Thank you for raising that question because, first, we need to be clear. When we talk about dispute settlement, the standard approach is state-to-state dispute settlement. That's what we have in the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement. That's what Australia got with the United States after NAFTA. There's no ISDS in the Australia-U.S. free trade agreement, in the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, in the softwood lumber agreement. There's no ISDS at the World Trade Organization, because foreign investors, like everyone else, are expected to rely on their own state to represent their interests and to make decisions about net benefit for their country as a whole.
For example, we've had cases under NAFTA. Foreign investors have brought claims that have challenged the interpretation of NAFTA given by the governments of all three countries—the U.S., Canada, and Mexico—and the arbitrators have agreed with the foreign investors and expanded international law in a way that the States would not have allowed under their own treaty.
That gets at the sense of how profoundly ISDS changes the dynamic in ways that are highly unpredictable and highly risky. I want to make this clear because I know lots of people have views about ISDS. ISDS is not something you have to give up to get trade. We have lots of trade agreements that don't have ISDS. In the TPP itself, some countries have side letters excluding ISDS.
We could pursue the same side letters with those other countries—and just to stress this, why do I care so much about this? I have two quick points in this regard. One, Canadian investors have never won an ISDS under NAFTA. Two, hedge funds are speculating in ISDS claims against countries in London right now. It's a very new development. This is a bit scary.