International Trade Committee on Feb. 22nd, 2007

[The Vice-Chair, Liberal, Lui Temelkovski]

I call the meeting to order. Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), we are studying Canada's trade policy.

We have today with us Mr. Yuen Pau Woo, president and co-chief executive officer of the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada. We have Peter Clark, president of Grey, Clark, Shih and Associates, Limited; and representing the Southeast Asia-Canada Business Council, Madame Tapia, president of the Philippines-Canada Trade Council.

We will start with Mr. Woo, and then we'll continue with Mr. Clark, and Madame Tapia will finish up the session. Then we'll start with the questions.

Mr. Woo, welcome.

[Yuen Pau Woo, President and Co-Chief Executive Officer, Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada]

Thank you, Chairman.

Bonjour. Good morning, everyone.

It's my pleasure to present to the Standing Committee on International Trade on an issue we think is of great importance: the Canada-Southeast Asia relationship.

Canada's importance as a trading partner for ASEAN has declined in the past decade, as has ASEAN's importance for Canada. However, ASEAN's importance for Canada as a trading partner relative to the rest of Asia has held up, which is to say simply that we have fallen overall in our importance for Asia as a whole, but ASEAN's share within Asia has remained steady. Furthermore, the stock of Canadian investment in ASEAN in 2002 was more than a third of total Canadian investment in all of Asia, and greater than the stock of investment in Japan, Australia, China, or South Korea. All of this is to say that ASEAN, while not performing quite as we would have liked in the last decade, remains an important trade and investment partner for Canada.

The declining importance of Canada-ASEAN trade in the 1990s can in part be explained by economic integration initiatives in North America and Southeast Asia during the last decade. NAFTA, as you all know, made it easier for Canadian businesses to sell in the U.S. at a time when the American economy was going through an unprecedented expansion. Across the Pacific, East Asian and Southeast Asian economies were undergoing a process of natural integration through electronics production networks. These links were further strengthened by formal proposals to create bilateral and sub-regional free trade agreements in the aftermath of the 1997 Asian crisis. The crisis itself led to a sharp fall in real incomes of many Southeast Asian countries, depressing import demand from Canada and from the rest of the world.

That was the past, and despite the setback of the late 1990s, ASEAN is expected to return to its long-term high-growth path, which over the last 25 years has created large pockets of high- and middle-income consumers in most economies of ASEAN. We estimate the middle class, defined as those with household incomes of more than $3,000 U.S., to be as large as 100 million consumers throughout the ASEAN region.

Also, increasing westernization can be seen in the tastes and preferences of consumers through Southeast Asia. For example, many urban consumers are showing dietary changes toward more wheat-based foods.

Even taking into account the recessions of the late 1990s and of 2001, the combined GDP of ASEAN has increased from $242 billion in 1980 to something approaching $850 billion today. Increasing affluence in many ASEAN countries has led to a demand for a diverse range of products and services that Canadian companies are in a position to supply.

ASEAN is not yet a single market, but it is on its way to becoming one, and Canadian companies can begin to consider ASEAN-wide strategies in their approach to Southeast Asian markets. The ASEAN economies collectively are larger than those of India and Brazil, and almost half as large as that of China. In pure economic terms, therefore, we think Southeast Asia has as much claim as does Brazil or India to be seen as a priority emerging market for Canada.

Most trade within ASEAN is already conducted free of tariff barriers. Likewise, with growing integration between ASEAN and neighbouring regions, Canadian investors can look at the viability of using ASEAN as a base for doing business not only within the region but also with India, China, and other parts of Asia.

At the same time, rapid industrialization and economic transformation in Southeast Asia have changed the comparative advantage of ASEAN vis-à-vis Canada. A number of the more advanced ASEAN countries are major exporters of high-value-added manufactured goods, as well as of sophisticated machinery, equipment, and services. The trading relationship between Canada and ASEAN, therefore, is no longer simply that of labour-intensive, cheap exports from Southeast Asia in exchange for natural resources and high-end manufactured goods from Canada.

