Thank you for your question. If you don't mind, I will answer in English, because I am more comfortable doing so.
If you look at the agreement itself, the investor about whom you speak has access to chapter 8 of the agreement. It's right here, section B, “Settlement of Disputes between an Investor and the Host Party”. That is to say, this dispute resolution mechanism has teeth, it has real remedies. It makes the investor whole, and it frankly challenges--and perhaps my friend from CELA will say this--the autonomy of the state in respect of these kinds of regulations. That is to say, investors are given procedures and real enforceable rights.
In respect of labour rights, those things simply don't exist under this agreement. Yes, a complaint can be filed, but relatively early on in the process the complaint itself is removed, is taken away from the party that files the complaint, whether it's the worker or the trade union, and put entirely in the hands of the state parties to resolve.
Under the NAFTA labour side agreement, our experience has been that the states themselves thus far have had no political will to actually follow through with these complaints. And for whatever reason, it continues to be the case that states in North America and throughout the Americas simply refuse to hand over any national sovereignty in respect of labour issues, while at the same time giving unprecedented rights to investors to assert their rights.
I am here largely just to point out that disparity, that we cannot promote these trade agreements as protecting labour rights if in fact the way labour rights are treated is fundamentally substandard when compared to the way the other rights under the agreement are treated.