International Trade Committee on May 26th, 2008

[The Chair, Conservative, Lee Richardson]

We shall resume. For the next 50 minutes we'll have representatives from Lawyers Without Borders and also from the Canadian Association of Labour Lawyers.

I'm going to introduce, first of all, Pascal Paradis and Denis L'Anglais from Lawyers without Borders, and also Mark Rowlinson. Mark is from the Canadian Association of Labour Lawyers.

We have spoken briefly and I understand, Mr. Paradis, that you will begin for five to ten minutes, followed by Mr. Rowlinson, at which point we'll go to questioning by the committee.

Mr. Paradis.

[Pascal Paradis, Director General, Lawyers Without Borders]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I am the executive director of Lawyers Without Borders, and I'm here with Denis L'Anglais, who is a member of the board of Lawyers Without Borders.

Lawyers Without Borders is an organization that contributes to the defence and promotion of human rights, the fight against impunity, the holding of fair and impartial trials and the respect of the rule of law in various countries in crisis, developing countries or what we call fragile countries.

We have been active in Colombia since 2003, when we launched at least a dozen missions that led us into virtually all of the regions of the country, from North to South and from East to West. We work alongside local and international partners such as the International Federation of Human Rights, the Colombian Lawyers' Commission or the Colectivo de abogados José Alvear Restrepo.

In December 2007, we published a report that, thanks to the translation service, has been provided to you in French and in English. This is a report that was tabled with the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers. Given that you have the report, I will not deal with it at length here today. I will simply summarize its main highlights to then deal with the issue of concern to us here.

The report contains documented evidence on recent cases showing that acts of violence and aggression against human rights defenders, especially lawyers, continue to be committed. These acts include killings and assassination attempts, threats and intimidation, with the result that these lawyers have been forced to move or go into exile.

Furthermore, the role played by lawyers is often stigmatized by government authorities. Persecution and deliberate contempt for the right to a defence are widespread among administrators in the justice system and the police, who engage in administrative and judicial actions with the intention of criminalizing the practice of law. These attacks obviously have serious consequences in terms of combating impunity, protecting and developing a social state under the rule of law and providing effective representation by a free and independent lawyer to all citizens, including local businesses and foreign companies.

Furthermore, the numerous statements made by the government and the president affirming that human rights activists are serving the cause of terrorism or are FARC members are a violation of articles 16 to 18 of the Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers adopted by the United Nations. These statements have a serious effect on the practise of law and undermine the rule of law by identifying lawyers with armed players, thus endangering their lives and their safety by exposing them to paramilitary attacks. That is our first message for today.

I know that during previous sessions you have heard comments on serious violations of the rights of trade unionists — my colleague will discuss this further today —, of Aboriginal peoples, of environmentalists and of peasant leaders. Our report shows that these violations of fundamental human rights extend to virtually all spheres of Colombian society, including the representatives of justice, namely lawyers. This is a rather simple strategy: without lawyers, there is no justice. You will understand that the rule of law is struck in its very heart. The respect by a country of the rule of law is, however, a prerequisite to the legal security required for the establishment of a healthy business or free trade environment.

This leads directly into the topic for today's discussion.

Lawyers Without Borders is a neutral and non-political organization. We therefore do not express any opinion in favour of or against free trade, neither do we have any specific or philosophical approach as to whether, in theory, free trade has or may have a positive or negative impact on the state of human rights in a specific country.

However, Lawyers Without Borders' focus is on the rule of law, justice, and human rights. We believe it is our role to denounce human rights violations committed by a state. If Canada embarks on free trade negotiations with that state, we believe it is our duty to urge caution. It is in such a context that our representation today must be taken.

A free trade agreement is a partnership. As in any other contract, it is a gesture of approval. In this case, as Colombia is in search of international legitimacy, we can be sure that signing a free trade deal with Canada will be advertised by the Colombian government as a seal of approval.

