Subcommittee on International Human Rights Committee on July 21st, 2020

[Errol P. Mendes]

If all the individuals you mentioned are involved in the detention, absolutely.

I mentioned these two in particular because the targeting of sanctions against these two would reach up to the highest level, especially if we target Chen Quanguo, because he is a member of the politburo of the party. In other words, he works with President Xi Jinping. It would send a message directly to Xi Jinping if we were to focus on that particular individual.

As I said, and I think we have to recognize this, it could trigger consequences, but I think we absolutely have to stand up, even if that happens. That's the reason why I focus on these two. The second one is the governor of Xinjiang, Shohrat Zakir. Again, he's not as high as Chen Quanguo. That's the reason why I focused on those two.

[Sameer Zuberi, Liberal, Pierrefonds—Dollard, QC]

Okay. I have a follow-up to that. The Chinese ambassador to Canada said on December 5, 2019, that if Canada were to adopt any form of sanctions of the like that we're talking about, then there would be “very firm countermeasures”. How should legislators respond to this statement by the Chinese ambassador, that there would be very firm countermeasures if we did implement that? How do you respond to that?

[Errol P. Mendes]

Well, I think that's what was in mind when Bob Rae made his comments, and I think the same thing happened with the U.K. when it basically said it would not extend Huawei to the 5G networks.

It's time the democratic countries...and this is where I'm pleading for us to start our alliance with all the democratic countries. We cannot take that type of blackmail and just cry uncle. One of the things we have to figure out is, if they do that, what are the consequences directed back at them?

One of the things we should be examining is that the thing that China treasures more than anything else is the ability of their economic sphere to carry on growing, and they rely very much on that, on co-operation with the rest of the world in terms of trade and in terms of investments. We should be starting to think about how we put the private sector and the economic and business connections together to make sure that there will be consequences back at them if they continue with this type of blackmail.

[Sameer Zuberi, Liberal, Pierrefonds—Dollard, QC]

What I hear from you very clearly is for a multilateral approach in response to that statement that was made by the Chinese ambassador, but also I hear you saying that we should use the levers over which we have control here locally, which include economic control.

We know that an Australian institute put forth 80-odd companies that are named, including Nike, Adidas and others, and those supply chains are in question. We heard about hair supplies. We heard about cotton, 84% of which is produced in the Uighur autonomous region, east Turkestan, Xinjiang. Can you elaborate a bit more?

We also heard about the security apparatus, how our technology actually could be supporting the security apparatus and monitoring within these concentration camps.

Can you speak to those two points: the supply chains and the security apparatus?

[Errol P. Mendes]

Absolutely. Now, in some respect, there's already an alliance there. Because of the recent trade agreement, the Canada-U.S.-Mexico trade agreement, since July 1 we already have now a prohibition against the importation of goods made with forced labour, either in whole or in part. Right there is something on which we should start working with the United States, and hopefully with other allies, on how we can focus on those companies that are using the forced labour in Xinjiang. That's one that we should start almost immediately.

Second, in terms of the security equipment and so on, one of the things I'm hoping we will consider is that we already have an alliance in terms of national security with the Five Eyes, dealing with national security more broadly. It's time for us to start thinking about how we expand that, dealing with national security on a broader front, including how to protect our values on the rule of law, on human rights and so on. In other words, we'd have an expanded Five Eyes and maybe include members of the European Union and other democratic countries with whom we can work together on how to stop this type of thing where China uses its acts of serious international crimes to promote its economic strategy, because ultimately, in the long run, that's what China cares most about.

[Sameer Zuberi, Liberal, Pierrefonds—Dollard, QC]

Thank you.

I'd like to get one quick question in about the responsibility to protect. In the less than one minute we have, can you comment on that, the responsibility to protect and Canada's obligation?

[Errol P. Mendes]

Absolutely. We were one of the architects of the responsibility to protect. In fact, in 2005, our ambassador actually managed to steer that whole thing through the United Nations to get the consent of the heads of state at the United Nations.

What I would say is that the responsibility to protect doesn't just mean sending in armed forces. One of the critical functions of the responsibility to protect is to prevent these types of actions, so how do we prevent it? That's exactly what we're talking about, in terms of Magnitsky sanctions, in terms of working with our allies to focus on what could penalize China to stop them from doing this thing. In other words, we should focus on the preventive actions, which actually goes toward what Ms. Kanji was talking about, the duty to prevent genocide.

[The Chair, Liberal, Peter Fonseca]

Thank you, Mr. Mendes.

