Good morning.
To add to what Ms. Clesca said, I would say there are essentially three problems associated with the Police nationale d'Haïti.
First, there's a personnel shortage. We currently have approximately 13,000 active officers, but, according to the calculations of various military experts, at least half are colluding with gangs. However, some special units have already been trained and subjected to a rigorous security control process. One of them is the recent UTAG, the temporary anti-gang unit, which could conduct operations jointly with international troops that would potentially intervene.
There's another essential element. Along with potential outside intervention, we have to reinforce, control and train special units and, more generally, the police as a whole. There are also preliminary steps to physical intervention that are extremely important to bear in mind. Many people who live in gang-controlled areas have told me that gang leaders are afraid of foreign armed intervention. There was a sharp decline in the number of gang wars in various areas in the weeks following Prime Minister Henry's call for intervention.
Lastly, we should set up adapted camps for displaced persons by providing the necessary infrastructure to house the thousands of additional persons who would leave those areas. You should know that there are already approximately 100,000 displaced persons in the metropolitan Port‑au‑Prince area. We should also prepare PNH quotas, which would be subjected to rigorous control, to support and, in a way, direct operations in those areas. Many people tell me that, as soon as images circulate showing that troops and support have arrived and that there's an imminent threat of physical intervention, negotiations should be started with certain leaders, who would then be prepared to negotiate.
