Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Good morning.
First, I want to say how much I appreciate this opportunity to meet with the committee.
My name is Yoshua Bengio, and I am a full professor at Université de Montréal, as well as the founder and scientific director of Mila - Quebec Artificial Intelligence Institute. Here's a fun fact: I recently became the most quoted computer scientist in the world.
Over the past year I've had the privilege of sharing my perspective on AI in a number of important international forums, including the U.S. Senate; the first global AI Safety Summit, an advisory board to the UN Secretary-General; and the U.K. Frontier AI Taskforce; in addition to the work I'm doing here in Canada in co-chairing the advisory committee on AI for the government.
In recent years, the pace of AI advancement has accelerated to such a degree that I and many leaders in the field of AI have revised downwards our estimates of when human levels of broad cognitive competence, also known as AGI, will be achieved—in other words, when we will have machines that are as smart as humans at a cognitive level.
This was previously thought to be decades or even centuries away. I now believe, with many of my colleagues, including Geoff Hinton, that superhuman AI could be developed in the next two decades, and even possibly in the next few years.
If we look at the low end, we're not ready, and this prospect is extremely worrying.
The prospect of the early emergence of human-level AI is very worrisome.
As discussed in the above international forums, without adequate guardrails, the current AI trajectory poses serious risks of major societal harms even before AGI is reached.
To be clear, progress in AI has opened exciting opportunities for numerous beneficial applications that have motivated me for many years, yet it is urgent to establish the necessary guardrails to foster innovation while mitigating risks and harms.
With that in mind, we urgently need agile AI legislation. I think this law is doing that, and is moving in the right direction, but initial requirements must be put in place even before the consultations are completed to develop the more comprehensive regulatory framework. With the current approach, it would take something like two years before enforcement would be possible.
I therefore support AIDA broadly and would like to formulate recommendations to this committee on ways to strengthen its capacity to meaningfully protect Canadians. They are laid out in detail in my submission, but there are three things that I would like to highlight.
The first is the urgency to adopt legislation.
Upcoming advances are likely to be disruptive, and the timeline for these is very uncertain. In this situation, an imperfect law whose regulation could be adapted later is better than no law and better than postponing a law too much. We should best move forward with AIDA's framework and rely on agile regulatory systems that can be adapted as this technology evolves.
Also, because of the urgency, the law should include initial provisions that will apply as soon as it is adopted to ensure the public's protection while the regulatory framework is being developed.
What would we do as an initial step? I'm talking about a registry.
Systems beyond a certain level of capability should report to the government and provide information about their safety and security measures, as well as safety assessments. A regulator will be able to use that information to form best-in-class requirements for future permits to continue developing and deploying these advanced systems. This would put the burden of demonstrating safety on developers with the billions required to build these advance systems, rather than taxpayers.
Second, another important point to add in the law is that national security risks and societal threats should be listed among the high-impact categories. Examples of capabilities to bring harm include being easily transformable to help bad actors design dangerous cyber-attacks and weapons, deceiving and manipulating as well as or better than humans, or finding ways to self-replicate in spite of contrary programming instructions.
Finally, my last main point concerns the need for pre-deployment requirements. Developers should be required to register their system and demonstrate its safety and security even before the system is fully trained and developed, and before deployment. We need to address and target the risks that emerged earlier in an AI's life cycle, which the current law doesn't seem to do.
In conclusion, I welcome the committee's questions and look forward to hearing what my fellow witnesses have to say. All of their comments thus far have been quite interesting.
At this point, I would like to thank you for having this important conversation.