Subcommittee on International Human Rights Committee on March 23rd, 2026

[The Chair, Liberal, Fayçal El-Khoury]

I call this meeting to order.

Welcome to meeting number 14 of the House of Commons Subcommittee on International Human Rights of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development.

Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2) and the motion adopted by the subcommittee on Monday, January 26, 2026, the subcommittee is meeting to study the global impact of transnational repression.

Today's meeting is taking place in a hybrid format, pursuant to the Standing Orders. Members are attending in person in the room and remotely using the Zoom application.

I would like to make a few comments for the benefit of the witnesses and the members.

Please wait until I recognize you by name before speaking. For those participating by video conference, click on the microphone icon to activate your mic, and please mute yourself when you are not speaking.

For those on Zoom, at the bottom of your screen, you can select the appropriate channel for interpretation: floor, English or French. For those in the room, you can use the earpiece and select the desired channel.

As a reminder, all comments should be addressed through the chair.

I'd now like to welcome our first witnesses.

As individuals, we have Dr. Michael Doran, senior fellow and director of the Center for Peace and Security in the Middle East at the Hudson Institute, who is joining us by video conference, and Ronald J. Deibert, professor of political science and director of the Citizen Lab at the Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy at the University of Toronto.

From the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, we have Tzvi Kahn, research fellow and senior editor. From Hong Kong Watch, we have Landson Chan, advocacy officer. From Resilient Societies, we have Maiwand Rahyab, founder and chief executive officer. From the Uyghur Rights Advocacy Project, we have Mehmet Tohti, executive director.

I welcome you all.

Each of you will have five minutes to give an introduction. Please try to respect the time.

I would like to start with Dr. Michael Doran.

[Dr. Michael Doran, Senior Fellow and Director, Center for Peace and Security in the Middle East at Hudson Institute, As an Individual]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee. It's a wonderful opportunity to testify.

The Islamic Republic is conducting a sustained campaign on western soil to shape our policy choices through intimidation and coercion. The Islamic Republic today is a military dictatorship run by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, IRGC. The IRGC is a terrorist jihadi organization dedicated to advancing a revolution based on an extreme interpretation of Islam, destroying Israel, expelling the United States from the Middle East and aligning with Russia and China against the established global order.

The regime is economically incompetent. It has no credible answer to inflation, unemployment, water scarcity or the collapse of public services. A large majority of Iranians reject the regime and its jihadi ideology. The jihadi ideology no longer commands a belief even among many who once professed it. The Islamic Republic, therefore, resembles the Soviet Union in its final years. It is a society held together not by conviction, but by patronage and fear.

Despite this malaise, the IRGC continues to conceive of itself as a revolutionary vanguard. Its ranks are filled with true believers. To square the circle between its revolutionary aspirations and its limited resources, it resorts to violent suppression of domestic opposition and to the application of divide-and-rule tactics. The IRGC applies this same method to the Iranian diaspora, co-opting some members of the diaspora, killing and coercing others and sowing division among the rest.

In 2018, Iranian diplomat Assadollah Assadi used a diplomatic pouch to smuggle explosives into Europe and directed a plot to bomb an anti-regime rally in France attended by Rudy Giuliani. He was convicted in Belgium and sentenced to 20 years.

The regime has also relied heavily on criminal proxies for deniability.

In 2024, as I'm sure you're all aware, U.S. prosecutors indicted Hells Angels members in a Canadian-linked murder-for-hire plot targeting an Iranian defector.

In March 2025, the U.S. Treasury sanctioned a criminal gang and its leader, Rawa Majid, for orchestrating an attack on the Israeli embassy in Stockholm. This gang recruited and manipulated teenagers as young as 13 and 14 through encrypted apps. The Swedish prime minister publicly accused Iran of directing this plot.

Very few states on earth, perhaps none, weaponize diplomatic immunity, diplomatic pouches and foreign ministry institutions to conduct terrorism. No other state outsources coercive operations to criminal networks for deniability. The Islamic Republic attacks Iranian opposition targets, carries out revenge plots against the U.S. and against Israeli officials and engages in religious persecution of Jewish communities that have no connection to Israel.

