Thanks very much, Mr. Chair, and thank you to the committee for this opportunity to address you today on CETA.
The Council of Canadians was founded in 1985. It is Canada's largest citizens' organization, with more than 50,000 members from coast to coast to coast, and that number is growing. We work locally, nationally, and internationally to promote policies on fair trade, access to clean water, energy security, public health care, and other issues of social and economic concern to Canadians.
Since the negotiations began on this proposed Canada-EU comprehensive economic and trade agreement in 2009, we've come to understand CETA not as a simple trade deal but more broadly as an agreement on economic governance. CETA will set new legal limits on social and environmental policy in ways that compromise our democracy.
For this and other reasons, the negotiations have been criticized by a growing number of environmental, labour, indigenous, student, and farmers' groups on both sides of the Atlantic. A recent collective request from a few dozen Canadian groups—actually, it was about 60 Canadian groups—to meet with Canada's international trade minister was turned down on the grounds that we all have access to Canada's top CETA negotiator in briefings following each of the past nine rounds of negotiations.
However, during the last briefing with DFAIT in October, civil society groups on the call were told that there are no plans to produce a report summarizing their feedback, as is the norm in the European Union. The negotiators were not even taking notes on what we were saying, apparently.
So these parliamentary hearings into the CETA negotiations are truly the first opportunity for groups such as the Council of Canadians to go on record with their concerns. While we have publicly called for the negotiations to stop and for an informed public debate to decide the scope and content of any deal with the EU, I recognize that this committee is not likely to take the same position. I would like to use this opportunity instead to propose a few changes to Canada's negotiating position, which would limit the potential of CETA to undermine the public interest in a number of important areas.
The first area is transparency. I could hear from the past speakers that you've been talking about this already today.
Canadian MPs should have the same access to CETA documents as their European Union counterparts. For example, I understand that members of the EU trade committee have access to Canada's and the provinces' services and investment offers and potentially their procurement offers as well. The former were exchanged shortly before the last round of CETA negotiations in October; procurement in goods offers were exchanged in July.
Access to those offers would provide this committee with a much better sense of the scope of the proposed agreement, including where it may fall short in the protection of public services or strategic sectors, which I will get to in a moment.
I have not seen this information, but it's difficult to understand why Canada's trade committee should not be able to see the information that MEPs are studying right now in Brussels.
The second change would be related to investment protection. We strongly believe that there should be no investor state dispute resolution process in CETA, as there has been in NAFTA and in subsequent Canadian free trade agreements. This is also the preference of the EU Parliament, as expressed in a June 8 resolution on the Canada-EU trade deal. The resolution says that
Given the highly developed legal systems of Canada and the EU, a state-to-state dispute settlement mechanism and the use of local judicial remedies are the most appropriate tools to address investment disputes.
The same advice was provided to the European Commission in a sustainability impact assessment of CETA produced by a consulting firm this summer. Their report says:
There is no solid evidence to suggest that investor state dispute settlement will maximize economic benefits in CETA beyond simply serving as one form of an enforcement mechanism.
The assessment adds that policy space reductions caused by the dispute process would be enough to cast doubt on its contribution to net sustainability benefits. Investment protections in trade agreements or stand-alone bilateral treaties give foreign investors incredible rights to bypass local courts in order to sue sovereign states before international tribunals, if they feel they have not been treated fairly. The lack of clarity in what constitutes fair treatment and the lack of transparency in the proceedings have given arbitrators enormous leeway in deciding what constitutes acceptable government policy. Investors are increasingly using this kind of arbitration to challenge social, environmental, and economic regulations that affect their profitability.
I know this committee has recently studied this process because of last year's $130-million settlement with Abitibi Bowater. Since then, Ontario has been the target of an expensive $275-million NAFTA claim by a Brazilian-owned cement company that was denied approval for a quarry outside of Hamilton, Ontario. We learned this week that Philip Morris will be challenging Australia's plain packaging laws for cigarettes because it feels that these also hurt its investments, even though the policy itself was a health measure enacted democratically.