Another very important new factor in the Canada-ASEAN relationship is the emergence of China as a competitor, as well as a new source of demand for both ASEAN and Canada. The so-called “China price” phenomenon, or the China price problem, is affecting global production and sourcing decisions, especially in Southeast Asia but also in Canada. Canadian firms are increasingly conscious of the need to develop a China strategy in their business plans, and they may well look to ASEAN as an alternative or as a complement to whatever approach they take to deal with the China threat. Production networks in electronics, for example, which were once dominated by ASEAN, now include China. In fact, China is the leading player in electronics production networks in the world. As ASEAN economies adjust to the competitive threat of China, through a process of industrial upgrading, in electronics, in automotive parts, there will be opportunities, we think, for Canada and Canadian firms to provide input into these new supply chains.

The Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada conducts an annual investment intention survey where we ask Canadian companies about their plans for investment in Asia over the next year. Our 2006 survey shows the highest level yet of Canadian companies planning to invest in Asia. China, no surprise, was at the top of the list, with 26% of respondents saying they plan to increase their investment in that country; but Southeast Asia, ASEAN, was not far behind, at 16% of respondents. So once again, we are looking at ASEAN as a promising source of investment for Canadian companies, as borne out by our annual studies.

What about the question of a free trade agreement with ASEAN? Should Canada initiate discussions with Southeast Asia for trade-barrier-free access to both markets? We believe that at this time there's limited appetite in ASEAN to open negotiations with Canada. Whereas Canada was among the top 10 export markets of ASEAN in the early 1990s, it no longer belongs on the top 10 list. It stands to reason, therefore, that Canada and ASEAN should strengthen trade and investment relations before broaching the issue of an FTA. And yet the discriminatory nature of trading arrangements that are already in effect or under negotiation within Southeast Asia, and between Southeast Asia and other partners, have the potential to make it that much more difficult for Canada to expand its presence in the region. It is very important in this respect to bring to a rapid conclusion to the Canada–Singapore free trade agreement, which has been under negotiation since 2001, and to use this agreement as far as possible as a platform for expanding economic ties with all of Southeast Asia.

There are other initiatives that we think Canada can pursue with specific ASEAN countries, such as the expansion of air services with Singapore and investment protection and promotion agreements with Indonesia and Vietnam. Canada already has FIPAs, or foreign investment protection agreements, with Thailand and the Philippines. These kinds of agreements will enhance the attractiveness of ASEAN as a destination for foreign investment in the light of growing competition from China.

It may also be possible to engage in a dialogue with ASEAN about common standards of foreign investment regulation and protection as part of a broader discussion on investment in the APEC forum. Canada should also look at negotiating social security agreements with ASEAN partners, especially Singapore and Malaysia, both of which have mandatory pension and health care programs for workers. We already have a social security treaty with the Philippines. It has been in force since 1997. These kinds of treaties facilitate the mobility of labour, especially skilled workers, and in so doing they promote trade in services, which is an area of comparative advantage for Canada.

Let me close by saying that Canada has had long-standing good relations with Southeast Asian countries that predate the creation of ASEAN in 1967. We were among the first non-members to be designated as what they called “dialogue partners”, which has provided us with ministerial-level dialogue and access through the annual post-ministerial conferences, and through the ASEAN regional forum. As ASEAN marks its fortieth anniversary this year, Canada should send a very clear signal that it wants to be a strong economic partner for the next forty years and beyond.

Thank you very much.

[The Vice-Chair, Liberal, Lui Temelkovski]

Thank you, Mr. Woo.

We'll continue with Mr. Clark, from Grey, Clark, Shih and Associates, Limited.

[Peter Clark, President, Grey, Clark, Shih and Associates, Limited]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I consider that Canada's need to get closer to ASEAN on trade and investment, including a free trade agreement, is rather more urgent than Mr. Woo suggested. ASEAN is a very large potential market. It's becoming increasingly affluent, and the way that trade and investment work, we can no longer afford to be left behind, relying on the United States market, where the preferences that we negotiated in 1988 continue to be eroded every time the Americans negotiate a new free trade agreement of their own.

The ASEAN countries are also ideally placed for Canadian manufacturers to work and invest in. Work with ASEAN in supporting these international supply lines to industries such as automotive, computers, other high-tech industries, and white goods industries. These industries are moving to the area.

We used to have these industries. We still produce parts. We still produce some of these products. The potential for Canadian manufacturing in the area will not be achieved unless we have free trade with ASEAN, and let me explain to you why.