Hostage-taking sits at the centre of Iran's coercive system. In the current crisis, Iran's prosecutor general publicly warned on March 9 that diaspora Iranians who sympathize, support or co-operate with the United States and Israel would face confiscation of their property in Iran. Diaspora figures who speak out against the regime routinely discover that their relatives in Iran have been summoned, interrogated and often detained by the regime.

In June 2025, regime agents took hostage family members of an Iran international presenter in Tehran, and they conditioned the release of those family members on her resignation. UN experts later revealed threats to 45 journalists and 315 family members across seven countries, including Canada.

Calls for appeasement of the Islamic Republic by members of the diaspora assure that their family members in Iran will remain unmolested. Advocacy for pressure on the Islamic Republic by the United States and Canada carries severe consequences.

The result is a structural bias in our discourse. Because the Iranian diaspora plays an outsized role in explaining Iran to the world, the IRGC's intimidation tactics shape what democratic governments hear, with whom they consult and what options they consider. Again—

[The Chair, Liberal, Fayçal El-Khoury]

Is it possible to wrap it up, please? Thank you.

[Dr. Michael Doran]

I'm finished now. I just wanted to say that no other state on earth behaves in this way, and we have to be clear about that fact.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The Chair, Liberal, Fayçal El-Khoury]

Thank you.

I'd like to invite Mr. Ronald Deibert to take the floor for five minutes, please.

[Dr. Ronald J. Deibert, Professor of Political Science and Director of the Citizen Lab, Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, University of Toronto, As an Individual]

Thank you, Mr. Chair and members of the committee. My name is Ron Deibert. I'm the director of the Citizen Lab at the University of Toronto. I'm pleased to provide testimony today about transnational repression, which I believe is growing in scope and scale and sophistication worldwide, including here in Canada.

For over 15 years, our investigations at the Citizen Lab have shown how governments take advantage of a poorly regulated and extremely sophisticated mercenary surveillance marketplace to hack, track and neutralize political opposition and civil society across borders.

As part of this research, we have spoken to hundreds of victims and these interviews surfaced common experiences. Victims who had suffered torture and other types of repression and who had fled from one country to another, like Canada, for their safety soon realized that they were not truly safe at all. Their sense of sanctuary was shattered when the governments they had fled from reached across borders to harass, surveil and track them.

Victims described not knowing where to turn or receiving little help when they reported their experiences to authorities. Formal complaints submitted to law enforcement typically went nowhere, with local officials either unable to determine who was responsible or, when it was clear, unable to hold foreign governments accountable.

Chilling effects are common, with people retreating from public life.

Despite some progress, which I'm happy to talk about in the Q and A, I believe transnational repression will expand dramatically in the coming months due to three factors, the first being the authoritarian turn in the United States. We have all witnessed the spectacle unfolding south of the border and as Canadians, we hear clearly the threats to our sovereignty.

Among the many things that can be said about that sad situation is its impact on the topic of this hearing. The U.S. has pivoted from combatting transnational repression to becoming a major enabler of it instead. The Trump administration has allocated $85 billion to ICE, transforming it into a secret paramilitary force equipped with the latest mercenary spyware and facial recognition tools. Its agents roam the streets without identification, outfitted in battlefield fatigues, heavily armed, routinely kidnapping people or breaking into their homes without warrants or probable cause. Trump associates and family members act as policy advisers while enriching themselves with Gulf sheikdoms that are the world's worst perpetrators of transnational repression.

This shift will normalize state repression and embolden dictators.

The second is artificial intelligence. AI will increase the scale and precision of transnational repression. It can now be used to rapidly de-anonymize social media users and generate hyper-realistic disinformation campaigns, and will be used in every aspect of the dictator's tool kit for repression.

It is concerning that the Canadian government appears broadly enthusiastic about AI while failing to deal with its harms. Our government has signed an agreement to collaborate on AI with the U.A.E., a regime with a long track record of supporting unethical surveillance. This is not an administration prepared for the coming flood of AI-enabled repression.