If human rights are really a priority for Canada, they must constitute a preliminary question. If Canada's undertaking in favour of human rights means something, we must first assess whether Colombia's human rights record makes it a country with which Canada wants to be associated.

Unfortunately, Colombia is no ordinary country. It is a country facing a horrendous internal armed conflict that has lasted for more than 40 years. It is still qualified as the worst human rights crisis in the hemisphere by independent international bodies, such as the United Nations and the Organization of American States. Gross human rights violations are still committed, including with the participation of public forces or the complicity of state agents.

On this, I wish to be clear. There exist in Colombia illegal groups, armed groups that we call guerilla groups, the FARC, the ELN and the PL. They commit gross human rights violations that we denounce as strongly as those that we will be discussing here today, namely the ones committed by the State or by paramilitary groups. However, given that it is the matter of the negotiation of a free trade agreement with the Colombian State that is being discussed, we will today concentrate on the State of Columbia and on the links it may have with paramilitary groups.

We know that the Committee has heard contradictory statements and statistics. Some people say that the situation is vastly improved. That is what you heard earlier. The second message that we wish to deliver to you today is that the situation remains so serious that it does not justify the ratification of a free trade agreement with Colombia without preconditions being fulfilled, specifically in the area of human rights.

What is the present situation? Once again, you have heard various conflicting statements. We are neither a political nor an activist organization. We rely upon what we know best. We are an association of lawyers and we will talk to you about facts that have been established in decisions rendered by international tribunals such as the Inter-American Court of Human Rights or by Colombian courts, after due hearing of the parties. We will talk to you today about evidence proven before the courts after due hearing of the parties.

Even if this fact is largely ignored, it is a reality that the courts have established: the Colombian government itself created the paramilitary groups, in particular with decree 3398 in 1965 and Bill 48 in 1968. These groups were then supported by the government, through the provision of military intelligence, equipment, logistical aid and authorizations to carry weapons.

It is only since 1989 that the paramilitary have been qualified under the law as delinquent groups. Despite this legislative acknowledgment, the Canadian government, again according to national and international courts, has failed in its duty to adopt effective prevention and protection measures for the civilian population faced with paramilitary action. Again despite this legislative acknowledgment, the government presided over the creation of a broad network of civilian police through decrees 356 in 1994, and 2794, in 1997, and this network is but a euphemism for a new form of paramilitary presence.

Worse yet, the direct participation of the army, police forces and public servants in serious crimes, including mass massacres has, up until very recently, been proven in law, namely before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. We could tell you about the Rochella massacre, a 2007 decision, the Ituango massacre, a 2006 decision, the Pueblo Bello massacre, a 2006 decision, and the Mapiripàn massacre, a 2005 decision. These were massacres of local peoples that the army, the police or public servants participated in or approved.

The decisions I have just listed are examples; there are others. Numerous similar cases are still before Colombia's national justice system or international courts. Violence in Colombia is continuing at a dramatic pace.

In the decisions of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights that I mentioned a few moments ago, as in other cases tried before Colombian courts, and in particular the Supreme Court of Colombia, it has been proven that there still today continue to be ties between the paramilitary and various levels of government or the State. Whereas these ties used to be but rumours or carefully guarded secrets, they are today clearly out in the open given the unprecedented wave of arrests, charges and incarcerations of members of the Congress, local politicians, public servants and law enforcement members. These arrests and charge-layings have involved the very top of the State of Colombia, of the country's administration and even President Alvaro Uribe's entourage. For example, Jorge Noguera, who is Chief of the Security Department and was Alvaro Uribe's campaign manager in 2002, is today accused of having allowed the infiltration of the Administrative Security Department — the ASD— by the paramilitary and of having supplied it with lists of trade unionists to be assassinated.

It is in this context, where the courts have recognized and confirmed the existence of direct links between the government and the paramilitary, that the demobilization process of the paramilitary has been launched. This is a process that the government flaunts to show that great strides toward peace are being made in Colombia.

