Good afternoon. I'm honoured to be able to join you today to speak about foreign investment review.
Until October of last year, I was the director of policy and international relations in the office of investment security—that is, CFIUS—at the U.S. Department of the Treasury. As you are probably aware, the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, better known as CFIUS, is the inter-agency committee that reviews foreign investment for national security risk. In my prior role, I led the process for drafting and finalizing regulations to implement CFIUS's new authority under a 2018 statute and also led the international engagement function for CFIUS, where Canada was an excellent partner to the United States.
I am currently practising law with Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld in Washington. Today, I am speaking in my personal capacity.
In establishing and implementing a foreign investment review mechanism, countries with open economies are attempting to meet dual objectives: protecting national security while maintaining an open investment environment.
In recent years, governments worldwide have created or strengthened review mechanisms—for example, to require more mandatory filings to ensure they have the opportunity to review higher-risk transactions, and in recognition of the fact that once material non-public technical information is shared, a subsequent divestiture cannot undo the damage to national security. These mechanisms vary by jurisdiction and, of course, each country must determine for itself where to draw various lines.
I understand that committee members have inquired as a point of reference how CFIUS has approached certain issues, and I will offer background on five relevant issues.
The first is mandatory filings. In the U.S., filing is generally voluntary, with parties receiving the benefit of a safe harbour from future review once CFIUS has cleared a transaction. Recent amendments made preclosing filings mandatory in two cases: investments where a foreign government would acquire a “substantial interest” in certain businesses with critical technology, critical infrastructure or sensitive personal data—called TID businesses—and certain investments by private companies into U.S. businesses with “critical technology”.
Although other transactions involving technology are subject to CFIUS's voluntary jurisdiction, the mandatory filing requirement is only triggered with respect to a particular transaction where a government authorization would be required to export the U.S. business's technology to the foreign acquirer or certain of its shareholders. Thus, transactions that are likely to be riskier are the ones that must be filed mandatorily preclosing. Other countries, such as the U.K., Japan and France, have taken a broader sectoral approach to mandatory filings.
Second is regulatory scoping. For CFIUS, the broad contours of jurisdiction are included in the statute, with many key terms defined in regulations, which can be updated more easily. Particularly where filings are mandatory, best practice is to provide as much detail as possible.
Third is interim measures. The 2018 legislation codified CFIUS's authority to impose interim measures while reviewing a transaction. Similar to the rationale for mandating filings, this can prevent harm to national security that cannot be reversed, such as preventing access to technology, though CFIUS has used this sparingly. CFIUS does frequently negotiate mitigation agreements to address identified risk.
Fourth is confidentiality. CFIUS's statute provides an explicit exception to its confidentiality requirements for sharing information with allied governments.
Fifth is excepted foreign states. Here, I will note an area of difference. As in Canada, CFIUS generally applies to investment from all foreign countries, and there is not a prohibited list. However, the 2018 legislation provided discretion for CFIUS to give exceptions for certain investors. Currently, investors with a tight nexus to Five Eyes countries, including Canada, are excepted from CFIUS's jurisdiction over non-controlling investments and all mandatory filing requirements. However, they are still subject to CFIUS's broad jurisdiction over transactions that could result in control.
Finally, I will also note that Congress provided CFIUS with a significant increase in resources concurrently with the expansion of its jurisdiction. Returning to the theme of protecting national security and open investment, this has allowed CFIUS to devote more resources to addressing risks while also more quickly processing benign transactions.
I look forward to your questions. While I'm not an expert on the Canadian process, I am happy to share my experience on investment security issues.