I urge the committee to consider the position of the Australian government on investor-state arbitration. The Gillard government released a new trade policy in April that discontinues Australia's former practice of negotiating investor-state dispute procedures in trade agreements. The policy states:
If Australian businesses are concerned about sovereign risk in Australian trading partner countries, they will need to make their own assessments about whether they want to commit to investing in those countries.
I would say that most companies, by and large, do this already.
In other words, the Gillard government believes it is not the job of the government to absorb the risk that these firms take when investing in foreign countries. The new trade policy also insists that foreign firms operating in Australia should be entitled to the same legal protections as domestic businesses. Investment treaties, on the other hand, discriminate against local firms by giving foreign firms more rights to challenge government policy.
If this committee is not prepared to recommend against investor-state protections in CETA, it could push for simple reforms to the process. For example, Canada and the EU could agree that firms must exhaust local legal remedies before moving to investment arbitration, as the EU Parliament's resolution suggests.
The third point I'd like to make is on public services, water in particular. The public services exception in CETA needs to be broad and precisely worded to protect the right of governments to regulate in areas such as health care, education, or water delivery and sanitation. Provincial and local governments must also insist on maximum space to maintain or create new public monopolies or universal programs in these areas, even where some degree of private sector involvement currently exists. If Canada's reservations are too narrow, unclear, or incomplete when it comes to public services, we risk inviting expensive compensatory claims by investors who feel that government regulations or social services interfere with their profits. This is also the position of the European Trade Union Confederation and the European Federation of Public Service Unions.
With regard to water, it is our understanding that the EU has taken a broad exclusion for water services and utilities, not only protecting existing public utilities from competition from the private sector but also making sure that governments at all levels have the right to re-municipalize previously privatized utilities in the future. The examples in France are good examples of where they brought services back in-house because they had been dissatisfied with the private delivery of those services.
We understand, however, that Canada has not--not yet, I should say--taken a similar reservation in its own offers to the EU. We feel this example underlines the importance of this committee having access to the Canadian and EU offers so that it can play a stronger role in assessing the risks and benefits of the proposed trade agreement.
On local procurement, I know this committee has heard several witnesses already on the issue. We certainly share the view that procurement commitments for municipalities and the so-called MUSH sector should be excluded entirely, because we don't think they're worth the sacrifice to local autonomy and policy space.
In almost all cases, local procurement happens in Canada in a completely transparent and fair way. There are no restrictions to EU firms bidding on Canadian contracts; they win quite a few. In the vast majority of cases, municipal councils make decisions based on value for money. So we're not sure there's necessarily a problem here.
The net result of CETA commitments on procurement, however, will be to prohibit local governments from adopting buy local or buy Canadian policies, or from otherwise considering the value of local sustainable development when tendering for goods, services, and construction projects over certain thresholds.
Japan's WTO challenge of the Ontario Green Energy Act, a challenge that the EU joined this fall, shows that the EU will use trade and procurement agreements and rules to undermine job creation strategies in their trading partners.
Who loses from a blanket prohibition on local hiring or content requirements? Well, mostly it will be small and medium-sized businesses as they are outbid by their considerably larger European counterparts. This is already happening in Canada in the P3 market, the public-private partnership market, according to the Canadian Construction Association in a recent article. The sustainability impact assessment that I referred to earlier also predicts much bigger gains for the European Union than for Canada in this respect, in the procurement chapter.
In conclusion, experience with past trade deals shows that there's little room in Canada, at the parliamentary level, to make amendments once a deal is signed. Clearly CETA is about much more than trade. As such, I hope this committee considers how it might take on a greater role in studying the negotiating texts as their European counterparts are doing, and in proposing amendments, where suitable, to protect public services and other important policy areas.
Thanks very much.