The United Arab Emirates is directly but mostly indirectly buying the arms that are funnelled to the Rapid Support Forces. The United Arab Emirates has a number of different interests in Sudan and in Africa in general. This is what is being worked out by the Quad. We can discuss that. It's not really about Sudan; it's an Africa strategy. That's really important and cannot be underestimated.
On the other side, the Sudanese Armed Forces is getting arms. They're not from Iran. Iran did, in the early period, give them drones, but these are from some of the most important and powerful countries you wouldn't even guess, including, for example, Turkey. In addition to that, there are other smaller countries like Serbia that you would be shocked to hear are also involved.
The Sahel region is not just about actors funnelling these kinds of arms. The biggest problem is really small arms supplies. The trade across the Sahel is what people have to focus on. What that requires is expanding the arms embargo that remarkably only applies to Darfur, as if that is the only part of the conflict.
Everyone is calling for a rigorous expansion of the arms embargo. That should be part and parcel of the Quad's relationship or discussion, because the fifth point of the Quad, if you saw the statement—and, of course, someone read it out here—is really about agreeing, at least in rhetoric, that external intervention, including arms flows, undermines the process towards peace in Sudan.
We should take that at its word and try to build on that to expand the arms embargo. There's a great deal of support in the United Nations unanimously for that, and we have to try to work it out and evade the Security Council in some way in doing that. There are precedents to do that. You don't have to wait for Russia and China to veto it. There are other ways to implement and expand the arms embargo.
John, you wanted to add—