I must talk to you about a legal point. Whereas the majority of the international community, much as it is the case in Canada, believes that the demobilization process is being carried out under a law that was passed in 2005, the justice and peace law, or Bill 975, as it is called, more than 90% of the paramilitary who have been demobilized these last few years were demobilized under another lesser known act, an act of 1982. This act grants complete amnesty to those who apply under it, which means that they have no prison term to serve. These people are simply put back into society without having paid for their crimes.

The highest court of the country, the Supreme Court of Colombia, has stated that this massive demobilization under Bill 782 of 2002 was done illegally and without any legal foundation. The government has ignored this decision and has even accused the judges of ideological prejudice.

In fact, the demobilization process has not even achieved the final result that its name announces, in other words demobilization. The National Reparation and Reconciliation Commission, a creation of the Colombian State — it is not an NGO, but an organization of the State of Colombia —, states, in its most recent report, that more than 60 paramilitary groups have been reorganized and relaunched, often under different names, in 23 departments of Colombia. The paramilitary therefore continue to exist, continue to control a portion of the economy and continue to control parts of the State of Colombia at the local, regional and national levels.

Generally speaking, impunity reigns in Colombia. Hundreds of members of the public forces and of the State machine have participated in gross violations of human rights that have been recognized as such by the courts. However, these people have not yet been arrested, nor accused, nor, most importantly, punished.

In short, Colombia remains a country where the rule of law, justice and the fight against impunity are lame and where the government has defaulted on its international obligations with regard to human rights, having notably been found guilty of violations of the most fundamental of human rights, the right to life of its citizens.

Before signing a free trade agreement with Colombia, Canada should undertake a serious evaluation of the human rights situation and impose conditions prior to the signing of any agreement. These conditions should at the very least include the adoption of concrete measures to remove any ties between the State and the paramilitary, to bring an end to impunity and to respect and protect citizens, lawyers, judges, public servants and civil society organizations working for the promotion and defence of human rights and the state of law.

I will leave you with our third and final message: so as to ensure that an eventual free trade agreement with Colombia produces concrete positive results in the area of human rights, it is now that Canada can have some leverage, but not once the agreement has been signed.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Conservative, Lee Richardson]

Thank you, Monsieur Paradis.

We will want to get around to questioning from all the members, so I'm going to have to ask Mr. Rowlinson to keep it shorter, if you could. We've gone over by about five minutes. Could you condense it a little, just so we have an opportunity for questions afterwards?

Thank you.

[Mark Rowlinson, Labour Lawyer, Canadian Association of Labour Lawyers]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. I will try to be brief.

My name is Mark Rowlinson. I'm here on behalf of the Canadian Association of Labour Lawyers. We're grateful for the opportunity to make these submissions on the ongoing negotiations aimed at establishing a free trade agreement between Canada and Colombia. CALL has taken a substantial interest in the situation facing workers, trade unionists, and advocates in Colombia over the last 15 or so years. We have worked with Colombian lawyers and academics to gain a better understanding of the human rights and labour rights situation in Colombia, and we are actively involved in the international campaign to bring an end to the ongoing labour and human rights abuses in Colombia.

As this committee has already heard, entering into a free trade agreement with Colombia raises important legal and ethical issues for Canada. Arguably, as you've just heard, Colombia has the worst human rights record of any country in the hemisphere. With respect to labour rights, Colombia continues to attract attention for its appalling record regarding the frequent murder of trade unionists.

Given our expertise, we are of course particularly concerned about the labour rights situation in Colombia. There are those who argue that hemispheric trade agreements that contain labour provisions or so-called labour side agreements serve to ensure that basic labour rights are respected by the countries that are bound by the agreement. However, our experience with hemispheric trade agreements has shown that the protection of labour rights in these agreements leaves much to be desired. Moreover, there continues to be a systemic failure to enforce labour rights in many parts of Central and South America, especially in Colombia.

