That is one of the things that actually came out of the negotiations. It's been our experience in other bilateral agreements or plurilateral agreements in the auto sector to have similar mechanisms to address things when things go wrong.
As an example, we have seen this happen in Korea, where although we have a free trade agreement, they continue to put in non-tariff barriers to trade, yet there's no really quick, fast mechanism to address the reintroduction of that non-tariff barrier without holding back the tariff relief that was otherwise provided in the agreement.
In other words, this would be something that is not new to trade agreements, but it would be necessary in terms of whether you would have snapback provisions included in the agreement, whether you would have other mechanisms to address non-tariff barriers that had been introduced after the agreement's been in place, and so forth.
These mechanisms can be very useful if they are constructed properly. They are looking at that in this case, but our experience previously, in agreements such as the agreement with Korea and elsewhere, has shown they have not been very effective, at least in the way they were constructed then.