We work with Canadian multinationals that have plants all over the world and have to determine, from time to time, where to source components or to build parts that they've been asked to supply worldwide for a major manufacturer. The analysis that we do for them is, firstly, what the duties are that they must incorporate into their products on inputs that they must bring into Canada, as well as whether or not, if there are duties, they can be drawn back on export because of the restrictions in free trade agreements.

These agreements are very detailed. It's not unusual to have 5,000 lines to 7,000 lines in a tariff. Rules of origin differ from product to product. What we generally find when we're putting together the numbers is that because of restrictions on drawback, the foreign suppliers who are in the best position are those who have free trade access to our market, so that there's no duty on the input and nothing to lose on the transaction.

We have been slow in negotiating free trade agreements, sometimes because we try to do them in too perfect a way. Mexico, on the other hand, has negotiated with nearly forty countries successfully because the Mexican approach, recognizing that a free trade agreement only has to cover 85% of the trade, is much more pragmatic. They leave the differences aside and resolve them later through joint ministerial committees. We keep trying for perfection and trying to satisfy everybody. As a result, we haven't had an agreement for the last five years.

We've also picked a number of potential partners whose relevance and importance are highly dubious. The markets tend to be small. What we should be dealing with are bigger markets.

I would agree that Canada's importance in Southeast Asia has been declining. That's not a reason not to try to catch up.

We have to analyze our trade with the area as well. We are in a deficit of about $6 billion with ASEAN countries, but in many cases...for example, if you take Thailand, the trade runs four to one in Thailand's favour, but you have to go down to the sixteenth most important item, after passing over $1.5 billion out of $2.2 billion in exports, to find something that we compete with them in. Before that we're dealing with shellfish, we're dealing with shrimp, or we're dealing with certain electronic and high-tech equipment, while on the other side of the ledger we're providing components, inputs, and technology for production. So we really have to take a look at what we're doing and do it much more seriously.

There is the reaction that we should not be competing in this area because the industries are low-cost producers, low-wage producers. First, we've already adjusted to the United States. Second, these trade agreements provide for phase-ins. Third, in the clothing and footwear area Bangladesh already has duty-free entry, and you're not going to get anybody more low-wage than they are. So we've already taken a number of decisions that suggest we have to take a fresh look.

There are also opportunities in these markets for agricultural exports. Thailand, for example, was the only ASEAN member that did not sign on to the trade agreement with Korea, because they couldn't get adequate access to agricultural products in the Korean market.

These trade agreements can't resolve all of the horizontal issues that have to be addressed. They can't resolve agricultural subsidies, for example. But when you're dealing with agricultural subsidies, that's a much bigger impediment to the United States than to us because their subsidies are so much greater. Even in our agreement with the United States, we have reserved most of our GATT rights or WTO rights on agriculture. So you can deal with textiles, clothing, and agriculture, but the fact is that we can't stand still. We can't ignore these markets. We can't ignore the fact that they're going to have duty-free access to India and China probably faster than we can negotiate it, and we can work together to provide inputs, exchange inputs, and enhance investment. We already have two FIPAs in the area. The potential is there, and if we don't catch this train before it leaves the station, we're going to be standing in the station for a long time.

There's nothing happening in Geneva. The United States and the European Union are talking to each other. They're resolving their problems. Mr. Verheul told the committee a few days ago that they're not necessarily addressing our problems. When the United States deals country by country with a number of developing countries, they are trying to extract specific market access concessions for the United States. They're trying to do bilaterals as well in the context of the WTO.

We need to move further and faster, and we need to be more flexible. You don't have to do all of the deals the same way. Korea took an interesting approach to ASEAN with a framework that can be modified, because many of the countries within ASEAN are at very different stages of development and ability.

We need to take a fresh look at bilaterals and markets where we can benefit and expand our trade. We negotiated an agreement early with Chile, but there have been suggestions that it really didn't increase our trade much with them. But Chile has free trade agreements with 41 countries, and I think if we hadn't negotiated a free trade agreement with Chile we would have lost a lot of what we have.

Thank you.

[The Vice-Chair, Liberal, Lui Temelkovski]

Thank you, Mr. Clark.

We will continue with Madam Tapia.