Preferential trade agreements have not generally provided any real mechanism, in our submission, to ensure that labour rights are protected when implemented by contracting parties. Therefore, our message to this committee, in a nutshell, is that there's no basis to believe that the insertion of labour provisions into a proposed trade agreement between Canada and Colombia will have any positive effect on the labour rights climate in Colombia. As a result, in our view, Canada should not consider free trade with Colombia until there is a clear and dramatic improvement in the general human rights conditions in Colombia.

From pages 2 through 4 of our brief I give you an overview of what we describe as the current labour rights crisis in Colombia. I'm not going to go through it in detail. You have already heard from Amnesty International, from the Canadian Council of International Cooperation, and I believe from the Canadian Labour Congress on this situation.

But I want to leave you with one overarching message. I have no doubt that during your trip to Colombia you were told, and have been told repeatedly, that the situation in Colombia is improving. The situation in Colombia has improved somewhat, but I think it is important to remember a few statistics. Under the current administration, the Uribe administration, over 400 trade unionists have been assassinated. In the first four months of this year alone, 22 trade unionists were assassinated in Colombia. The reality is that the International Labour Organization continues to cite Colombia for its repeated failure to comply with ILO core labour standards and for its repeated failure to adequately protect trade unionists in Colombia. The reality is that trade union density in Colombia has been declining over the last 10 to 15 years. The last figures I have show it was under 5%, therefore making trade union density in Colombia amongst the lowest anywhere in the Americas.

So I would commend to you that at page 4 of our brief we have included an excerpt from the most recent ILO report, from the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association. It notes with great concern that members of trade unions continue to be the targets of serious acts of violence because of their union membership. It expresses the fact that while the government has made significant efforts, it nonetheless observes that the number of persons being protected has declined and considers that the protection efforts need to be strengthened by the Colombian government. It is simply not the case, with respect, that these issues have been adequately addressed by the current Colombian government. There are no significant international human rights institutions that are prepared to stand up and tell you that Colombia is meeting its international human rights obligations.

I want to talk very briefly about our experience with respect to the labour provisions in existing hemispheric trade agreements. In short, they have proven thus far to be a disappointment.

Obviously I'm speaking to you here without the benefit of a draft text of the Canada-Colombia agreement. I have reviewed the evidence given by Mr. Pierre Bouchard before this committee. It's fairly clear that Mr. Bouchard indicated that while there will be moderate improvements in existing labour provisions and trade agreements, the trade agreements that are likely to be in a Canada-Colombia agreement will be similar to those we have found in NAFTA, the Canada-Chile Free Trade Agreement, and the Canada-Costa Rica Free Trade Agreement.

Those trade provisions have a number of serious defects that I've identified at pages 5, 6, and 7 of our brief. I'll just review them with you very briefly.

First, the agreements focus on the enforcement of existing statutes rather than on raising labour standards.

Second, those agreements that do require the parties to maintain ILO core labour standards, such as the draft U.S.-Colombia agreement, only require that states not derogate from that obligation in a manner “affecting trade or investment between the parties”. This means Colombia can continue to violate ILO core labour standards provided it does so in a manner that doesn't affect trade and investment. That's a serious deficiency, in our view.

Third, the enforcement mechanisms in existing labour provisions of trade agreements are uniformly unsatisfactory. They are slow. They're cumbersome. They're not independent. They're not often transparent. They're too bureaucratic. The result—and I don't have time to go through all the stages—is that under existing trade agreements, such as NAFTA.... There have been multiple complaints filed on the labour side agreement of NAFTA and not a single one has ever reached the arbitration stage. They end in ministerial consultations and then they die; that is to say, the signatory states have shown no desire whatsoever to create enforceable labour rights under trade agreements.

Finally, the remedies that are available under the labour provisions in existing hemispheric trade agreements are also uniformly unsatisfactory. At best, they amount to fines, and if the states agree, there is the potential for the revocation of the trade agreement. Again, the remedies are largely fines. So the question this committee has to consider is, in the context of the state of Colombia, where the labour rights violations are so egregious, whether or not the kinds of remedies you see in existing trade agreements are appropriate.