We'll now move on to Monsieur Brunelle-Duceppe for seven minutes.

[Alexis Brunelle-Duceppe, Bloc, Lac-Saint-Jean, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I want to acknowledge the immense relevance and competence of our witnesses today and those we heard yesterday. I thank them all very much.

My first question is for Ms. Alexeeva.

During your testimony, I understand you made a connection between the New Silk Road project and the current situation in Xinjiang province. I think that’s quite interesting. Could you elaborate on that?

[Olga Alexeeva]

The New Silk Road is a project dear to Xi Jinping. In fact, you could say it’s his biggest project. It is directly related to the implementation of this scheme, since this road will be part of the main land routes through Xinjiang. Even today, several gas and oil pipelines from Central Asia pass through Xinjiang, and soon there will be some from Russia as well.

What worries Beijing today, therefore, is that the region is unstable and that this project may be compromised. All kinds of unrest may call into question the reliability of this project and the delivery of gas and oil to China, but also the development of gas and oil resources in Xinjiang itself. The coordination centre for the New Silk Road project should be located in Urumqi, the capital of Xinjiang. It is, therefore, a sort of showcase for the road project to the countries of Central Asia, Pakistan and Afghanistan. So, if everything goes wrong in this region, it cannot be a showcase for the project.

[Alexis Brunelle-Duceppe, Bloc, Lac-Saint-Jean, QC]

Thank you.

Officially, Xinjiang is an autonomous region, but are we talking about true autonomy?

[Olga Alexeeva]

It is an officially autonomous region, but there is no real autonomy. Yes, there is a regional government, but in fact, a lot of power belongs to the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps, which has 2.5 million demobilized Chinese soldiers. It is run directly by the Chinese State Council that controls one third of the arable land in Xinjiang and one quarter of industrial production. It is like a mini government within the government that is an instrument of policing, surveillance and economic management.

This autonomy is written on paper, which allows China to say that it does not oppress minorities and that they are autonomous, but in reality, all the key positions in the regional administration are held by the Chinese. Uighur executives are junior positions, and if Uighurs want to have a career in the civil service, they must have a perfect command of Mandarin, be members of the Communist Party and openly renounce the Muslim faith and its rites. This is very peculiar. Despite the name, it is not an autonomous region at all, and it can never be.

[Alexis Brunelle-Duceppe, Bloc, Lac-Saint-Jean, QC]

Yesterday, and again today, several witnesses told us about assimilation practises that the Chinese authorities are applying in Xinjiang.

Could you tell us more about that?

[Olga Alexeeva]

There’s a lot of them. For example, since the 1960s, the Uighurs have been forced to raise pigs. They are Muslims, but since they are citizens of China, it is said that this should not be a problem for them. When I went to Urumqi, in all the restaurants, there was pork on the menu.

As far as language is concerned, it’s the same. Yes, there are schools where you can be taught in Uighur. The problem is that, if you want to go to university afterwards, you have to do it in Chinese. If you want to have a career, whether as a university professor, civil servant or entrepreneur, you have to speak Chinese. For the Chinese authorities, therefore, integration comes through language and culture. Thus, Uighurs who want to succeed cannot do so in their mother tongue and Uighur culture, but only in Chinese. In other words, they have to accept the dominant culture.

[Alexis Brunelle-Duceppe, Bloc, Lac-Saint-Jean, QC]

All right. Thank you, Ms. Alexeeva.

Mr. Browder, could you tell us how many Chinese citizens with assets in Canada could be affected by the Magnitsky sanctions?

[William Browder]

First of all, I should say that the Magnitsky act is not dependent on having assets in Canada. The purpose of sanctioning somebody under the Magnitsky act is to name and shame those individuals. If they have assets in Canada, that's a plus. If we look at the more than 200 people who have been sanctioned in the U.S. under the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act, we see that very few of them have assets in the United States. But the moment a person gets added to the sanctions list, that person basically becomes a pariah in the world of banking and international finance and no longer can open bank accounts anywhere.

I would argue, first of all, on a previous question of how many Chinese officials should be sanctioned, a lot more than the four who have been sanctioned by the United States. Just so it's clear, there are 52 people on the U.S. Magnitsky list, and this is just one case. We're talking about a genocide affecting a million Uighurs. That doesn't happen unless there's a massive organization involved. I think there should be a massive sanctions list for Chinese officials so the names are known and these people are named and shamed. Others who are involved may then start to worry that they're going to be named and shamed and their lives will be cut off from the international world of finance.