[Carmelita Tapia, President, Philippines-Canada Trade Council, Southeast Asia-Canada Business Council]

I'd like to thank the committee for the opportunity to present the views of the council on the ways the Canadian government can assist in the development of better and progressive economic and cultural relations within Canada and ASEAN.

I have lived in Canada for the last 17 years. For the last 10 years, I have been actively involved in the support of trade and culture within Canada and ASEAN, being president of the Philippines-Canada Trade Council from 2004 to 2006, and being founding president of the Southeast Asia-Canada Business Council. Both councils are private sector initiatives, funded by the members themselves. The councils were formed to promote trade and investments between Canada and ASEAN.

As president of PCTC, I have organized trade missions to the Philippines, and as president of SEACBC, I have organized cultural and trade functions, like the ASEAN trade fair and business forum Gateway 2005, which went back to back with the ASEAN senior economic officials meeting organized by the Canadian government in May 2005 in Toronto. We also had an ASEAN festival of food, arts, business, and culture in September 2006, which aimed to showcase each and every ASEAN country for Canadian businesses to get to know more about ASEAN and its unique qualities, so that they can relate when doing business with each or all of the other countries.

My experience has unearthed a common theme: ASEAN is not viewed as a mainstream opportunity in the eyes of the Canadian government and commerce. This sentiment is echoed by members of ASEAN bilateral business organizations.

The ASEAN market combined represents an enormous emerging market opportunity that remains to be exploited. These countries have a population base of close to 600 million. The nations vary greatly in terms of their capital wealth, ranging from a low of a few hundred dollars for countries such as Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, to a high approaching $30,000 for Singapore and Brunei. Its approximate combined GDP is $900 billion. Total trade with Canada approximates $11 billion per year. More importantly, some of these nations are now experiencing growth spurts. Cambodia, for example, is approaching double digits at 9.8%, and Vietnam is close at 8.4%. Collectively, the ASEAN growth rate is 5.5%.

Due to rapid westernization of the ASEAN economy, opportunities in high-end commercial goods, mining, biotechnology, trade services, and medical tourism are the more notables. In the service industry, noteworthy are infrastructure development, quality of life, innovation, and good governance. In Indonesia alone, Canada's reconstruction assistance due to the tsunami of 2004, which covers traditional design and construction services, can be bundled with infrastructure services, financing, environmental consulting, and the development of renewable energy sources.

Another area of opportunity is in the field of education and training. Canadian firms should be able to partner with ASEAN educational institutions, particularly in the more advanced country of Singapore, and offer quality accepted training, technical and language training, especially to Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Indonesia, Myanmar, Brunei, and Thailand, where quality English instruction is very much needed. In the field of dental and medical tourism, Vietnam is flourishing, as does the Philippines.

During my most recent trip to Manila a month ago, I saw the great potential of trade in the medical tourism sector. The new facilities in Manila are outstanding.

Additionally, Canadian firms should be able to partner with Philippine companies that can provide backup staggered time coverage to Canadian nurse triage centres and make use of highly trained Filipino migrant nurses in the Philippines, the country being a call centre and e-services hub.

Canadian firms can engage in innovative partnership in multimedia design and production, like in the Philippines, which is proving to be very good in animation. It is noteworthy that Cambodia opened up areas of opportunity for Canada in remote sensing technology and climate change. This Canadian expertise can be offered to the rest of ASEAN. In Brunei, Malaysia, and Thailand, opportunities also exist in oil and gas services, in ICT-related services, and in financial, environmental, and two-way flow of high-end commercial goods.

For the most part, Canada will never have the same economic muscle as the other members of the G-8. Business is based on volume, and Canada pales in comparison to the business that ASEAN will do with the U.S.A. and other G-8 members or with China; however, Canada can adopt a first-to-market approach. In other words, Canada needs to position itself as an early partner in trade. To make it viable, a relationship must be built today. Australia is adopting this approach and is lobbying to become a member of ASEAN. It will be a missed opportunity if a free trade agreement cannot be negotiated with ASEAN at this point in time, since, through FTAs, trade barriers--like tariff quotas, import restrictions, food safety and quality standards--can be reduced and the flow of goods and services both ways can be easily facilitated.