The third is variable geometry. Prime Minister Carney has recently outlined a foreign policy of variable geometry or values-based realism. In practice this has meant entering into partnerships with major perpetrators of transnational repression like China and Russia. The protection of citizens rests on international human rights law. This foreign policy shift signals a softening of that stance.

Here are my recommendations in light of the coming tsunami of transnational repression.

The first is to engage the grassroots. The government must engage deeply with affected diaspora communities. Victims need an easy-to-use hotline with immediate responses. We must reverse the financial cuts to immigration and refugee support systems at the very time they are needed most.

The second is to turn pledges into action. Canada has not yet put in place export controls or other restrictions against mercenary surveillance vendors. We must also hold individuals accountable with visa restrictions and sanctions.

The third is to regulate AI. The government should cease any co-operation on AI with governments known to be perpetrators of transnational repression. We must mandate independent due diligence audits of tech platforms.

Finally, the fourth is to review the safe third country agreement with the United States. The determination that the U.S. meets a “high standard” for human rights is now out of date. We must rethink this agreement alongside the risks of transnational repression emanating from south of the border.

Canada has always prided itself—

[The Chair, Liberal, Fayçal El-Khoury]

Please wrap it up. We've exceeded the time.

[Dr. Ronald J. Deibert]

We must contrast our approach more forcefully, not only with words but with deeds to match.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

[The Chair, Liberal, Fayçal El-Khoury]

Thank you.

I would like to invite Mr. Tzvi Kahn to take the floor for five minutes, please.

[Tzvi Kahn, Research Fellow and Senior Editor, Foundation for Defense of Democracies]

Mr. Chair and honourable members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify. I am pleased to offer insights about the Islamic Republic of Iran's transnational repression on behalf of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, a non-partisan research institute in Washington, D.C., where I serve as a research fellow and senior editor.

Iran and the Islamic Republic of Iran are not the same entities. Iran, not the Islamic Republic, denotes the historic, millennia-old civilization of Persia, rooted and manifested in a nation with borders. The Islamic Republic, however, is rooted in a religious ideology whose aspirations are unconstrained by geography. In fact, the Islamic Republic's radical, revolutionary Shiite creed has broader ambitions that transcend lines on a map.

In this sense, when I speak of the clerics who lead the Islamic Republic, I choose my words carefully. I describe them as the regime in Iran, not the Iranian regime. It's a crucial distinction, for there is nothing Iranian about the regime in Iran today. In fact, I would argue, to use a more apt description, that the Islamic Republic is a foreign entity occupying the nation of Iran. It is using that occupation as a launching pad to launch a campaign of transnational repression targeting dissidents outside its borders.

As the Islamic Republic's constitution states, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, or IRGC, which leads this campaign, seeks to fulfill “the ideological mission of jihad in God's way; that is, extending the sovereignty of God's law throughout the world”. Thus, since 1979 the Islamic Republic has assassinated or plotted to harm hundreds of critics across the globe, including in Iraq, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Austria and Switzerland. That's just a partial list.

In my home country of the United States, the Islamic Republic has attempted to kill Iranian American human rights activist Masih Alinejad. It has also plotted to assassinate President Trump. The regime has even sanctioned my organization, the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, and threatened violence against us. In Canada some 700 IRGC agents reportedly take residence. CSIS recently said that it thwarted numerous lethal threats against Canada originating in the Islamic Republic. Just last week, the U.S. Department of Justice unveiled court documents reportedly indicating that the regime offered a $250,000 bounty to a drug cartel to kill former Ontario politician Goldie Ghamari.

Because the Islamic Republic's ideology animates its transnational repression, and because this ideology inspires its supporters around the globe, the regime's threat to Canada extends beyond Tehran's direct agents. In recent years, and particularly since the atrocities of October 7, 2023, committed by Hamas, which is a proxy of the regime in Iran, attacks against Jews and Iranians by a range of perpetrators have significantly increased in Canada. But the views of the Islamic Republic, which helped orchestrate the October 7 atrocities, constitute an ideological heart of global Islamist sentiment, ultimately making the regime complicit in these attacks in Canada.