To wrap up, our organization essentially has two recommendations to this committee. In our view, the Government of Canada should not enter into a trade agreement with Colombia until such time as respected international human rights institutions have determined that Colombia is in fact meeting its international labour rights and human rights obligations.

Second, given the importance of this trade agreement, both for Canada's foreign policy and for the Americas in general, the negotiation and ratification of the trade agreement must take place in a free, transparent, and democratic context, which is to say that once it is completed, the text of the trade agreement should be released to the public. The Government of Canada should engage the trade union movement, civil society organizations, and professional organizations in a full consultation process about the agreement, and then at the end of the day the agreement should be subject to ratification, if you will, by the House of Commons.

Those are very abbreviated submissions, and we look forward to your questions.

Thanks very much.

[The Chair, Conservative, Lee Richardson]

Thank you.

We're going to begin with Mr. Dhaliwal, and we're going to have to keep very tightly to seven minutes for the questions and the answers. We'll simply have to cut it off at seven minutes. If you're in the middle of an answer, we're going to cut your microphone off. I'm sorry.

Mr. Dhaliwal.

[Sukh Dhaliwal, Liberal, Newton—North Delta, BC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, and welcome to Lawyers Without Borders and the Canadian Association of Labour Lawyers.

Mr. Chairman, I hear this story here and I heard it when we were in Colombia. When we heard the vice-president and also the foreign affairs minister of the country speaking there, they admitted they have come a long way and have a long way to go. They admit there are issues, and in fact the foreign affairs minister has also indicated, when it comes to the lawyers and the justice system, that the budget for the justice system has been doubled, new trial courts have been established, and more judges have been hired. A prosecutors unit has been set up as well.

I would like to ask you this, first of all. Do you agree with the foreign affairs minister's statement, and if not, can you tell this committee how we, as Canadians, can help to address those problems of the justice system as part of the agreement?

[Pascal Paradis]

Thank you for the question.

I believe it is true that some progress has been made in Colombia regarding the justice system. For instance, a new penal procedure was implemented lately, starting in 2004, but it has also entailed a lot of problems for litigation lawyers.

That being said, there still remains a long way to go. As I was saying, there are still links between the paramilitary and some parts of the justice system that have been proven in front of tribunals. Also, there is a failure to put an end to impunity. A lot of cases still remain to be merely investigated: no investigation, no inculpation, and of course no court decision.

There are, for instance, some specific cases, which we look at, of attacks against human rights defenders. For years we have been going back to Colombia and asking, “Where is the investigation in this case?”, and the answer is always the same: we have empty files in front of us.

What can we do? Once again, the message for us is that we now have leverage because we are negotiating a free trade deal with Colombia. Within the negotiation process, it's possible for us to put in conditions to say we would like to see this and this realized.

[Sukh Dhaliwal, Liberal, Newton—North Delta, BC]

What are those conditions? Do you have some suggestions?

[Pascal Paradis]

I wouldn't say I have specific recommendations now, but of course an assessment has to be undertaken first.

Look at our report. It contains 23 specific recommendations. Those are specific recommendations we would make to this committee. Those are things we would like to see improved in Colombia.

I think my colleague has a comment.

[Denis L'Anglais, Member of the Board of Directors, Colombia Group, Lawyers Without Borders]

May I add to the point that a substantial number of judges were named in order to deal with an increasing number of cases. According to the new law, the Justice and Peace Law of 2005, they created two tribunals of exception in Barranquilla and Bogota in order to deal with the possible demobilization of the paramilitaries. In fact, they expected a certain number, a very high amount of demobilization, which wasn't the case.

So you have two tribunals of exception with a new criminal procedure. In those tribunals, the judges are not formed for that and the advocates and the lawyers are not formed to try those cases. So you have a possible justice system that could deal with this but is not really ready to do so. In fact, the problem is that they haven't tried any demobilized paramilitaries yet; they are still under investigation.

