As I said, I'm happy to take these conversations off-line privately, but there are many things, and it doesn't need the quantum-specific expertise which I bring to the table to answer those kinds of questions.
I think it's fairly easy to imagine ways to ensure compliance in short order on certain items. One of the precursor elements are going to be the NIST standardization process along post-quantum cryptography, because many large organizations are loath to make next steps until there exists some standard to adopt. My recommendation is to say to adopt all of those standards, layer them on so that they have to all be hacked to get through, and put in these additional layers of protection that are provably secure, because none of those post-quantum algorithms are actually proven to work.
As I said, there were three that were put forward that have been suggested as ultimately resilient against quantum attack, and three of them have fallen. It's not all of them, but we haven't yet subjected any of these post-quantum algorithms to attack like RSA has seen over decades of work, and that's quantum attack or classical attack.
My suggestion is for critical infrastructures, such as interbank lending, to start with—but also things to do even with consumer banking. Imagine some solution using one-time pad distribution, or ultimately QKD for renewal outside of keys.