As such, Ottawa should recognize that because the Islamic Republic's creed constitutes its very reason for being, it will not end its transnational repression so long as the regime remains in power. Without its creed, the Islamic Republic simply would not be the Islamic Republic. That means diplomacy alone will not end the threat. For this reason, I believe Ottawa should make clear, beyond the shadow of a doubt, that it supports the U.S. and Israeli military campaign against the Islamic Republic as well as the rise of a new, democratic government in Iran. Recent calls in Ottawa for de-escalation are counterproductive, as ending the military campaign prematurely would ultimately ensure the regime's survival. In this vein, I also recommend that Ottawa take immediate action to expel all IRGC agents from Canada.

Mr. Chair, I come before this subcommittee as an American who believes in the historic special relationship between the United States and Canada. In this context, I am mindful of the tensions between Ottawa and Washington over the past year, but I believe America and Canada have a shared interest in a free Iran. The Islamic Republic threatens us both. By uniting in common cause, we advance our mutual security and shared values.

Thank you again for the opportunity to testify.

[The Chair, Liberal, Fayçal El-Khoury]

Thank you. We have a shared interest, of course, in respecting our sovereignty on both sides.

I would like to invite Mr. Landson Chan to take the floor for five minutes, please.

[Landson Chan, Advocacy Officer, Hong Kong Watch]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

My name is Landson Chan, and I'm the advocacy officer at Hong Kong Watch.

Hong Kong Watch has documented cases showing how transnational repression is affecting the Hong Kong diaspora in Canada, including harassment, intimidation and surveillance. In one case, a Hong Kong diaspora advocate received anonymous threatening messages linked to her pro-democracy advocacy. The messages included violent videos and references to her boyfriend, to her employer and to her workplace address. In another case, a co-founder of a Hong Kong diaspora community group that has assisted more than 30 Hong Kong asylum seekers received anonymous Telegram messages showing images of his home, threatening him that he would be beaten in Chinatown. We have also documented cases in which family members are targeted. One Hong Kong activist received anonymous messages referencing a private family trip, warning that her young daughter could be harmed.

Importantly, these incidents do not only affect activists. In Toronto, a community worker with no advocacy involvement received threatening emails at his workplace after attending a Hong Kong community event, forcing him to eventually leave his job. These cases show a clear and intensifying pattern of transnational repression targeting the Hong Kong diaspora.

At the same time, Hong Kong authorities have issued public bounties on 34 overseas activists, including Joe Tay, a Canadian citizen and federal electoral candidate. During the 2025 election campaign, “wanted” styled posters targeting Joe Tay were circulated across multiple social media platforms. He was informed by the RCMP that they had received credible intelligence indicating that he could be harmed. He also reported an unfamiliar vehicle outside of his home and his volunteers being followed. Additionally, in 2025, an MP publicly suggested bringing Joe Tay to the Chinese consulate to claim a bounty of approximately $170,000, and later apologized. These incidents occurred within weeks of his nomination in late March 2025, during the election period. Following the election, his relatives in Hong Kong were taken in for questioning by the Hong Kong police.

More recently, the father of Anna Kwok, another “wanted” Hong Kong democracy activist, was convicted and sentenced in Hong Kong. His case reflects how legal consequences can extend beyond individual activists to family members. These developments reflect the extraterritorial enforcement claims embedded within the national security law of the People's Republic of China.

In January 2026, the Canada-China joint leaders' statements referenced law enforcement co-operation, raising concerns about safeguards and information-sharing risks, especially given past concerns about alleged Chinese “police service stations” in Canada. The outcomes of investigations remain unclear. While Canada enacted foreign influence transparency legislation in 2024, the registry remains non-operational as of March 2026, and no prosecutions have been publicly advanced under this framework.

This issue is not solely a Hong Kong diaspora issue. It concerns Canada's sovereignty, security and democratic integrity. Transnational repression silences voices within diaspora communities and discourages civic participation.

