Digital Charter Implementation Act, 2022

An Act to enact the Consumer Privacy Protection Act, the Personal Information and Data Protection Tribunal Act and the Artificial Intelligence and Data Act and to make consequential and related amendments to other Acts

Sponsor

Status

Second reading (House), as of June 16, 2022

Subscribe to a feed (what's a feed?) of speeches and votes in the House related to Bill C-27.

Elsewhere

All sorts of information on this bill is available at LEGISinfo, an excellent resource from the Library of Parliament. You can also read the full text of the bill.

June 16th, 2022 / 4:35 p.m.
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Staff Lawyer, Samuelson-Glushko Canadian Internet Policy and Public Interest Clinic

Tamir Israel

I would second what Ms. Bhandari is saying. It's not too late to act.

I would just also add really quickly that we have a very big enforcement problem in Canada. Obviously we had rulings against Clearview here as well. Clearview is currently challenging those rulings against it from the B.C. privacy commissioner, the Alberta privacy commissioner and the Quebec commissioner.

Federally though, it did not challenge the federal Privacy Commissioner's ruling because that ruling is not binding, so it's essentially, “take it as a recommendation and move on.” I think the enforcement mechanisms that will come through in the private right of action that is coming through Bill C-27—which I imagine may come before you shortly—is something that you would also like to take a look at very closely when you're considering how to make sure that whatever laws you put in place are respected by Clearview and all the other companies that follow its model.

June 16th, 2022 / 4:30 p.m.
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Bloc

René Villemure Bloc Trois-Rivières, QC

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Ms. Bhandari, this morning, the Government of Canada introduced Bill C‑27, which, among other things, implements the Digital Charter. Part 3 of the bill is entitled “Artificial Intelligence and Data Act.”

The bill therefore deals with artificial intelligence and facial recognition. It will be sent to committee for study so that we can discuss it and make suggestions for improvement.

From what you know of the Biometric Information Privacy Act, or BIPA, what should we look to in that legislation to enrich our digital charter that will eventually be implemented?

June 16th, 2022 / 3:50 p.m.
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Tamir Israel Staff Lawyer, Samuelson-Glushko Canadian Internet Policy and Public Interest Clinic

Good afternoon, Mr. Chair and members of the committee.

My name is Tamir Israel and I'm a lawyer with the Samuelson-Glushko Canadian Internet Policy and Public Interest Clinic at the University of Ottawa, which sits on the traditional unceded territory of the Algonquin Anishinabe people.

I want to thank you for inviting me to participate in this important study into facial recognition systems.

As the committee has heard, facial recognition technology is versatile and poses an insidious threat to privacy and anonymity, while undermining substantive equality. It demands a societal response that's different and more proactive than that to other forms of surveillance technology.

Face recognition is currently distinguished by its ability to operate surreptitiously and at a distance. Preauthenticated image databases can also be compiled without participation by individuals, and this has made facial recognition the biometric of choice for achieving a range of tasks. In its current state of development, the technology is accurate enough to inspire confidence in its users but sufficiently error prone that mistakes will continue to occur with potentially devastating consequences.

We have long recognized, for example, that photo lineups can lead police to fixate erroneously on particular suspects. Automation bias compounds this problem exponentially. When officers using an application such as Clearview AI or searching a mug shot database are presented with an algorithmically generated gallery of 25 potential suspects matching a grainy image taken from a CCTV camera, the tendency is to defer to the technology and to presume the right person has been found. Simply including human supervision will, therefore, never be sufficient to fully mitigate the harms of this technology.

Of course, racial bias remains a significant problem for facial recognition systems as well. Even for top-rated algorithms, false matches can be 20 times higher for Black women, 50 times higher for native American men, and 120 times higher for native American women than they are for white men.

This persistent racial bias can render even mundane uses of facial recognition deeply problematic. For example, a United Kingdom government website relies on face detection to vet passport image quality, providing an efficient mechanism for online passport renewals. However, the face detection algorithm often fails for people of colour and this circumstance alienates individuals who are already marginalized by locking them out of conveniences available to others.

As my friend Ms. Bhandari mentioned, even when facial recognition is cured of its biases and errors, the technology remains deeply problematic. Facial recognition systems use deeply sensitive biometric information and provide a powerful identification capability that we know from other investigative tools such as street checks will be used disproportionately against indigenous, Black and other marginalized communities.

So far, facial recognition systems can be and have been used by Canadian police on an arrested suspect's mobile device, on a device's photo album, on CCTV footage in the general vicinity of crimes and on surveillance photos taken by police in public spaces.

At our borders, facial recognition is at the heart of an effort to build sophisticated digital identities. “Your face will be your passport” is becoming an all-too-common refrain. Technology also provides a means of linking these sophisticated identities and other digital profiles to individuals, driving an unprecedented level of automation.

At all stages, transparency is an issue, as government agencies in particular are able to adopt and repurpose facial recognition systems surreptitiously, relying on dubious lawful authorities and without any advance public licence.

We join many of our colleagues in calling for a moratorium on public safety and national security related uses of facial recognition and on new uses at our borders. Absent a moratorium, we would recommend amending the Criminal Code to limit law enforcement use to investigations of serious crimes and in the absence of reasonable grounds to believe. A permanent ban on the use of automated, live biometric recognition by police in public spaces would also be beneficial, and we would also recommend exploring a broader prohibition on the adoption of new facial recognition capabilities by federal bodies absent some sort of explicit legislative or regulatory approval.

Substantial reform of our two core federal privacy laws is also required. Bill C-27 was tabled this morning and it would enact the artificial intelligence and data act, as well as reform our private sector law, our federal law PIPEDA. Those reforms are pending and will be discussed, but beyond the amendments in Bill C-27, both PIPEDA and the Privacy Act need to be amended so that biometric information is explicitly encoded as sensitive, requires greater protection in all contexts and, under PIPEDA, requires express consent in all contexts.

Both PIPEDA and the Privacy Act should also be amended to legally require companies and government agencies to file impact assessments with the Privacy Commissioner prior to adopting intrusive technologies. Finally, the commissioner should be empowered to interrogate intrusive technologies through a public regulatory process and to put in place usage limitations or even moratoria where necessary.

Those are my opening remarks. I thank the committee for its time. I look forward to your questions.

PrivacyOral Questions

June 16th, 2022 / 3 p.m.
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Saint-Maurice—Champlain Québec

Liberal

François-Philippe Champagne LiberalMinister of Innovation

Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague for her question, for her excellent work and for her leadership.

As my colleagues will attest, there is a lot of enthusiasm for what we did today. Earlier, I introduced the Digital Charter Implementation Act, 2022, which will give people more power to protect their personal information and their children. This is how we are ensuring that Canadians can take advantage of the latest technologies and be confident that their personal information is protected and secure and that companies are acting responsibly. Security and trust are key words in the digital age.

Digital Charter Implementation Act, 2022Routine Proceedings

June 16th, 2022 / 10 a.m.
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Saint-Maurice—Champlain Québec

Liberal