[The Chair, Liberal, Peter Fonseca]

Now we'll move to Ms. McPherson for seven minutes.

[Heather McPherson, NDP, Edmonton Strathcona, AB]

Thank you very much, Chair.

Thank you to all of our witnesses for participating today. Yesterday, of course, we heard from witnesses. It was very hard to hear the testimony of many of them, and it was very moving. I like that today we are doing a lot of discussion about some of the propositions of what we can do moving forward.

I'm going to start by playing a little bit of a devil's advocate role, not necessarily because I don't agree with the Magnitsky act and calling out individuals, but just to clarify the impacts.

Mr. Browder, I'll pose this to you, and then perhaps to Mr. Mendes afterwards.

We know the Magnitsky act addresses individuals, and it does not in fact impact the underlying system. How can we enact widespread, systematic changes in China, not just on the Uighur issue, but in terms of Hong Kong, in terms of the Falun Gong, by targeting individuals one at a time? That's one question. The other one is this: When targeting individuals, is it possible that by increasing and creating this confrontation we will limit our opportunities to use diplomacy and persuasion?

Perhaps you could both comment on that. I think I know what you're going to say, but I'd like to hear your words, please.

[William Browder]

The beauty of the Magnitsky act is that it doesn't sanction the country. Why is that beautiful? A lot of people in China are victims of the regime as well, so you end up in a situation where instead of sanctioning the perpetrators, you're sanctioning the victims. I don't think Canada has a beef with the Chinese people; Canada and the world have a beef with the organizers of this genocide, which is the Chinese government.

Now, the other elegance of the Magnitsky act is that if anyone were to suggest right now that the world should cut off business relations and diplomatic relations with China over this issue, everyone would say, “Well, that's totally unrealistic. That's never going to happen.” China is too important a business player, too important a financial player, and too important a diplomatic player. What's so elegant about the Magnitsky act is that it allows the Canadian government, the U.S. government, the British government and other governments to create real punishments for people who are doing real abuses, and at the same time being realistic that they're not just going to cut off all trade and diplomatic relations with China. This is what I would describe as a powerful intermediate step. It doesn't in any way come to the level of genocide.

By the way, I should point out that you don't have to prove genocide to do Magnitsky. That's not necessary. You can do Magnitsky because of human rights abuses. Human rights abuses are clearly defined, whether genocide is defined or not, which I think it is. You have a situation where the people who are doing this have already met the threshold. You can do this; it's politically possible, and you don't have to do it alone. You can do it with the British, and you can do it with the United States. You can do it as a way of making clear that this is not acceptable and the situation will be escalated going forward.

[Heather McPherson, NDP, Edmonton Strathcona, AB]

Thank you.

Mr. Mendes, do you have anything to add to that?

[The Chair, Liberal, Peter Fonseca]

We have lost Mr. Mendes at the moment.

[Heather McPherson, NDP, Edmonton Strathcona, AB]

Okay. When he comes back, I have another question for him. Hopefully I'll get another opportunity for it.

Dr. Alexeeva, you spoke a little bit about the radicalization of the Uighur activists in Xinjiang. Could you speak a little further about that, please?

[Olga Alexeeva]

Yes, of course.

It is true that some of the Uighur fighters who are leading the fight against the repressive measures of the Chinese government are members of Islamic terrorist organizations. Some of these organizations are recognized as such, including by the Canadian government. I am talking about the Islamist Party of Turkestan, but there are others.

The problem is that China represents them all as fighters in this international jihadist movement. The truth is that when we look at the data, for example, the number of Uighur fighters in Guantanamo Bay or the number of Uighur fighters arrested after the dismantling of Daesh, we realize that there are tens of them, not hundreds as the Chinese government claims.

Yes, some young people are becoming more radical, which is not surprising since they have no other forums or ways of expressing themselves. They have no voice or margin for action, and this has created a favourable environment for recruitment, including by Koranic schools and international jihadist movements. However, I repeat that they are small groups, very small groups. It cannot be said that, even among the various more or less radical Uighur organizations, they are all of Islamic terrorist inspiration. Yes, there are a few, but they are a minority.

[The Chair, Liberal, Peter Fonseca]

Mr. Mendes is back.

[Heather McPherson, NDP, Edmonton Strathcona, AB]

Thank you very much.

Very quickly, I'll ask Ms. Kanji and Ms. Alexeeva.... We know of course that the Chinese government has an anti-Muslim or Islamophobic sentiment. Do you feel that an anti-Islam sentiment has made it much more difficult for other countries to intervene in this particular instance?