We're talking about three years now since the adoption of that law. So the justice system doesn't work in Colombia.

[Sukh Dhaliwal, Liberal, Newton—North Delta, BC]

My next question is to Mr. Rowlinson.

Canadian businesses have been to Colombia and have created opportunities and have put money into corporate social responsibilities, improving the lives of Colombians. When we asked the question about human rights situations, and even murders and whatnot using the paramilitary, there was not a single case, even with the ILO, of Canadian companies violating the human rights situation.

Free trade is going to create opportunities for Canadian investors, but at the same time it's going to improve the lives of Colombians through this corporate social responsibility that Canadian companies carry. So why do you still say that we should not get into this Canada-Colombia free trade agreement?

[Mark Rowlinson]

I'd answer your question in two ways.

First, I think when you're talking about a free trade agreement between a Canadian state and a Colombian state, the interests of the Canadian government in pursuing the trade agreement have a broader impact and a broader meaning than simply the effect it may or may not have on Canadian resource extraction companies in Colombia.

Second, you are absolutely correct. As I sit here today, I am not aware of any egregious human rights violations that have occurred in the context of Canadian companies operating in Colombia. I don't know if that is because Canadian investment in Colombia is a relatively recent phenomenon or a smaller phenomenon, but there are a litany of examples--and I'd be happy to review them with you in some detail--whereby American companies investing in Colombia have been the subject of innumerable lawsuits in the United States over the egregious murders of trade unionists in their workplaces.

I'll give you an example. I believe Penamco was a company bottling Coca-Cola in Colombia. The president of the trade union in that workplace was assassinated in the workplace by paramilitaries, and that has become the subject of extensive litigation in the United States.

I would like to think, as I'm sure you would, that Canadian companies are more committed to social responsibility than other companies. I don't know the answer to that. As I said, we don't necessarily take a position on that issue. But it's not clear to me that this particular trade agreement being considered by the Government of Canada will necessarily have much to say about corporate social responsibility.

[Sukh Dhaliwal, Liberal, Newton—North Delta, BC]

But we should be able to come up with something. If we walk out of this agreement without doing anything to address the situation in Colombia, it probably will make life worse for the Colombian people.

[The Chair, Conservative, Lee Richardson]

We move to Mr. Cardin for seven minutes.

[Serge Cardin, Bloc, Sherbrooke, QC]

Welcome.

I will be sharing my time with my colleague, Mr. André.

You stated that the paramilitary groups were for all intents and purposes created by the government. Today, even if there is talk of demobilization, approximately 90% of these groups are reconstituting themselves. People have been targeted and are under investigation. Others — including government officials — have been incarcerated. When one sees the monster that these paramilitary groups that the government created have become, one might ask if the government has not simply lost control of the situation. Have these groups become delinquents or criminals who are trying to manipulate the judicial system from the inside? Is the bench still in cahoots with these groups?

You talk about impunity and indeed it was recently reported in the news with regard to the FARC that trips to France and even money were being offered. This is yet another case of impunity. We went to Colombia. Various situations are brought to our attention and it is now up to us to sift through all of that. People say that there has been improvement. There is talk of unionization. However, in 2007, 38 people were assassinated. We are still only in May, and when you made your report, there had already been 22 victims.

In absolute numbers, there have been improvements during certain periods, but it seems that the trend is holding fast. We have talked here about the lawyers, the judges, the bench. People are unable to act if the government refuses to make a firm commitment to clean things up. I imagine that in the absence of the rule of law, even the business people who go over there will have well-founded fears.

[Guy André, Bloc, Berthier—Maskinongé, QC]

With regard to the unions, there is talk of people assassinated by companies, paramilitary groups or the State, because they are linked to drug trafficking. That is what is being said out there.

Who is largely responsible for the killings of these trade unionists? That is a fundamental issue. Of course, unionization is falling back. It had reached 15%, but it is now at only 3%. The Uribe government does not favour new union accreditations, unionization.