In response, we recommend that the Government of Canada adopt a prevention, protection and punishment approach. Firstly, Canada should expedite the full implementation of the foreign influence transparency registry and establish a formal reporting mechanism for individuals experiencing transnational repression. Secondly, law enforcement and intelligence agencies should provide appropriate protection to victims and high-risk individuals facing threats linked to foreign-state actors. Lastly, Canada should pursue diplomatic measures and targeted sanctions when foreign actors are responsible for acts of transnational repression.

Canada must remain a place where individuals can speak freely without fear of intimidation by foreign governments. Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Fayçal El-Khoury]

Thank you. You respected the time well.

I would like to invite Mr. Maiwand Rahyab to take the floor for five minutes, please.

[Maiwand Rahyab, Founder and Chief Executive Officer, Resilient Societies]

Thank you very much, honourable Chair and members of the subcommittee, for the opportunity to testify before you.

My name is Maiwand Rahyab. I'm the founder and CEO of Resilient Societies, a Canadian institution supporting civil society actors and human rights defenders working under authoritarian pressure and in exile.

I came to Canada three years ago after being forced into exile following the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan. Over the past years, my organization has conducted research on the experiences of exiled activists and human rights defenders, including in Canada.

Our findings are clear. For many, crossing a border does not mean reaching safety. Repression follows them. Exiled individuals in Canada continue to face online harassment, surveillance, coercion through family members abroad and pressure through transnational networks. Over time, this shapes behaviours, narrows participation and leads to self-censorship, even within a democratic society. This is not only a matter of individual safety, it affects the integrity of Canada's civic space.

What we are seeing in Canada reflects a broader global pattern. Transnational oppression is expanding. It's becoming more networked, more adaptive and increasingly normalized. Public attention often focuses on high-profile cases—assassinations, abductions or major cyber-attacks.

The more common and often more effective forms are the quieter ones. It's the messages that go unanswered, the family members who are pressured and the warnings that cause someone to step back. That is everyday oppression. It is subtle, deniable and scalable. It silences people before they become visible enough to be protected.

At its core, transnational oppression is not only about intimidation, but it's also about erasing agency. Authoritarian regimes are not only simply trying to make exiles feel unsafe; they are trying to ensure they cannot organize, speak or influence. However, exiled activists and human rights defenders are not passive victims. They are credible voices for democracy, with networks, knowledge and lived experiences, but only if they are able to remain active.

This is a global challenge. No country can address it alone. It crosses borders, exploits legal gaps and thrives where responses are fragmented. At the same time, national leadership matters.

Canada is both a destination for those seeking refuge and a space where foreign regimes attempt to exert control. This places Canada at the front line, but also positions it to lead. In 2025, under Canada's G7 presidency, leaders recognized transnational repression as a growing threat, and committed to addressing it collectively. The question now is this: How will Canada build on that commitment?

My recommendation is that Canada adapt a “civic refuge” approach, a concept advanced by Resilient Societies in 2025. A civic refuge is not simply a country that offers safety; it's a country that protects and enables. It protects individuals from transnational oppression through stronger reporting mechanisms, coordinated responses, updated legal tools and real consequences for perpetrators. It also creates the conditions for exiled civic actors to remain active through access to networks, mentorship, mental health and digital security support, and pathways to participate in public life and policy spaces. It recognizes exiled activists not as beneficiaries of protection, but as contributors to Canadian society and global democratic resilience.

If we respond only through a security lens, we will fall short. The objective of the repression is not only to harm; it's also to silence. The most effective response is not only protection but the restoration of agency. Restoring agency is a strategic investment in democratic resilience at home and globally. Canada has the opportunity to ensure that those who defend rights and freedoms are not only safe, but they are also able to contribute and continue their work.

Thank you. I look forward to your questions.

[The Chair, Liberal, Fayçal El-Khoury]

Thank you. You respected the time limit.

Now I would like to invite Mr. Mehmet Tohti to take the floor for five minutes.