Canadian businessmen are wary of dealing with business people from a different culture. This kind of fear can be allayed if ASEAN bilateral organizations can be utilized to help. Inasmuch as a cookie-cutter approach cannot be used for all 10 countries, the bilateral organizations can help in finding good and respectable ASEAN partners. They can assist Canadian-ASEAN trade commissioners to get more accurate information and can help deal with the ASEAN governments because of the “have been there” factor.

However, the Canadian government must be able to support the ASEAN bilateral logistically. Since it is the common belief that SMEs are the engine of any economy, loosen the banking regulations so financing can be made available to these SMEs; coordinate with ASEAN governments on how to facilitate visa issuances for temporary business travel; likewise, coordinate with ASEAN governments on matters of mutual recognition of professional credentials. Make the government more approachable, not just to SMEs but to big businesses and business organizations, so issues can be dealt with in a timely manner.

We are respecting government support to the Southeast Asia-Canada Business Council trade mission in October. This will be a strong business promotion technology the government can adopt through the help of ASEAN bilaterals. Most importantly, give the Southeast Asia-Canada Business Council the opportunity to meet with the Minister of Trade, the Honourable David Emerson. This meeting, which we have been requesting since the new government came into office, can be a well-meaning dialogue that can start and enhance a working relationship that would form a foundation for much better ASEAN-Canada economic relations.

On behalf of the Southeast Asia-Canada Business Council, the board, and the general membership, I want to thank you for this opportunity. Rest assured that our council will continue to focus on building a meaningful business relationship between Canada and ASEAN.

[The Vice-Chair, Liberal, Lui Temelkovski]

Thank you very much, Madam Tapia.

We will start our question and answer period of seven minutes with Mr. Maloney.

[John Maloney, Liberal, Welland, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Mr. Woo, you referenced the Singapore free trade agreement. Negotiations have gone on for some time. What do you feel are the obstacles to those negotiations? Are these the same obstacles that apply to other ASEAN countries? Is it your opinion that we should conclude that one before we move on to others?

I think Mr. Clark suggested we should maybe deal with more ASEAN countries as a group, if I didn't misinterpret. What are the main obstacles? Why aren't we moving forward in the ASEAN area a little more ferociously?

[Yuen Pau Woo]

Thank you for your question.

The Canada-Singapore free trade negotiations have been ongoing for nearly seven years now. They were only restarted early last year at the intervention of Minister Emerson. The principal stumbling block is the unwillingness on the part of the Singaporeans to give concessions to Canada that they gave to the United States.

Let me paint a bit of context here. We in fact started our negotiations with Singapore before the Americans. The Americans closed quite quickly--before us. When the Americans started talking to the Singaporeans, Singapore of course gave much more attention to negotiations with the U.S. than with us. After the closure of their agreement, we, in part because of our NAFTA relationship, understandably wanted similar concessions. The Singaporeans were unwilling to do that for reasons you can expect, and that has led to a deadlock in the negotiations.

This is a very problematic issue, not only in the case of Singapore but in any negotiation we might undertake where the Americans are having similar talks. There's an eerie and ominous parallel developing in the talks with Korea. We started talks with Korea before the Americans did. But in a very similar pattern, the Americans started negotiations and the Koreans seem to be putting much more attention on their negotiations with the Americans than on ours. This may lead to the similar complications we have seen in the Singapore arrangement.

To go back to the broader question, though, of what the Singapore impasse might mean for a broader agreement with ASEAN, I think there's no question that if we cannot close a deal with Singapore it will be very hard to start a deal with ASEAN as a whole.

Singapore, as you may know, is one of the freest economies in the world. There are virtually no tariff barriers. There are restrictions in the services sector. There are some problems around competition policy. There are issues around government procurement. But in terms of merchandise trade, there are virtually no restrictions.

If Canada cannot conclude a deal with essentially a free port, there will be questions around whether Canada can close a deal with countries that have much more substantial trade barriers. This is not to say that we shouldn't try to work towards an agreement with ASEAN as a whole, but we're sending a very negative signal in failing to conclude with Singapore after six or seven years of negotiations.

[The Vice-Chair, Liberal, Lui Temelkovski]

Mr. Clark.

[Peter Clark]

While I have seen some problems that Canada has caused in bilateral negotiations, I would have to applaud our negotiators for not accepting a second-best deal. There's no reason we should. And there's no reason we shouldn't try with ASEAN. Most of the other countries have a different economic makeup than Singapore, which is unique in many ways. It has already been established in ASEAN that not everybody has to sign a deal. Thailand excluded itself from the ASEAN agreement with Korea.