[Pascal Paradis]

The comments you made cover a lot of aspects. I will try to deal very briefly with a few of them. I see that the Chairman is watching the clock.

Has the government lost control over the paramilitary? It is clear that the paramilitary today have a life of their own. These are independent groups. Just like the guerilla, they are involved in drug trafficking. All of that is a war to gain control over coca shrub growing land. One must not forget that the coca shrub is at the heart of all of this.

I am not the one who is saying this, and it is not my opinion, but that of the Colombian courts. After having heard the evidence put to them, the Colombian courts, as well as the international courts, have determined that there are still very strong links between various levels of government, the State and the paramilitary. For example, government officials can supply hit lists to the paramilitary in order to get them to do their dirty work for them. Collaboration is possible.

For example, the cases before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights that I mentioned earlier led to major judgments stating that the paramilitary had arrived by helicopter, transported by the military. The armed forces transported 100 men, paramilitary fighters entered the village, massacred a few men and raped a few women and then left. During that time, the police had blocked all of the roads in order for the crimes to be committed. When we talk about collusion, that is the type of thing that happens. It can be at the regional level, at the local level, or as we now see, at the national level.

You talk about better statistics, but it is a war of numbers. And as I told you earlier, we do not march in these wars. I do however wish to invite you to be prudent with regard to official numbers. Indeed, two of the most recent national directors for statistics in Colombia, in 2005 and 2006, resigned because they deemed that they were being submitted to too much pressure to change the numbers. These people had been appointed by the government. So, yes, there certainly has been some improvement, but, as we stated earlier, the situation remains serious.

Are we fearful for those companies? Yes, certainly. It is not an easy environment. I know that it is sometimes difficult to imagine, when you have gone to Bogota, a large city where the men wear suits and ties and where women in well-tailored clothes simply go about their business. It is true that that Colombia exists, the Colombia of North Bogota. But I would challenge some of the people who spoke earlier to go with their family to the South of Bogota, one kilometre from the centre. They would witness a completely different reality, and I am not talking about the countryside or the jungle, where most human rights violations are being committed, far from the centres. Yes, companies can have certain fears. They are often forced to take part in a given process.

I will try to be brief.

Your last question pertained to who does the assassinating. I cannot answer that question. For example, last year, the American courts condemned Chiquita Brands — not just your ordinary company — to a record fine of 25 million dollars. It had been proven that the company had, for years, paid paramilitary groups to maintain security around its production site. During that time, the paramilitary, who were being paid, assassinated dozens and dozens of union leaders. That fact was proven before a court of law in the United States. Companies sometimes feel forced, either voluntarily or under threat, to participate in this type of thing. This process is occurring in Colombia.

[Denis L'Anglais]

In an interview given on August 20, 2003, the vice-president answers your question by saying that there are many enemies of unionization. Union leaders are mainly the victims of the paramilitary, but there is also the FARC and the national liberation army. There are also business people and company presidents who do not want to see their workers organized under unions and who give out contracts to have these people eliminated.

It is the vice-president himself who gave that response.

[The Chair, Conservative, Lee Richardson]

Thank you.

Mr. Julian.

[Peter Julian, NDP, Burnaby—New Westminster, BC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Mr. Paradis, would it be possible to have that report from the courts provided to our Committee?

[Pascal Paradis]

These are decisions of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and they are available. I could easily provide you with the references.

[Peter Julian, NDP, Burnaby—New Westminster, BC]

If you could sent that to our Clerk, it would be much appreciated.

I have three questions. First off, the Colombian government has an extremely slick public relations machine. We saw that at work when we were down in Bogota. Not only the government, but also representatives of the so-called independent sector that turned out later to be their former cabinet ministers or ambassadors. So there were a lot of people taking essentially the same line as the government, but upon further investigation it turns out that a lot of those people are connected with the government.