[Mehmet Tohti, Executive Director, Uyghur Rights Advocacy Project]

Thank you, Mr. Chair and all honourable members, for the opportunity to testify today.

Today we are addressing the issue of transnational repression and its impact on individuals and communities. To begin my testimony, I would like to draw attention to the case of Huseyin Celil, which reflects the growing concerns of victims in Canada.

In three days, it will be exactly 20 years since Mr. Celil, a Canadian citizen, father and UNHCR-recognized refugee, was abducted in Tashkent, Uzbekistan while visiting his wife's family. He was handed over to Chinese authorities, subjected to a closed trial and sentenced to life imprisonment. For two decades, no Canadian official, nor even his own family, has been allowed to see or speak with him once.

Mr. Celil's ordeal is not an isolated injustice. It is the blueprint for transnational repression. His disappearance has become a warning to every Uyghur Canadian that abduction, surveillance and fear can go beyond the Chinese border. This is also a direct assault on Canadian sovereignty. When Mr. Celil was taken, his citizenship was not simply ignored; it was erased. For 20 years, China has refused to recognize him as a Canadian. This is not a bureaucratic mix-up. It is a deliberate act of defiance and a denial of our sovereignty.

There has been zero consular access in those 20 years. Despite repeated efforts by previous Canadian governments, our officials have been denied the right to confirm his health, his living conditions or even his existence. The denial of Canadian citizenship and consular access has allowed China to assert that it is entitled to Canadian recognition. Additionally, China does not recognize dual citizenship, which means that if Huseyin Celil is a Canadian citizenship, as was granted him, he is not a Chinese citizen. His Canadian family has lived in limbo for 20 years. His wife has been separated from her husband, and his four children have grown up without their father. The youngest has never even met him. There have also been no phone calls, no letters and no visits. That silence is not a by-product; it is part of the punishment. Transnational oppression operates by undermining national sovereignty while instilling fear, isolating victims and deterring others from speaking out.

Mr. Celil's case represents a pattern we have since seen repeated with hostage diplomacy, intimidation of diaspora communities and surveillance of Canadian residents on Canadian soil. Transnational repression is the export of authoritarian control into democratic societies. It turns Canadian cities like Vancouver into extensions of foreign interference. It leaves citizens wondering whether their government can, in practice, protect them when it matters most.

This committee has a proud history of confronting such abuses. This committee recognized early and courageously the genocide against Uyghurs and other Turkic people on October 22, 2020. This committee urged Canada to uphold human rights even when it is diplomatically inconvenient. Today, as we mark 20 years of this injustice, this committee has another opportunity to lead.

We cannot allow this anniversary to pass with a ritual expression of concern. After 20 years, concern is not enough. The asks before the government are clear and are long overdue. However, I have prepared five direct urgent needs for action.

First is immediate and unconditional consular access.

Second is direct and high-level diplomatic intervention to confirm proof of life and permit communication.

Third is, at a minimum, one phone call between Mr. Huseyin Celil and his wife and children.

Fourth is a renewed, determined effort to secure his release and reunite his family.

Fifth is stronger protection for Uyghur Canadians facing harassment and intimidation here at home.

For 20 years, Canada has failed to change the outcome. The least we can do now is achieve the most basic act of humanity—to hear his voice again and bring him home. Huseyin Celil has been silenced for two decades. It is now our responsibility, as legislators and as Canadians, to be his voice.

At 11:00 a.m. on March 26, which is the 20th anniversary of his imprisonment, we will hold a press conference in the press gallery of this chamber. I would like to invite each member to stay for that press conference to support a call for action on behalf of Huseyin Celil.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Fayçal El-Khoury]

Thank you.

Now I would like to start the first round of questions and answers, starting with Mr. Majumdar.

You have the floor for seven minutes, please.

[Shuv Majumdar, Conservative, Calgary Heritage, AB]

Thank you, Chair.

Thank you to all who have provided powerful testimony about how transnational repression is launched by authoritarian regimes against the west and democracies around the world. Many of you have personal experiences in this, and we thank you for your courage and perseverance through it all.