If we're not taking deals that are second-best, I think our negotiators are taking the right position.

[John Maloney, Liberal, Welland, ON]

Why does Singapore want to give preference to the U.S. and not deal with us? What is the advantage for them?

[Yuen Pau Woo]

The U.S. is a much more important economic partner. They have long-standing economic and strategic interests in Singapore. To put it bluntly, the value of a free trade agreement with the United States is manyfold more important than the value of a free trade agreement with Canada.

[John Maloney, Liberal, Welland, ON]

I can appreciate that, but I have some trouble comprehending why they would go for the big fish when the little fish are still out there and are just as tasty.

[Yuen Pau Woo]

In fact, that's not the case. Singapore has signed treaties with--I've lost count now--more than a dozen countries, including Australia and New Zealand. There's the AFTA agreement, and Singapore has been working with India and Japan. In fact, many of these deals were negotiated after Canada started talks with Singapore. So we came in early. We weren't late in the game when it came to talks with Singapore, but we simply were unable to close.

I quite agree with Mr. Clark that we shouldn't settle for a second-best solution, but you can be sure that the signal we are sending to Singapore, ASEAN, and all of Asia is that we can't close deals. If we can't close with Singapore, the negotiators on that side will be wondering if we have the appetite and political will to close with more difficult partners.

[John Maloney, Liberal, Welland, ON]

Do we have a sufficient number of trade commissioners in the ASEAN area? You're saying no, and then obviously--

[Yuen Pau Woo]

I'm sorry, do you mean trade commissioners, as opposed to negotiators?

[John Maloney, Liberal, Welland, ON]

We'll deal with trade commissioners and trade negotiators.

[Yuen Pau Woo]

The short answer is that I don't know, but I'll tell you of a very positive development I've seen in ASEAN. There's a focus in our trade commission and our diplomatic service not just on the individual economies of ASEAN but on ASEAN as a whole. We now have an officer who covers all of Southeast Asia--ASEAN specifically--working out of Singapore. That brief can be expanded, and we should dedicate more resources to looking at ASEAN qua ASEAN, rather than simply as individual markets. That will give us a window into the things that ASEAN is doing through their bilateral free trade agreements, deeper economic integration, plans for intra-industry trade, and so on. Those are essential to a different kind of positioning for Canadian companies, not just in single markets but in the region as a whole.

[The Vice-Chair, Liberal, Lui Temelkovski]

Thank you very much, Mr. Maloney.

We will now move on to....

[Diane Bourgeois, Bloc, Terrebonne—Blainville, QC]

Madame Bourgeois.

[The Vice-Chair, Liberal, Lui Temelkovski]

Madame Bourgeois.

[Diane Bourgeois, Bloc, Terrebonne—Blainville, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Good morning, lady and gentlemen. We are very pleased to see you. Your presentations were very interesting.

Mr. Woo, you said Canada and Singapore have been negotiating for seven years and that following negotiations between Singapore and the United States, Washington obtained concessions Canada was not able to get because Singaporeans were unwilling to give them to Canadians.

Can you tell us what specific concessions Singapore refused to give us?

[Yuen Pau Woo]

Thank you.

I don't have all the details on the roadblocks in the negotiations between Canada and Singapore, but I understand they have to do with areas related to investment and the provision of services. These are the principal areas where Canada has to gain in an agreement with Singapore, because the barriers to trade in goods are already removed. I understand that the Americans have received concessions from Singapore in these areas that we have not been able to get.

I should add that other issues remain unresolved that may not have to do with what the Americans got. These have to do with shipbuilding, which is a very sensitive sector in Canada. The Singaporeans are looking for further concessions in our shipbuilding industry, which our negotiators—on instruction from the political class—have been unwilling to provide.

[Diane Bourgeois, Bloc, Terrebonne—Blainville, QC]

My question is to any of the witnesses.

Canada has signed foreign investment protection agreements with a number of countries. You said earlier that people are not inclined to invest in the Asia-Pacific region. They only see China. China is indeed very attractive but it is obvious markets could be developed in the Asia-Pacific region.

Did we sign any FIPAs with these people?