When you find out in a court case, as lawyers, that somebody has a conflict of interest, that they're testifying but they don't reveal fully their links with the government, what generally happens? And what advice can you give this committee in terms of that testimony?

Secondly, in terms of the independent, the really independent testimony we heard, it was overwhelmingly concerned about the ongoing human rights violations and labour rights violations. There is as well a lot of concern about economic violence that is occurring, the fact that there are very clearly, as you've testified, links between the government and the paramilitaries. The paramilitaries are very present. Thousands of them are still on the ground. And we heard some testimony from people who were working on the ground for the UNHCR that there is increasingly economic violence. In other words, paramilitaries working with companies, none of whom have been investigated, like Nestlé, Coca-Cola, and Chiquita.

My second question is, do you feel the government is almost rewarding criminal activity by moving ahead with a free trade agreement when there is all of this uncertainty around links between the paramilitary and the government?

My third question is this. As you may have seen from previous testimony, what the Canadian government proposes is that there be some sort of fine. When there are ongoing human rights violations, labour rights violations, you pay a fine into a solidarity fund, kind of treating it like a speeding ticket if you kill a labour activist or a human rights activist. Do you feel that is sufficient to deal with the human rights issues in Colombia, or do you feel, like I do, that it's some kind of horrific joke?

[Mark Rowlinson]

Let me answer quickly all three questions.

First, in respect of the independence of those with whom the committee met, obviously I can't necessarily comment on that. But the reason why CALL is specifically urging this committee and the Government of Canada to only embark upon this free trade agreement after independent international human rights institutions have confirmed that Colombia is living up to its human rights commitments is precisely for this reason. We don't have the time to get into a debate and a back and forth about statistics and numbers, but it is essential that only truly independent organizations can be relied upon in an environment like Colombia to provide you with reliable advice.

Your second question related to the Colombian government rewarding or encouraging criminal activity. There's no question that the Colombian government is, as I'm sure you witnessed, actively seeking to promote a free trade agenda with Canada, with the United States, and with others. The Colombian government clearly believes that the free trade agenda will ultimately serve its purposes. It's not clear to me, at least, that the Colombian government really cares, frankly, whether or not foreign investment acts in accordance with, for example, accepted corporate social responsibility norms. Frankly, I think they have another agenda.

Third, on your question related to fines, I think this is precisely the point. If this committee is going to consider a free trade agreement with the Government of Colombia, this committee needs to think about whether or not the provisions of that agreement are actually going to do something to improve the labour rights situation in Colombia, whether or not there is going to be a sufficient deterrent on the Government of Colombia to actually act and stop these labour rights violations that are taking place in Colombia. In our view, given the previous hemispheric trade agreements and given all of the information we have about the likely content of this trade agreement, the answer to those questions has to be no. There is simply not going to be any incentive on the Government of Colombia to improve the human rights and labour rights situation in Colombia.

[Denis L'Anglais]

The Justice and Peace Law offered transitional justice under which five to eight-year sentences were provided for those accepting to give testimony and to confess to the exactions committed by them. Such persons, if prosecuted under the Colombian justice system, risk 40, 50 or 60-year jail sentences. Traditional justice provides for five to six years' detention. Once these people have served their time, they are reintegrated into society and are entitled to an allowance for up to 18 months, whereas the victims and their families have not yet been able to obtain a single cent from the justice system. Does that partly answer your question?

Allow me to draw your attention to an article by Mr. Pablo Heidrich that appeared recently in the Globe and Mail. He suggests a rather interesting interpretation. In his view, Canada is interested in a free trade agreement with Colombia and if it flies, it will provide Colombia with sufficient ammunition to fight off the American government's hesitations. If the latter were to see Canada, a country that enjoys a solid international reputation in matters of human rights, accept to sign a free trade agreement, that would facilitate things. The real objective is a free trade agreement with the United States, and not with Canada. But that is just a journalist's interpretation.

[The Chair, Conservative, Lee Richardson]

Thank you very much.

Mr. Cannan.