Dr. Doran, maybe I'll begin with you, if that's okay. Your testimony was interesting on so many levels. I would like to pick up on the thread about how authoritarians, over the last half-century, have focused on expanding and extending their transnational repression in the west. Over the last 50 years, we've seen the rise and, perhaps even today, the fall of the Islamic Republic—at least the beginning of the end—and Beijing replace the Kremlin as the west's principal rival.

What's the common approach of these authoritarians in how they divide the west against itself?

[Dr. Michael Doran]

We're seeing, especially after October 7, a convergence in the propaganda of the Chinese, the Russians and the Iranians with respect to the American alliance system. I focus mainly on the Middle East, but I think you'll find that the use of anti-Semitism and anti-Israeli themes is enormously productive for the Chinese, Russians and the Iranians in several ways.

First of all, they depict the American alliance system as a colonialist and genocidal system. If Israel is conducting genocide in Gaza, if it's an apartheid state, well, then the United States, which is Israel's biggest supporter, is the leader of a system that is imposing apartheid. It drives a wedge between the United States and Israel, and as we see, the current administration in Washington has expanded military co-operation with Israel beyond anything that we've known in the past and regards Israel as absolutely vital to American security in the Middle East. The administration, and not just this administration, but I think the United States government in general, wants to do less militarily in the Middle East and focus the resources of the United States on East Asia. It is leaning more on allies in the region, and Israel first and foremost.

Any ideology that can drive a wedge between the United States and Israel weakens the United States, but then it also weakens us with respect to our other allies. There are protests on the streets in Europe against Israel. That weakens the cohesion of the U.S.-European alliance. The same is true even on our own campuses here in the United States. Our domestic cohesion is affected by the strength of these ideologies. What you find is that the Chinese, Russians and the Iranians are engaging in their own messaging campaigns, but they're also using web-based propaganda tools to boost the signal of homegrown anti-Semites in the United States and elsewhere.

[Shuv Majumdar, Conservative, Calgary Heritage, AB]

Thank you very much for that, Dr. Doran.

Tzvi, I only have a couple of minutes left, so let me ask you this question fairly quickly. You described, in your testimony, how the Department of Justice recently revealed four websites that were behind a $250,000 bounty, one on California thought leader Elica Le Bon and another on a former Ontario legislator, Goldie Ghamari. To what extent do you see the regime in Iran propagating these types of violent threats against dissidents among Iranian communities in the west?

[Tzvi Kahn]

We see this throughout the world, actually, particularly in Europe and the United States. When we look at the situation you just described with the U.S. Department of Justice announcement, what we see actually is an effort by the regime to target the United States and Canada at the same time. We saw two dissidents—an American and a Canadian—targeted simultaneously. It shows that the United States and Canada are a united target of this effort by the regime to target our dissidents, to target our citizens and upend our way of life.

[Shuv Majumdar, Conservative, Calgary Heritage, AB]

I appreciate that.

When you're discovering that these types of attacks are happening to dissidents who are quite powerful voices, both inside Iran and around the world, what's your counsel to governments like the one here in Ottawa and elsewhere to work together to confront how this regime is using technology and terrorism on our streets to go after people?

[Tzvi Kahn]

First and foremost, we need to recognize that when Canada speaks, the world listens. Canada has been a long-standing leader on human rights and transnational repression. We need to speak with one voice about anti-Semitism and about dissidents who have been targeted. There are numerous ways we can do that.

Canada has already done a great deal by sanctioning the IRGC, as has the United States. In this respect, we have a common bond.

I would urge Canada to continue these kinds of efforts for targeted dissidents, to sanction those who would engage in this kind of behaviour and to co-operate on law enforcement activities so that we can find these people together. That would be my initial counsel for Canada to address this problem.

[Shuv Majumdar, Conservative, Calgary Heritage, AB]

Thank you both.

I'll yield my time to the floor.

[The Chair, Liberal, Fayçal El-Khoury]

Thank you, Mr. Majumdar.

I would like to invite Mr. Zuberi to take the floor for seven minutes, please.