Thank you very much, Mr. Kenney, and thank you to the subcommittee for this invitation. Normally it would be the president of Rights and Democracy, or the International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development, Jean-Louis Roy, who would address this committee. However, he is travelling; hence I have taken his place on this occasion.
Rights and Democracy believes that the Canada-China bilateral human rights dialogue should continue but not in its current form. It is better to talk than not to talk; however, the conversation has to lead somewhere and not be used as a decoy in addressing fundamental human rights issues. It is in this context that Rights and Democracy is making the following suggestions to improve the effectiveness of the dialogue.
First, the purpose of the dialogue should be clearly defined. What are its objectives? What is it trying to achieve? After nine sessions, the answers to these key questions are still unclear. There is some confusion, not to mention discrepancy, between the views of the Chinese authorities and those of Canadian representatives. It is time, we believe, to move beyond a talk shop and into a more focused approach with clearly articulated goals.
One of the main findings of Mr. Burton's report is that after nearly ten years the dialogue could not even demonstrate one significant outcome. Throughout, each of the dialogue sessions have had a theme: equality, UN mechanisms, racism, conditions of detention, women's rights, and so forth, and yet there are no concrete outcomes; hence, the dialogue could greatly benefit from a mutually agreed upon long-term action plan—mutually agreed upon, obviously, between Canada and China. This would enable both parties to gauge outcomes, to evaluate progress based on benchmarks, and to link the general discussion that takes place during the dialogue to specific changes on the ground.
For example, specific steps can be taken on the issue of the prisoners lists and support for human rights defenders. We therefore recommend that Canada and China first define the purpose of the dialogue and develop a plan of action aimed at specific and measurable outcomes. As such, if and when there is progress on an issue, it can be demonstrated. If there is no progress or if there is regress on an issue, that too can be demonstrated and appropriate measures taken.
Second, the dialogue should take place with the appropriate interlocutors in China and within the framework of a whole-of-government approach in Canada. This entails three elements.
The first is that the dialogue should engage the higher-level representatives of the two countries, ie., it should take place at the very least at the deputy ministerial level.
The second is that it should involve Chinese ministries that actually have a domestic mandate, and Mr. Burton addressed some of these problems. The Chinese foreign ministry does not have a mandate to improve the human rights situation within the country, but to defend the country's interests abroad. This is perfectly understandable. Other ministries within China can play a more relevant role, such as the ministry of justice, the ministry of public security, the ministry of education, or of communication, and so forth.
The third element is that we believe a whole-of-government approach will make the dialogue much more effective. Coordination between the various branches of the Canadian government will enhance Canada's message. For example, CIDA's human rights programming in China can be adapted or linked to the dialogue's subjects.
We therefore recommend that the dialogue be expanded to include various other Chinese ministries with relevant jurisdiction and that it use a whole-of-government approach in Canada.
Third, open and efficient communications are key to the success of any dialogue, from the publication of documents in the appropriate languages, to good interpretation, to sharing of information with interested parties outside of the formal dialogue process.
There are two elements in this: first, the dialogue process has been rather secretive so far, with not much information being shared with the wider community that could benefit from the content of the discussion; and second, formal civil society input or participation in the dialogue process has been inadequate—for example, the lack of follow-up with civil society in Canada and, on the Chinese side, hand-picked, pro-government NGOs as their NGO representatives.
We believe that civil society organizations with expertise on human rights issues should play a valuable role in the dialogue process. Moreover, it will open the door to direct links and collaboration between Canadian civil society and Chinese civil society organizations.
We therefore recommend that the participants in the dialogue on both sides regularly share information with their respective societies, incorporate civil society participation in the dialogue process more thoroughly, and encourage direct civil society to civil society links.
The fourth point I would like to make is that the dialogue should be situated within the wider context of raising concerns regarding the human rights situation in China. It should not be Canada's only vehicle to help improve human rights in that country. Multilateral mechanisms such as the Human Rights Council remain effective instruments in this regard.
Moreover, there are other countries engaged with China on similar human rights issues—the U.S., U.K., Australia, Norway, Sweden, Germany, and Japan, to name some of them. Canada's coordination with these countries on the dialogue, known as the Berne process, as mentioned, is important for the sake of effectiveness and should be enhanced.
We therefore recommend that the Canadian government not see the bilateral dialogue as an either/or policy and explore other complementary ways of engaging with China on human rights. Improved coordination through the Berne process should continue.
Finally, as a fifth point—it's obvious, but worth making—if the bilateral dialogue process is to be effective with some real impact, then the Government of Canada must invest more resources into it.
In conclusion, Rights and Democracy believes that human rights should be at the heart of the Canada-China relations. We do not view human rights in contrast to business opportunities, and we do not believe that the relationship between human rights and national interests is a zero sum game. In fact, what we would argue is that human rights, the rule of law, due process, and other democratic practices are good for business, for investment, trade, and development in China and elsewhere.
As it stands, the Canada-China bilateral dialogue is not serving human rights in China. This is not to say that it should be scrapped altogether, perhaps temporarily suspended, but it should be revamped and enhanced with a clear focused vision and organization.
Finally, it is a cliché to say that China is emerging as a superpower. Canada must engage with it constructively through a clear strategic partnership, and the dialogue has the potential to be one of the vehicles for that, but not in its current ineffective form.
Thank you very much.