that there was no real competition in wireless and that Canada was among the industrialized countries with the highest prices for wireless services, diligently pursued a disciplined policy as of 2007, designed to enable a fourth wireless player to emerge and do business on a lasting basis; it was to have a sound foundation and its own facilities in all regions of the country. The conditions established when the auction of licences for advanced wireless services was held in 2008 achieved these objectives. Videotron in Quebec and Eastlink in the Maritime provinces became the linchpins of this successful policy.
Since 2008, we have invested over $2 billion to deliver the best networks and the most innovative services in Quebec. As a result, Quebeckers now have the lowest rates in Canada for wireless services, up to 40% lower than for other Canadians. That's not me saying it, but rather the CRTC's Competition Bureau. Not only does this promote better rates, but also better customer service. Everyone knows how little the Big 3 care about that.
All of this became possible when the federal government realized, about 15 years ago, that strong competition would never emerge on its own, and that concrete steps had to be taken to break the oligopoly of the Big 3. I have three measures in mind: reserved spectrum; mandatory tower sharing to prevent their proliferation and visual pollution, and to speed up the deployment of wireless; and mandated roaming.
Not everything was as successful, and Canada had to live through the Wind Mobile fiasco, whose financing by foreigners was not aimed at building a network, but rather pure speculation. In the meantime, two newcomers, Public Mobile and Mobilicity, were swallowed up. Wind Mobile eventually received some solid support from Shaw, which demonstrated that it was perfectly capable of taking on the Big 3 in Ontario and Western Canada.
Rogers' proposed acquisition of Shaw would put us back to square one by eliminating the fourth player so essential to ongoing real competition.
You, the members, and the various regulatory organizations, need to ask the following question: do consumers in other provinces deserve to have the same experience as consumers in Quebec and the Maritime provinces, meaning being able to purchase their services from a trusted and innovative supplier like Videotron, which is not a member of the Big 3's oligopoly.
One thing is certain, and that is that the dramatic consequences that led to the abandonment of the policy promoting genuine competition cannot be countered by mobile virtual network operators, usually referred to as MVNOs in our jargon, entities which only exist through their access to networks operated by others. MVNOs, which are essentially service resellers, will never have the same market influence as suppliers that have their own infrastructure, because they don't really have the means to innovate. I say this on the basis of our own experience, because Videotron was itself an MVNO prior to 2010. Clearly, the model does not provide the attributes and flexibility needed to compete with the Big 3 oligopoly, which controls over 90% of Canada's wireless market.
So if we want sustainable competition that benefits consumers over the long term, it's essential not only to maintain and strengthen the competition model based on facilities, but also to continue with the fourth-player policy for wireless.
Rogers and Shaw told you that 5G investments justified market concentration. This is a rather surprising statement, because as recently as last September, Shaw wrote to this committee to say that the Big 3’s arguments are “a transparent and desperate attempt to thwart further competitive entry and expansion by regional competitors like Shaw, in order to maintain and further entrench their joint dominance in the 5G era.” This is only a very short excerpt from the brief tabled by Shaw on December 18.
To conclude, we're asking you to have the courage to subject the main transaction, that of the wired networks group, to the disposal of Freedom Mobile's assets by including the conditions required for the effective operation of a wireless network, which are spectrum ownership, roaming agreements, tower sharing and an equitable agreement for use of the wired network, known as backhaul.
Thank you for your attention.